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Abstract 
 
This dissertation begins by recognizing that many texts written at the end of the twentieth 
century by individuals with autism spectrum disorders share distinctive aesthetic and poetic 
characteristics with experimental modernist texts. Despite the literary significance ascribed to 
modernism, texts in both genres are still characterized in terms of lack—when literature by 
autists is analyzed at all. They are often treated as incoherent collections of juxtaposed 
fragments, which depict isolated protagonists struggling to unify their experience. This 
perspective is reminiscent of Uta Frith’s theory of weak central coherence, which pathologizes 
autists for the way that they process information. Frith’s theory and the critical maxim that 
modernist texts are “fragmented” are both revealed as ideologies that flatten the texts and people 
that they are used to analyze. They restrict the spatial relationships possible among these texts, 
the elements of which they are composed, and their environments.  
To reorient such discussions, this dissertation takes a methodological approach grounded 
in post-structuralism and disability studies. These theoretical areas equip readers to abandon 
claims of “incoherence” and instead chart multidimensional textual maps, which reveal ever 
more lines of flight. Specifically, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of a minor 
literature provides a framework that facilitates the analysis of contact among texts by authors 
from T.S. Eliot to Tito Mukhopadhyay. Less restricted by temporal boundaries than most, this 
literary category also depends less on a writer’s identity than a minority literature. Alternatively, 
a minor literature attends to the way writers subordinate a major language’s communicative 
function to experiments with the materials of which it is composed. It is from this perspective 
that authors in a minor literature become “strangers” to language. These authors interrupt 
cognitive processing through literary style, which is a means of joining disparate elements. 
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Rather than juxtaposing texts by modernists and autists, this dissertation considers them 
adjacently as both contiguous and continuous: “always in contact…but also always repelled.” An 
adjacent reading gives readers access to new spatial relationships that reveal new possibilities in 
environments that otherwise appear arid.  
Overall, this project performs the kind of textual reorganization that Eliot lauds in “The 
Function of Criticism” (1923) by “review[ing] the past of our literature, and set[ting] the poets 
and the poems in a new order” to accommodate “new and strange objects in the foreground.” It 
reassesses the relationship between foreground and background to accommodate texts that give 
their characters and readers access to spaces in which alternative relationships are possible. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: A New Minor Literature1 
 
Why read texts written by individuals with autism spectrum disorders (ASDs) at the end 
of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first with experimental modernist 
literature from the interwar period? This is the question on which the next three chapters 
focus as they lay out convergences in the texts’ aesthetics and poetics, along with the 
affordances of this particular comparative approach for the study of both genres. Such a 
comparison is difficult, in part because both “autism” and “modernism” are constantly 
shifting terms, which is why I lay out the history of both terms at the beginning of 
chapters two and three, respectively. Before addressing the question with which this 
paragraph opens, however, it seems necessary to clarify the meaning and relevance of 
“aesthetics” to this project.  
First, it is important to distinguish “aesthetics” from both the more general “form” 
and the more specific “poetics,” as Samuel Otter does. Aesthetics focuses on the value 
accorded to particular works of art based on the sensory experience (typically, pleasure) 
that they give the audience. According to Raymond Williams, the term goes back to 
Alexander Baumgarten’s Aesthetica (1750-8) and derives from the Greek aisthesis, 
which referred primarily to “material things…things perceptible by the senses, as distinct 
from things which were immaterial or which could only be thought” (31). Though 
Immanuel Kant’s later use of “aesthetics” diverges somewhat—aesthetics is not 
necessary aligned with beauty—the focus continues to be on sensory perception. Later 
discussions of aesthetics either implicitly or explicitly draw on these texts in addition to 
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those by Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schiller, and Friedrich Schlegel, along with more 
contemporary work by Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, and Ludwig Wittgenstein.  
As Baumgarten recognized, the study of aesthetics is intensely personal because it 
is based on individual responses to works of art—the subjective as opposed to the 
objective, which is often conflated with the collective. It brings a “human dimension” to 
the interpretation of art, according to Williams (32), which Tobin Siebers defines more 
specifically: aesthetics has an “underlying corporeality,” in that “[t]he human body is 
both the subject and object of aesthetic production” (1). Such humanity is often lost in the 
assumption that humans experience sensations in essentially the same way—and if they 
do not, there is something wrong with them. Another complication in this experience is 
that “we think the pleasures we take and the judgments we make are entirely our own, but 
they also are the products of a market and a culture that we imagine to be outside of us” 
(Otter 121). Therefore, aesthetic decisions are made on the basis of a complex interplay 
between the individual and the collective, whose influence we often do not recognize we 
learn to ignore the interconnection of inside and outside: “Readers are trained to see, and 
they also discern with their own peculiar eyes” (122). As Otter recognizes, though, “[w]e 
seldom pause and reflect on our formal preferences and aesthetic commitments” (122). 
This dissertation takes the obligation to reflect seriously, proposing several reasons why 
it benefits us to think critically about aesthetics and the way that aesthetic judgments can 
limit our appreciation of particular texts and experiences.   
 “Form” is related to but different from aesthetics. It refers to the shape that a text 
takes, the way in which it is composed. Since its etymological origin, this term has 
focused on a body’s outward appearance, but it makes no direct reference to judgments 
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about this form, as aesthetics does. “Poetics” is again similar but different, referring to 
the way that language itself is used in a text, the words authors choose and the way that 
they are positioned in relation to each other. “Aesthetics” can be applied to all kinds of 
art, whereas “poetics” is restricted to language-based art. More than “form,” “poetics” 
also captures the principles behind a particular formal construction, as Aristotle’s Poetics 
does. Though people often assume “poetics” refers only to poetry, one can also study the 
poetics present in or that informs a different genre, following Aristotle.  
In the field of disability studies, Tobin Siebers coined the term “disability 
aesthetics” to refer to an analytical approach that “embraces beauty that seems by 
traditional standards to be broken,” though he goes further, arguing that “it is not less 
beautiful, but more so, as a result” (3). His text locates two ways in which attention 
drawn to disability can productively influence aesthetic histories: scholars can work “(1) 
to establish disability as a critical framework that questions the presuppositions 
underlying definitions of aesthetic production and appreciation; (2) to elaborate disability 
as an aesthetic value in itself worthy of future development” (3). This dissertation could 
be located under the auspices of disability aesthetics as it examines “how specific artists 
and works force us to reconsider fundamental aesthetic assumptions” (3); yet, it takes a 
slightly different approach. Rather than embracing broken beauty and “irregularity” (32), 
it questions the frame within which the work is judged to be broken. It also focuses on a 
much more limited context than Siebers does, looking at work by autists rather than work 
by artists with a variety of different kinds of disabilities.  
This dissertation primarily uses the word “autist” as a form of person-first 
language to capture the experiences of individuals with ASDs. By avoiding the person 
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with insert-diagnosis-here model, it recognizes that ASDs are not illnesses; they reflect 
neurological differences that structure the way a person experiences herself and her 
environment. This word originally comes from Asperger’s “‘Autistic Psychopathy’ in 
Childhood” (1944), and it has an already established connection to artistry via Oliver 
Sacks’s essay “The Autist Artist” (1970). Though it could be argued to elide differences 
between autists, this word does so in favor of recognizing their shared pattern of neural 
connectivity. Otherwise, the dissertation changes the labels it uses to capture the ways 
people define themselves and the ways autism has changed as a diagnosis over time. As a 
result, references to this diagnosis will be fluid, based on the context. For example, 
Bleuler’s term “autism” is used when referring it as a symptom of schizophrenia or as 
discussed by Kanner/Asperger and “autism spectrum disorder” (ASD) when referring to 
the diagnosis defined by the American Psychiatric Association in the DSM-IV and 5.  
 As part of their recent article “Surface Reading: An Introduction,” Stephen Best 
and Sharon Marcus propose an attitude of “willed, sustained proximity to the text” (10), 
and the ethics of this approach overlaps with both disability studies and also the attitude 
that the texts under analysis in this dissertation seek to foster. With this approach, a 
reader commits to remaining near a body that (s)he may have difficulty reading and may, 
therefore, not understand. Such an approach fosters an intimate relationship based not on 
the assumption of transparency, but instead on the inverse, obscurity—the recognition 
that bodies are difficult to read but that it is worth the effort to allow them to reveal 
themselves in their own time. Such contact likely contradicts the reader’s preferences, but 
that is the point; it is given on the other’s terms. It becomes what Marjorie Levinson calls 
“learned submission” (qtd. in Best and Marcus 14). Such a position rejects the belief that 
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the critic is “heroic,” as Fredric Jameson proposes in The Political Unconscious, and also 
that the best way to approach a text is as an adversary (Best and Marcus 5, 16). As Best 
and Marcus suggest in line with Levinson, “in submitting to the artwork, we come to 
share its freedom, by experiencing ‘the deep challenge that the artwork poses to ideology, 
or to the flattening, routinizing, absorptive effects associated with ideological regimes” 
(Levinson qtd. in 14, emphasis added). This dissertation shows two such flattening 
ideologies at work: Uta Frith’s theory of weak central coherence and the critical maxim 
that modernist texts are “fragmented.”  
Yet, surface as a concept relies on some amount of flattening, and while Best and 
Marcus argue that “depth is not to be found outside the text or beneath its surface (as its 
context, horizon, unconscious, or history); rather, depth is continuous with surface” (11, 
emphasis added), bodies do present particular surfaces to the world. At least, we perceive 
these bodies as presenting such surfaces. Best and Marcus define “surface” as “what is 
evident, perceptible, apprehensible in texts; what is neither hidden nor hiding; what, in 
the geometrical sense, has length and breadth but no thickness, and therefore covers no 
depth. A surface is what insists on being looked at rather than what we must train 
ourselves to see through” (9). Often lost in such discussion is the fact that what appears 
as surface changes depending on the context. Different people perceive surfaces in 
different ways at different moments in time. While the label “surface reading” makes 
these authors appear to work within the limitations of old terms—which lose their critical 
purchase through the authors’ analysis—it does recognize that in challenging flatting 
ideologies, texts and people are not free from them, as Levinson seems to suggest. 
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  Chapter two begins by examining the interpretive frames that figures like Frith 
have applied to what can be called autists’ “cognitive style.” Originally from psychology, 
this term denotes “a recurring pattern of perceptual and intellectual activity” (Lavenda 
and Schultz), and all humans—not just autists—are unconsciously predisposed to adopt 
some patterns over others as a result of the way in which neurons are distributed in their 
brains. Cognitive style is one factor that influences the surfaces that are accessible to 
different people. The second chapter describes the cognitive style to which autists are 
predisposed in more detail, as represented by both scientists and autists themselves. It 
recognizes that autists, like most other people, can employ different cognitive styles if 
they have sufficient time and motivation, but also that scientific and medical practitioners 
have established the existence of neurotypically developing individuals, whose cognitive 
style is treated as the norm.  
Instead of embracing existing terminology, this dissertation describes so-called 
neurotypicals as “neuro-normates.” This word is an adaptation of Rosemarie Garland-
Thomson’s influential term “normate” for this context. Garland-Thomson’s term 
designates a social category that is constructed through its opposition to and separation 
from “an array of deviant others” (8). She recognizes that though it has great social power 
and cultural capital, very few people can occupy this position indefinitely, if ever. Adding 
the prefix neuro- restricts the position to situations in which people gain power through 
their comparative cognitive and neurological normalcy. In autism studies, the word 
“neurotypical” typically occupies this position; however, scientific research uses it with 
the assumption that most people are neurotypical. With “neuro-normate,” I seek to 
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acknowledge a priori the constructed nature of this position and to question its 
representative power.  
The cognitive style common among autists contributes to their production of 
images—and, I would argue, texts—that exhibit weak central coherence when judged 
from a perspective biased toward neuro-normates.2 It predisposes them to prioritize 
stimuli that neuro-normates consider trivial and represent their environments with images 
that look disjointed to neuro-normates. Framed more constructively, autists distribute 
salience differently than others, assigning importance to different objects or stimuli and 
creating innovative connections among them. Autists may seem to lack the control that 
neuro-normates have over their cognitive processing, but analysis of literature written by 
authors like Tito Rajarshi Mukhopadhyay and Craig Romkema demonstrates that the 
associations autists locate and the gestalts they produce are just as valuable as those with 
which neuro-normates are more familiar. Based on its treatment of Frith’s theory as flat, 
this dissertation takes an approach adopted by many modernists: it recognizes that “the 
prevalent mode of discourse is by no means necessarily the legitimate one” (Eysteinsson 
59) and seeks to provoke a state of discursive crisis that will be familiar to readers of 
modernist literature.  
This approach also encourages the integration of current terminology from the 
cognitive sciences into modernist studies via its prior application to texts written by 
autists. Part of the basis for this is that criticism of modernist and autistic aesthetics has 
used similar spatial language. Modernism is often distinguished by its attention to 
cognition, as manifested in the development of techniques like stream of consciousness. 
A term like “cognitive style”3 provides a sharper tool for integrating analysis of a text’s 
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form and the attention that it pays to cognition than the more ambiguous “subjectivity” or 
“mind.” “Cognitive style” is closely related to other terms, including “intellectual style,” 
“mode of thinking,” and “mind style,”4 which are prevalent in psychological literature. 
By avoiding any references to mind or intelligence, “cognitive style” positions us more 
squarely in the domain of information processing, which helps to avoid the dangers of 
Cartesian dualism. Additionally, psychologists like Frith use the term “cognitive style” in 
their discussions of cognitive processing among autists, which makes it seem even more 
appropriate.  
Now, to the heart of the argument. This dissertation approaches a specific group 
of texts written by autists and modernists as a new minor literature, a category theorized 
by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, on the basis of the aesthetic and poetic strategies 
that the texts share. According to Deleuze and Guattari, “minor literature” is a category 
that is less restricted by the temporal boundaries used to delineate many literary 
movements and more focused on texts’ aesthetic and poetic properties. The work of 
Franz Kafka serves as their primary example as they argue that Kafka revitalized the 
major language in which he wrote (German) by suspending our perception of it as, first 
and foremost, a medium for communication. The ways in which a minor literature draws 
readerly attention away from content toward expression differ, depending on the 
situation; however, the goal is to “make it [language] vibrate with a new intensity” using 
its material properties (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 19). The result de-stabilizes 
linguistic hierarchies so that “[t]here is no longer any proper sense or figurative sense, but 
only a distribution of states” (22). This unconventional distribution rejects two-
dimensional scales in favor of a more scatted, multidimensional plot. Overall, these 
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authors propose a change in the way we think about the spatial relationships between 
objects, which include both literary texts and the linguistic elements of which they are 
composed.  
Specifically, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that these objects should be treated as 
both “continuous” and “contiguous” (51), two properties that may seem mutually 
exclusive. The first term implies that the relationship among them is “uninterrupted,” yet 
the latter indicates that space is preserved between them. This paradoxical relationship 
positions the texts in a minor literature as similar in their proximity but still different in 
the fact that though they may touch, they do not overlap. They are “always in 
contact…but also always repelled,” which is why Deleuze and Guattari repeatedly 
describe texts in this minor literature as “adjacent” to one another (61). They are 
separated by “barriers” that are only passable under certain conditions (51). This model 
introduces more freedom to move, which gives readers access to new relationships 
besides simple comparison or juxtaposition—a common term in modernist studies. The 
same spatial approach can be applied to elements within a single text, an objective 
pursued in the next two chapters.    
This theory becomes even more relevant to the texts at hand because Deleuze and 
Guattari’s proposal overlaps with the way that author Tito Mukhopadhyay characterizes 
his style of sensory processing: as “tangential” to the cognitive style common among 
neuro-normates (How 203). In fact, Mukhopadhyay’s word choice is a synonym for 
“contiguous,” and reading his interpretation with Deleuze and Guattari’s theory yields a 
more productive way to think about the relation between neuro-normative and autistic 
cognitive styles (see Figure 1 for a spatial illustration). Though they foreground different 
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information, these styles do make contact, albeit in a restricted way. Therefore, the 
environments perceived by neuro-normates and autists, while different, are not wholly 
dissimilar. With this perceptive word choice, Mukhopadhyay demonstrates both self- and 
interpersonal awareness. It also acknowledges the negative connotation that neuro-
normates, who constitute the social majority, ascribe to autists’ cognitive style. The latter 
are often seen as digressing from the subject at hand, deviating from the appropriate path 
or going off on a tangent. To a neuro-normate, those on this tangent may look like they 
are engaging in “an active turning-away from the external world,” with “the world” here 
constituted by neuro-normative perceptions (Bleuler, “Autistic” 399). As chapter two 
demonstrates, autists are invested in their environments, though their interests may 
diverge from neuro-normates’.  
Different authors and texts use different methods, but the goal of a minor 
literature is to yield “a new expressivity, a new flexibility, a new intensity” in language. 
By drawing the reader’s attention to the language itself—as opposed to the story that it is 
used to tell—this approach disrupts the hierarchy of senses that has developed in the 
word “sense” itself (meaning over sensation). Based on this re-distribution, a minor 
literature fosters an appreciation for marginalized senses both in terms of meanings 
considered secondary and sensations ignored as unimportant. This redistribution of 
significance also makes it so that “there is no longer any difference between being 
outside and inside” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 8). Such a post-Cartesian approach 
proves fruitful for questioning the introversion traditionally attributed to both modernism 
and autism. Deleuze and Guattari take this argument further, aligning outside/inside with 
form/content as they propose that “pure content that can no longer be separated from its 
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expression” (Bensmaïa xvii). This approach is similar to the Caledonian anti-syzygy 
embraced by Hugh MacDiarmid; however, it removes all distinctions between binaries, 
while MacDiarmid still appears committed to maintaining some.  
One consequence of this approach is that it strains the habits that readers have 
developed for processing information—particularly, the written word. Some readers may 
perceive this result as negative because it derails the speed with which neuro-normates 
process information and thereby requires them to expend more conscious effort. For, 
these readers process information so quickly that they do not even realize they have done 
it.5 The goal is to disrupt their processing habits so that they cannot privilege content as 
they normally would. As Réda Bensmaïa acknowledges in her foreword, in some cases 
readers may “slow down to a crawl,” while others may “send [them] into a panic, 
unfolding at a vertiginous pace” (xvi). The feeling of vertigo figures importantly in this 
minor literature, though it is most obviously an issue in MacDiarmid’s “Café Scene” (see 
chapter three). While vertigo refers generally to “a disordered state of mind,” it can more 
specifically capture a sensation of “whirling” connected to the vibrations with which a 
minor literature imbues language (OED). Either the person herself may feel as if she is 
spinning or as if the environment itself is. As a result, these texts can leave their readers 
dizzy and disoriented, not sure which way is up or down. This effect has the potential to 
shock readers out of their established processing habits, eliminating the boundaries 
between such spatial categories as outside and inside. In the process, they may also 
recognize that “unity” is a “nebulous” pursuit (8) as one cannot be sure how far the 
burrow extends or in which directions.  
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Deleuze and Guattari’s approach has distinct similarities to Viktor Shklovsky’s 
theory of enstrangement from Theory of Prose (1917). He proposes that art impels its 
audience to see rather than merely recognize an object. Like perception, reading can 
become a habitual practice according to which “objects are grasped spatially, in the blink 
of an eye. We do not see them, we merely recognize them by their primary 
characteristics. The object passes before us, as if it were prepackaged” (5). Here 
Shklovsky locates a problem with the way many people treat literary texts and their 
environments, more generally. Specifically, he emphasizes how disrupting automatic 
processing can enable readers to distribute their attention differently, to consciously 
develop new habits. Authors can use specific literary techniques to “make perception 
long and ‘laborious’” so that the reader “dwells on the text” (6, 12)—an effect that 
sounds like the “crawl” described by Bensmaïa. Such texts have the potential to “return 
sensation to our limbs” (6), to awaken us from numbness and make us aware of 
properties that had formerly seemed unimportant; yet, to reach this state, we must leave 
behind accepted ways of reading and encounter the texts as Best and Marcus suggest. 
As an aesthetic philosophy, the desire to shock has been denigrated within the 
context of modernist studies as épatism, particularly when directed toward the 
bourgeoisie.6 Though it can “disfigure” a text, according to some critics (Freeman 612), 
épatism can also startle a person out of complacency, which explains why it is often 
directed at a particular kind of person, one likely to adopt this attitude. By enstranging 
her from the familiar, a text may cause this reader reject her old beliefs and behave 
differently. From this perspective, texts in this minor literature take up the tradition of 
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Decadence by producing literature whose language and linguistic combinations may 
shock their readers.  
In the case of the texts discussed in this dissertation, literary critics and scientists 
alike have become too familiar with established language and particular theoretical 
frames. These two genres—literature by autists and modernists—may seem very 
different, but both have been interpreted based on a model that values coherence and 
unity without recognizing the variables that contribute to such judgments. For 
modernism, such criticism has embraced the description of texts like The Waste Land as 
collections of juxtaposed fragments. Similarly, autism research and popular culture 
continue to embrace Frith’s theory of weak central coherence, which positions autists as 
only interested in particular parts or details of an environment, not the wholes that 
interest neuro-normates. Both treats the individuals they study as isolated from the people 
around them, struggling to unify their experiences, which are subordinated to neuro-
normative ones. 
One factor that contributes to their ability to shock is that all of these texts were 
written by authors who can be characterized as “stranger[s] within [their] own language” 
(Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 26). This position reflects their distance from the 
conventions that typically restrict people’s language usage; yet they are not true 
strangers, or aliens, because the authors still assign them ownership of this language. 
Writers may consciously choose to occupy this position, as H.D. and T.S. Eliot did when 
they left the U.S. to live and work in Britain. Others may be thrust into it by an accident 
of birth. For instance, Hugh MacDiarmid (Scottish) no doubt had a different relation to 
the English language and British literature than Edward Marsh (English). Similarly, 
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autists are often treated as and feel like strangers because their brains develop at a 
different rate and according to a different neural pattern than neuro-normates’. Based on 
this development, their exposure to and engagements with language and the environments 
in which they live differ from those available to others.  
Such distance from linguistic convention can be detrimental, in that these authors 
never quite fit in, but they also gain access to many aspects of their environment (which 
includes their language) that natives do not see. Deleuze and Guattari value similar de-
valued social positions, such as the “nomad,” “immigrant,” and “gypsy” (19), because of 
the possibilities accessible from such positions based on their freedom to travel. One such 
benefit is the ability to foster new communities. As Deleuze and Guattari note, “if the 
writer is in the margins or completely outside his or her fragile community, this situation 
allows the writer all the more the possibility to express another possible community and 
to forge the means for another consciousness and another sensibility” (17). Based on their 
word choice here, participating in such communities would allow an individual to alter 
her own cognitive style and the aesthetic sense to which it contributes. It also creates the 
potential for other people to follow her lead, to develop a community that appreciates 
different ways of processing and interpreting familiar information. This dissertation sees 
the authors whose work is analyzed here as occupying just such a position.  
Critical analyses that participate in the body of scholarship that Levinson has 
called New Formalism often ignore the biography of the authors whose work they study 
because such an approach is better aligned with historicism. Yet, Bensmaïa recognizes 
that Deleuze and Guattari embrace Montaigne’s phrase “Mon livre et moi ne faisons 
qu’un” (trans. My book and I, we are one). She writes further: 
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It is impossible to separate the tool from the artisan…they are together as machine 
and rhizome, a network, an entangled knot of movements and stops, of impulsions 
and immobilizations to experience interminably. They constitute what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a body without organs, to experience and deploy, according to 
the procedures, methods that are always new. (xii) 
While such information is not necessary for appreciating the texts analyzed in this 
dissertation, it provides another layer that ultimately contributes to a more fruitful and 
far-reaching analysis.   
One reason why the modernists profiled in this chapter may have been so 
receptive to ideas and techniques that others affiliate with cognitive disorder is that all 
received psychological treatment or experienced “breakdowns.” Eliot spent time working 
with Dr. Roger Vittoz in Switzerland; H.D. lived in Vienna while meeting with Sigmund 
Freud and later in life with Erich Heydt; though Hugh MacDiarmid did not seek 
treatment, he was known to have experienced a breakdown while living on the island of 
Whalsay in 1935. These experiences distance them from neuro-normates, providing one 
explanation why all represent characters that have extreme difficulty making sense of the 
objects and events that they confront. Despite these experiences, the authors were able to 
pass as neuro-normates for most of their lives. None carried an open diagnosis, as the 
autists whose work is analyzed in the first chapter do, which means that they wrote from 
biological positions privileged by their societies. This explains at least in part why their 
experimental activities were not written off as mad or as evidence of cognitive disorder. 
Though they had to justify the importance of their work, many had champions (i.e., Ezra 
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Pound), and their mental competence would only have been questioned by the most 
extreme reviewers. 
This background may also explain why these authors take more risks pushing 
their texts toward incoherence than writers like Tito Mukhopadhyay and Craig 
Romkema. Like most other autists, both are constantly having to justify their experiences 
and ability to craft literature. For instance, Mukhopadhyay began writing through 
facilitated communication, a controversial practice where a caregiver mediates an 
individual’s use of language. He had to prove that his mother was not simply 
manipulating him and his linguistic output, which is one reason he began writing on his 
own. It seems to be up to autists to prove the authenticity of the literature they have 
written, that it has not been manipulated by editors or other intermediaries in an attempt 
to make it more accessible. Additionally, these texts have been treated until recently only 
as phenomenological reports. As Francesca Happé has reported, “so little has style—the 
way these accounts are written—been considered of importance that most researchers 
have simply paraphrased their subject’s reminiscences” (222). Paraphrased expressions 
lose the texture of the original language, an argument furthered by Cleanth Brooks, and 
drawing attention to the aesthetic and poetic experiments that these authors conduct can 
unsettle this practice. 
 Though such historical connections prove important for understanding authors’ 
commitments to particular approaches, they can also limit readers’ appreciation of the 
textual aesthetics. As chapter three discusses, the supposedly fragmented form of 
modernist texts has often been assessed as a reflection of the chaos of modern 
environments. Though this reading is logical, it operates on the logic of a major literature, 
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which “goes from content to expression” such that “one must find, discover, or see the 
form of expression that goes with it” (Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka 28). On the contrary, 
“a minor, or revolutionary, literature begins by expressing itself and doesn’t 
conceptualize until afterward” (28). Treating the aesthetic of modernist texts only as a 
reflection of modern environments positions it as a major literature. This approach 
suggests that writers begin with such a goal in mind and thus limits the texts’ potential to 
incite change and foster new communities. Though Deleuze and Guattari recognize that 
“[e]xpression must break forms, encourage ruptures,” they link such ruptures with “new 
sproutings” in a classic deconstructive move: “When a form is broken, one must 
reconstruct the content that will necessarily be part of a rupture in the order of things” 
(28). The language that literary critics have used to characterize modernist aesthetics does 
not recognize the “sproutings” that exist in these texts.  
 The resistance that this dissertation displays to interpreting these texts in terms of 
their failure or lack comes not just from disability studies but also from Deleuze and 
Guattari. In their theory of a minor literature, Bensmaïa recognizes that these authors read 
Kafka differently than Benjamin in that they “refrain[n] from…referring to any idea of 
failure, of shortcoming, or of ‘immemorial’ guilt” (xiii). Though they see him “constantly 
running the risk of annihilation, destruction, or regression…Kafka’s work is 
characterized by the total absence of negation” (xiii). Despite the risk he runs, there is 
always a “sprouting,” a new structure that appears. Deleuze and Guattari purposefully 
take this approach because otherwise they would be allowing the return of “a logical, 
even ontological, priority of content over form” (xvii). In this way, Bensmaïa sees their 
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reading as a turning point in interpretations of Kafka’s work, and it can provide another 
such turning point in the analysis of literature by autists and other modernists.  
 Deleuze and Guattari’s theory aligns with disability studies in another way as it 
promotes an ethics that would be similarly embraced by those in this field. In 
approaching a minor literature—which they, not surprisingly, classify as a rhizome—they 
argue that “no entrance is more privileged even if it seems an impasse” (3). An “impasse” 
is typically ignored or discounted because it appears to lead nowhere; it represents a place 
of resistance that does not allow the actor to reach his goal easily. The texts studied 
here—particularly, in chapter three—represent many such impasses. In giving space to 
these places that seem to thwart progress, they do not seek to privilege them but to upset 
the preference that has developed for representing places that promote easy neuro-
normative passage. This approach places the cognitive styles common among autists and 
neuro-normates on more equal footing, ignoring the socially assigned hierarchy that has 
been used to devalue autistic experiences. Readers are left to experiment for themselves, 
try new cognitive styles and find their own paths through this “burrow” (3).   
Though a minor literature focuses more on aesthetics than the conditions of a 
text’s production, it may still seem ahistorical to read autists writing in the last 20 years 
in conjunction with canonical modernist writers publishing 100 years ago. Yet, the 
histories of these two literary genres are intertwined. To start, the initial development of 
autism as a diagnosis—from 1908 through 19437—overlaps significantly with the period 
most associated with modernism in Great Britain and Ireland, and the next two chapters 
open with summaries of this history, as mentioned earlier. This temporal convergence 
raises questions regarding how much modernist authors knew about autism and autistic 
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ways of thinking. As a diagnosis, autism began as a symptom of schizophrenia, which 
was well known to canonical authors like Eliot and James Joyce. These authors 
distinguished modernism as a disruption of social and literary traditions inherited from 
the Victorian and Edwardian periods; texts written by such autists as Temple Grandin 
also unsettle such practices developed by and for the benefit of neurotypicals, who 
constitute the dominant social group at this time. While medical professionals like 
Bleuler and Leo Kanner were pathologizing the cognitive style associated with autism, 
experimental artists like Joyce, MacDiarmid, and Virginia Woolf were featuring similar 
ways of processing information in literary form.8 Through their common attention to 
cognition and form of literary organization, texts in this new minor literature embody a 
cognitive style that today’s medical and scientific community associates with autism and, 
thus, regards as abnormal. Though autists exhibit a bias toward this cognitive style, which 
results from their non-normative and shared forms of neural organization, all of these 
authors deliberately choose to make this way of processing information visible in their 
texts.  
Consequently, not all texts written by autists are part of this minor literature, and 
the same applies to texts labeled “modernist.” Though Daniel Tammet is on the spectrum, 
his Embracing the Wide Sky: A Tour Across the Horizons of the Mind (2009) treats 
language more as a communicative rather than an experimental tool, as do D.H. 
Lawrence’s Women in Love (1920) and Ford Madox Ford’s Parade’s End (1924-28), 
among many others. In these texts, language functions more as a vehicle by which a story 
is conveyed than as a tool to disturb conventional ways of thinking and consuming 
literary texts. They represent a major literature, in Deleuze and Guattari’s terms.  
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Additionally, not all of the texts included in this category fulfill the characteristics 
of a minor literature—and this minor literature, in particular—in the same way. Texts 
written by autists maintain more of a balance between language’s function as a medium 
for communication and as an artistic tool. A variety of explanations for this difference 
exist, some already mentioned, though others include the influence of editors and the 
contemporary publishing market.9 As a result, texts written by autists in this minor 
literature exhibit more concern about using the written form to connect with their readers 
than texts written by individuals off the spectrum; they strain literary conventions while 
still striving to remain comprehensible. In contrast, texts written by authors like 
MacDiarmid and Eliot more openly disregard the literary conventions assumed to 
facilitate communication and comprehension by taking this literary style to a more radical 
aesthetic and poetic place. 
The two chapters that follow apply these methodological approaches to first, 
literature by autists, and second, literature by modernists. Autist Donna Williams extols 
art’s power to “take[s] you inside the experience rather than speaking to you from outside 
it” (10). Too often, scientific research and literary criticism speak from outside, imposing 
interpretations whose power persists long after they have been factually left behind. As 
art, the literary texts analyzed in this project unsettle what Williams refers to as “the 
learned system of interpretations” upon which most people depend in their everyday life 
(11). This system has become insufficient to meet the needs expressed in these texts; 
thus, it must be shifted, altered, and a revised system developed. This dissertation aim to 
further such a goal by pushing open a door that is already ajar to accommodate less 
normative ways of experiencing life and language.  
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1 This chapter includes material that was previous published in Barber-Stetson, “Slow 
Processing.” 
2 In fact, more recent studies have found that among autists this overconnectivity remains 
consistent in distinct areas—particularly in what is called the “salience network,” which 
includes the anterior insular cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex. For more 
information, see Uddin et al.  
3 For more information about cognitive styles, see Zhang, Sternberg, and Rayner.  
4 In the context of modernist studies, David Herman briefly uses the term “mind-style” in 
his chapter from The Emergence of Mind, and he relies on a definition for this term that is 
similar to the way in which I use “cognitive style.” 
5 I treat this issue more directly in the article “Slow Processing: A New Minor Literature 
by Autists and Modernists.”  
6 In D.H. Lawrence’s The Plumed Serpent (1926), the narrator describes artists “whose 
very pigments seemed to exist only to épater le bourgeois” (52). 
7 These dates mark the publication of Eugen Bleuler’s “Die prognose der dementia 
praecox–schizophreniegruppe” and Leo Kanner’s “Autistic Disturbances of Affective 
Contact.”  
8 Some literary scholars have already proposed connections between autism and 
modernism, and I build on their research when making this argument. See Quayson; 
McDonagh; Glastonbury; and Valente.    
9 For example, Temple Grandin had a co-writer for Emergence: Labeled Autistic (1986). 
Conversely, in Aquamarine Blue 5: Personal Stories of College Students with Autism 
(2002), Dawn Prince-Hughes expressly clarifies that she has “chosen not to edit the 
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essays” (xii), and when writing her own essay, she “let [her]self just write as [she] 
thought” (xiii).  For more background about this conflict, see Happé.  
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Chapter 2 
The Flat Theory of Weak Central Coherence1 
 
As a discipline, disability studies questions the hegemony of dominant structures 
and ideologies, a methodology it shares with queer theory and Marxism. It also draws 
attention to the kinds of literal and figurative movement afforded by the social and 
political conditions of a specific context. These conditions undergird our classification of 
particular bodies and movements as disabled or normal, and disability studies promotes 
rigorous analysis of them.  
 This chapter focuses on the forms of cognitive movement exhibited by autists like 
Tito Mukhopadhyay, Wendy Lawson, Temple Grandin, and Craig Romkema engage. 
Two major forces influence the directions in which their cognitive energies flow: their 
embodied situations—specifically, the way in which the neurons in their brains are 
organized—and interactions with neuro-normates and the environments in which they 
live. Particular kinds of cognitive and linguistic movement are visible in the literary texts 
that these authors have written, specifically, How Can I Talk if My Lips Don’t Move?: 
Inside My Autistic Mind (2008), Life Behind Glass: A Personal Account of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder (1998), Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism (2006), and 
Embracing the Sky: Poems Beyond Disability (2002). Cognition shapes these texts, and it 
appears most prominently in the content of passages where the authors describe the ways 
that they process information and also the literary techniques that they use in so doing.  
Though this spectrum of disorders contains extreme diversity, psychologists and 
neuroscientists have repeatedly drawn a connection among autists based on the proposal 
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that they share a common way of processing information: a “cognitive style.” As 
mentioned in the introduction, this term denotes “a recurring pattern of perceptual and 
intellectual activity” (Schultz and Lavenda 121). Though human brains are largely 
similar, even small structural differences can significantly affect the style toward which a 
person tends and her engagement with an environment. As this chapter notes, cognitive 
neuroscientists like Eric Courchesne have recognized that many neurons in autists’ brains 
are organized according to a different logic than they are in neurotypicals’ brains. Based 
on these structures, all humans—not just autists—are unconsciously predisposed to apply 
some patterns instead of others. Neurotypicals also have a processing bias toward a 
particular cognitive style, one that scientific research has established as “normal”—
hence, my use of “neuro-normate” throughout this chapter.  
Despite this difference, both autists and neuro-normates can employ different 
cognitive styles if they have sufficient time and motivation. In fact, we commonly alter 
our cognitive style based on both the task and its context. As research in neuroplasticity 
has demonstrated, our brains change over time in response to our behavior and 
environment. Consequently, cognition should not be treated as an immutable object or 
property; it is a flexible behavior affected by but not wholly dependent on the structure of 
an individual’s brain.  
 Developmental psychologist Uta Frith’s theory of “weak central coherence” has 
dominated cultural and scientific discussions about how individuals with ASDs process 
information for almost thirty years. The current DSM does not refer to Frith or her theory, 
though the previous version (DSM-IV-TR) did include “persistent preoccupation with 
parts of objects” as a descriptor for “restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of 
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behavior” (“299.0 Autistic Disorder”).2 Despite its recent fall from grace, parents like 
Matei Calinescu and Michael Blastland continue to fall back on this theory in their 
memoirs to understand the way their children experience their shared environments. 
However, recent research has turned toward discussions of the interaction between global 
and local processing, which differs from Frith’s approach. This development is positive 
because it openly rejects a deficit-based assessment of this cognitive style and allows for 
more depth. It reveals the flatness of Frith’s theory but leaves unquestioned the hierarchy 
according to which a so-called “top-down” style of processing is privileged as normal.  
As a critical term, “flat” has generated attention through its recent use to describe 
a style of web design. In his short article “Flat Theory,” David M. Berry cites several 
companies that take this approach, presenting information without the stylistic features 
that make it appear three-dimensional, such as “bevels, reflections, drop shadows, and 
gradients” (Amber Turner qtd. in Berry). With this design, companies like Apple also 
implement what Berry calls “a laminate structure” of interfaces, thus taking a different 
stylistic approach to introduce depth. This arrangement “enables meaning to be conveyed 
through the organization of the Z-axis” as users navigate the different “layers,” according 
to Berry. Such multidimensional language differs from that which Frith uses, but it will 
be familiar to many readers of contemporary materialist theories.  
Berry’s analysis is closely related to such philosophical approaches as Manuel De 
Landa’s flat ontology and the broader but closely related object-oriented ontology—both 
of which have their foundation in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. All of these theories 
grapple with questions of scale while advocating that we revise the ways that we 
understand relationships between objects and people. Timothy Morton provides one such 
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example in his discussion of what he calls hyperobjects: “things that are massively 
distributed in time and space relative to humans,” such as global warming (Hyperobjects 
1). Because of the scope of their distribution, “one only sees pieces of a hyperobject at 
any one moment” (4). Despite their seeming absence, hyperobjects are “viscous,” to use 
Morton’s term. Though we may not sense their presence, “there is no outside” (5); these 
objects are always sticking to us, going inside of us, floating in the air around us. When 
locating hyperobjects, Morton suggests we look for their effects on other objects and/or 
beings through attention to “a space that consists of interrelationships between aesthetic 
properties of objects” (Hyperobjects 1). Literature presents just such a space.  
Thinking about such figures may require a different cognitive style, for 
“Hyperobjects don’t just burn a hole in the world; they burn a hole in your mind” 
(Morton, The Ecological Thought 130). Considering perception from the ecological 
perspective presented by Morton draws attention to the dynamic relationships inherent in 
the development of what autist Mukhopadhyay calls a “mental map” (How Can I Talk 
191). Neuro-normates and autists both unconsciously develop such images to make their 
experiences within particular environments more predictable. These maps come to 
constitute their realities; however, many people do not recognize that these maps, like 
others, are representations. They believe that mental maps passively embody a stable set 
of characteristics that are accessible to and recognized by all people. They do not realize 
that these maps can be composed differently as a result of the cognitive style(s) used at a 
given time and the stimuli on which these styles motivate us to focus. As it exposes the 
assumptions that obscure such conditions, this analysis aims to incite “a being-quake” 
similar to that which Morton proposes (19). 
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In light of such theoretical approaches, I suggest that Frith’s theory is flat. Like a 
flat table, its uniform appearance allows it to function well. Her concept of “weak central 
coherence” is easily accessible to people from diverse educational backgrounds and 
applicable to a wide variety of situations. It reduces a complex situation to a single plane 
of perception, and over the years, Frith has remained largely consistent in applying this 
interpretive frame to research data. Yet, like a flat color, it lacks the luster—or, depth—
that would give it life. Frith has based her theory on the one-dimensional concept of field 
dependence developed by psychologist Herman A. Witkin, and the language she uses 
reflects the spatial limits of this approach. She restricts her theorization of autists’ 
cognitive style to a single plane, thus reducing the complexity of real-time cognition. 
Based on such limitations, this analysis looks to add depth to Frith’s theory of weak 
central coherence in both a literal and figurative sense.  
 Frith’s theory falls particularly flat when read with literature written by 
individuals with ASDs. These artists whose work is analyzed here come from different 
cultural, educational, and national backgrounds—Mukhopadhyay grew up in India but 
now lives in the United States; Lawson grew up in the UK but has also lived in Australia; 
and both Grandin and Romkema were born and raised in the United States. Their texts 
reveal the flatness of Frith’s theory in their organization, the descriptions of cognitive 
processing they provide, and the language that they use to structure these descriptions.   
In his attempt to “radically displac[e] the human” (17), Morton shares a similar 
motivation with the authors whose work is examined here. These texts displace the 
neuro-normate from the center of scientific analyses and cultural knowledge about autism 
spectrum disorders. They loose his hold on concepts like coherence by exposing the false 
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distance that exists between this individual and his environment. As Morton recognizes, 
“‘distance’ is only a psychic and ideological construct designed to protect me from the 
nearness of things” (27). Whether executed actively or unconsciously, distance functions 
as “a defense mechanism” (27). Frith’s theory reflects a normative desire achieve a 
feeling of security and certainty by believing both one’s environment and one’s body to 
be a coherent entities. What Morton describes is a fundamental méconnaissance in the 
tradition of Jacques Lacan’s “Mirror Stage,” one that allows our bodies and environments 
to appear singular and coherent when they are, in fact, multiple, full of potential conflict. 
Before turning to Frith’s theory, it is important to chart the development of autism 
as a diagnostic category to understand how her theory came to be and to what dominant 
ideas autist authors are responding.   
 
The History of Autism 
Any attempt to describe autism as a single coherent category will fail. As the first 
chapter tried to show, it is a slippery term that Donna Williams describes as “less 
substantial, less dependable, than a piece of lint” (9). It escapes attempts to define it first 
because as it is a pervasive developmental disorder that manifests itself differently from 
individual to individual. Additionally, the diagnosis itself has changed significantly, as 
this section will chart, from its inception in 1911 until the present day.  
 
Eugen Bleuler 
Though Swiss psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler first used the term “autism” in a 1908 
article, he provided the first significant description of it in Dementia Praecox or the 
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Group of Schizophrenias (1911). For Bleuler, autism named a symptom of schizophrenia 
that described an abnormal way of thinking: “the inclination to divorce oneself from 
reality” (Bleuler, Dementia 14, 63). Individuals who display autistic thinking turn inward, 
hence the term’s etymological origination in the Greek autos, or “self.” In this sense, 
autism has much in common with psychoanalytic discussions of egotism and Carl Jung’s 
concept of introversion, which David Rapaport points out in his translation of Bleuler’s 
“Autistic Thinking” (399n2).3 To create their personal realities, individuals demonstrate 
what might be called selective perception. They ignore those aspects of reality that 
contradict their fantasy, seeking only pleasurable sensations and avoiding external stimuli 
that cause pain. By “withdraw[ing] actively from the reality which angers and irritates” 
(419), they create a reality that functions for them alone. Because he sees these 
individuals as allow their emotions to dominate rationality, Bleuler reads autism as an 
affective disorder, a disorder of motivation. This pathologization of the decision to turn 
away from collective reality and specific(ly negative) manifestations of affect persist as 
tropes in later research.  
Bleuler’s autism relies on the questionable belief that there is one true reality, 
which grounds the neuro-normate’s existence. According to this model, any individual 
who does not conform to this reality must receive some punishment for making a deviant 
choice. Such an individual has rejected the social world in which he has a moral 
obligation to participate.  Bleuler is certainly correct when he argues that those exhibiting 
autism will have “conflicts with the environment” (423), but he makes a distinction 
between autism and autistic ways of thinking that distinguishes who should be punished 
or pathologized. Individuals who display autism both think autistically and withdraw 
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from reality. Bleuler argues that it is possible to display autistic thinking but not 
withdraw from reality. Individuals displaying what he calls “normal autism” retain the 
ability to distinguish their fantasy from the common reality. Because they accede to this 
reality while still participating in an inner world, their fantasies are comprehensible to 
others. Even though he sees autistic thinking as a symptom of schizophrenia, neuro-
normates can also use it. This perspective is similar to today’s assignation of a particular 
cognitive style to autists, with the recognition that neuro-normates can also use it; they 
are just biased toward a different style.      
Though Bleuler claims autistic thinking is illogical, it may simply operate 
according to a logic that is unfamiliar and at times inaccessible to neuro-normates. 
Rapaport describes Bleuler’s autism “fundamentally as a certain form of organization of 
percepts, ideas, drives, and behaviors in general” (“Autistic” 411), and it is this 
organizational structure that interests me. Autistic thinking disturbs and “loosen[s]” 
associations (421), which Bleuler sees as having “endless possibilities” (432). Unlike 
latent content, autistic thinking can be either unconscious or conscious, and it can be 
employed to greater or lesser degrees. Bleuler even recognizes that “[a] small degree of 
autism carried into life may be of some use” because “[a] degree of one-sidedness is 
indispensable in pursuing certain goals” (435).  He cites poets as individuals who display 
autistic thinking as they relive experiences and release the attendant emotions while 
writing (417).  
 Despite its early publication Bleuler’s 1911 text was not translated into English 
until 1950, so it remained largely unknown to the U.S. populace.4 Many people remark 
on the coincidence that Leo Kanner and Hans Asperger, a psychiatrist in Baltimore and a 
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pediatrician in Vienna, would both write significant studies of autism in the 1940s.5 
Looking back to Bleuler’s work, however, shows that autism, as a term, had already been 
circulating for thirty years.  
 
Leo Kanner 
The translation of Bleuler’s 1911 text was preceded by Leo Kanner’s influential 
1943 article “Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact.” Kanner published this article 
while he was the Director of Child Psychiatry at the Johns Hopkins Hospital and is 
credited with naming this disorder “early infantile autism” (Frith, Autism and Asperger 
Syndrome 5). In it, Kanner uses case studies of eleven children to propose a general 
profile of autism, which he claims to be the first researcher to describe (242). In fact, 
Kanner’s descriptions of autistic behavior are strikingly similar to contemporary 
diagnostic criteria, indicating that despite its publication nearly seventy years ago, this 
article still has critical purchase in autism studies generally and psychology more 
specifically. Kanner’s work differs from Bleuler’s in his attempt to separate autism 
nosologically from schizophrenia rather than to subsume it as a schizophrenic symptom.  
For him, autism differs from schizophrenia in two ways.  First, autistic children manifest 
symptoms from birth, whereas schizophrenic children display a period of typical 
development followed by a change in behavior (248).6 These symptoms include the 
social deficits on which Kanner focuses. According to Kanner, we should not talk about 
autists withdrawing from social life because they never participated in it to begin with 
(242). Second, schizophrenics gradually move away from the world as their symptoms 
appear, while autists move towards it by participating in neuro-normative society more 
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over time (249). Thus, Kanner describes autists according to a model of progression and 
schizophrenics according to a model of regression. 
Kanner locates lack of social interest as the most important characteristics of this 
disorder.  Autistic children are born “with [an] innate inability to form the usual, 
biologically provided affective contact with people, just as other children come into the 
world with innate physical or intellectual hand[i]caps” (250).  They do not desire social 
contact; instead, they exhibit “extreme autistic aloneness” by ignoring people in favor of 
objects (242). Objects are always the same, which is why autistic children prefer them; 
they make no demands, social or otherwise, on the children.  This “anxiously obsessive 
desire for the maintenance of sameness” is Kanner’s second-most important characteristic 
of autism (245). People disturb the autistic child by introducing disorder into what is 
repeatedly figured as a peaceful, almost Zen-like, state (244). Thus, Kanner figures 
autistic children as wanting to be alone to avoid change and uncertainty.  As we saw in 
Bleuler’s work, Kanner positions the children as choosing to engage with objects over 
people in what appears to be an act of selfishness. Largely because of this article, autism 
becomes a social disorder through which children demonstrate an “inability to relate 
themselves in the ordinary way to people and situations from the beginning of life” (242).  
However, Kanner neglects to describe what the conditions of “the ordinary way” of 
relating to people and situations are, a common oversight that allows them to morph over 
time.   
Kanner’s third major concern is that autistic children do not seem to use language 
for communicative purposes, though the actual motivation for their language use remains 
unclear. They demonstrate an “excellent rote memory,” but their language use devolves 
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into what Kanner perceives to be meaningless repetition, or echolalia (243). Spoken 
language becomes “a self-sufficient, semantically and conversationally valueless or 
grossly distorted memory exercise” (243). Kanner is most concerned by their lack of 
spontaneity, which carries over to autistic behavior in general. One example of this lack 
of spontaneity is autistic children’s inability to appropriately use shifters like pronouns: 
“Personal pronouns are repeated just as heard, with no change to suit the altered 
situation….Not only the words, but even the intonation is retained” (244).7 Their speech, 
along with all of their behaviors, is “monotonously repetitious,” a neuro-normative 
description if ever there was one (245). As monotonous, these behaviors lack variety; 
they are only one tone and display the autist’s desire to maintain order through routine. 
As such, these behaviors do not maintain neuro-normates’ interest, although they do 
pique it with their abnormality. His assessment is not all negative, though Kanner 
remains suspicious of “[t]he astounding vocabulary of the speaking child, the excellent 
memory for events of several years before, the phenomenal rote memory for poems and 
names, and the precise recollection of complex patterns and sequences” (247-8).  
In his second article, “Irrelevant and Metaphorical Language in Early Infantile 
Autism,” Kanner provides an account of autistic language that differs slightly from his 
earlier views. This article uses some of the same examples, but it explores autistic 
language in a less negatively charged way and provides examples of the innovative ways 
in which autists use metaphor. Unlike neuro-normative metaphors, autistic metaphors 
rely on a “private, original frame of reference” of which only the autists and those close 
to her will be aware (244). For example, Kanner describes one child who would say 
“Peter eater” every time he saw a saucepan. Only someone close to him would know that 
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his mother was once reciting “Peter, Peter, pumpkin eater” when she dropped a saucepan. 
He explicitly treats such language as “metaphorical expressions which, instead of relying 
on accepted or acceptable substitutions as encountered in poetry and conversational 
phraseology, are rooted in concrete, specific, personal experiences of the child who uses 
them. So long as the listener has no access to the original source, the meaning of the 
metaphor must remain obscure to him, and the child’s remark is not ‘relevant’ to any sort 
of verbal or other situational interchange” (243). Kanner recognizes that the origin of this 
name, while unusual, is perfectly clear with sufficient background. 
Neuro-normative metaphors rely on common usage to be recognized as 
metaphors, but unlike neuro-normates, “[t]he autistic child does not depend on such 
prearranged semantic transfers. He makes up his own as he goes along” (244), argues 
Kanner. In this article, he positions autists as linguistic innovators. For example, 
synecdoche—calling a car a set of wheels—requires the recognition that wheels are an 
integral part of a car. Though it might be difficult for another person to grasp at first, an 
autist who called a car “wipers” would be using synecdoche appropriately, despite the 
atypicality of this association. Kanner again legitimates these expressions by arguing that 
the metaphors created by autistic children “do not differ essentially from poetical and 
ordinary phraseological metaphors,” except that “the creation is in the main self-
sufficient and self-contained” (244).  In this case, his primary issue with autistic language 
is that these children make little effort to clarify the referent of their language for an 
audience. Unfortunately, linguistic constructions such as these are used by Kanner and 
still today by others as evidence of autists’ lack of interest in social interaction.  
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Hans Asperger 
Discussion continues today about the relation between autism and Asperger’s 
syndrome, which is particularly evident in the elimination of Asperger’s syndrome from 
the DSM-5. As of January 2011, the American Psychiatric Association reclassified 
Asperger’s as an autism spectrum disorder, a controversial move. A Viennese 
pediatrician, Asperger published part of his doctoral thesis, “Die ‘Autistischen 
Psychopahten’ im Kendesalter” (“Autistic Psychopathy” in Childhood), in 1944, the year 
after Kanner’s article was published. Like Kanner, Asperger believed that he was the first 
to locate autism as a disorder separate from schizophrenia (Frith, Autism and Asperger 
Syndrome 6). Unlike Kanner, Asperger recognizes the contributions of Eugen Bleuler and 
locates his concept of autism as descended from Bleuler’s theories (Asperger 38). The 
goal of Asperger’s paper was to describe the characteristics of this disorder by 
performing a detailed analysis of four case studies. To do so, he also relies on general 
experience with more than 200 autistic children over ten years. Frith translated the article 
in 1991, making it available to an English-speaking audience for the first time. In her 
introduction to Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome and translation notes, she emphasizes 
the similarities between the patient profiles used by Kanner and Asperger and the 
findings of both papers.   
For example, Kanner and Asperger both consider autism to be a “disorder of the 
will” (48), like schizophrenia, in which individuals choose not to participate in the social 
world that confronts them. They see this lack of social reciprocity as the primary deficit 
of autism. Bleuler reads this deficit as a result of autistic preference for an inner dream 
world, but Asperger focuses on the autistic individual’s attention to other parts of the 
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external environment. Rather than a contrast between inner and outer worlds, Asperger 
describes autism as “a disturbance of the lively relationship with the whole environment” 
(74). Asperger’s word choice here suggests that autists’ relationship with their 
environments is lifeless or static. Because they have this kind of relationship with their 
environments, many autists to develop “a special interest which enables them to achieve 
quite extraordinary levels of performance in a certain area” (45).  For example, Fritz’s 
interest is mathematics, and as Frith’s notes tell the reader, he became an astronomy 
professor, quite a success for someone that teachers labeled “uneducable” (39). As 
always, much of an autist’s success seems to depend on how close his interest is to neuro-
normative interests. As Asperger harshly points out, “it is possible to consider such 
individuals both as child prodigies and as imbeciles with ample justification” (46).  
Despite the limitations of autistic interests, Asperger praises these individuals for 
their “independence in thought, experience, and speech” (50). This aspect of Asperger’s 
essay has become well known, mostly because he sees social value in autists at a time 
when very few do. But, Asperger also pathologizes their hyper-individuality based on the 
distance that autists maintain between themselves and other people. They supposedly 
“make life difficult for themselves” through their determination to ignore education 
provided by teachers and parents and pursue their own methods for achieving goals (75).  
For example, Asperger finds Harro’s mathematic methods “fascinating” in their 
originality, but “[t]hey were often so complicated—however ingenious—that they 
resulted in errors” (56). Harro’s case supports Asperger’s claim that autists present “an 
inability to learn from adults in conventional ways. Instead the autistic individual needs 
to create everything out of his own thought and experience” (56). And so, Asperger 
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places responsibility for social difficulties on the autist’s shoulders even while 
recognizing autists for their creativity. 
Children with autism manifest a more general “disturbance of active attention,” 
which Asperger sees in in the unusual interests discussed above and also the particular 
gaze that they have in common (76). For example, here is Asperger’s description of 
Fritz’s way of looking: 
His eye gaze was strikingly odd. It was generally directed into the void, but was 
occasionally interrupted by a momentary malignant glimmer. When somebody 
was talking to him he did not enter into the sort of eye contact which would 
normally be fundamental to conversation. He darted short “peripheral” looks and 
glanced at both people and objects only fleetingly. It was “as if he wasn’t there”. 
(42) 
In this passage, Asperger recognizes eye contact as an important marker of social 
attention. For him and other neuro-normates, Fritz’s intermittent gaze suggests a lack of 
interest. Despite this apparent disinterest, Fritz surprises Asperger with his level of 
attention to his environment. During testing, Fritz “betrayed an excellent apprehension of 
a situation and an accurate judgement of people” (45).8 This awareness is surprising 
because neuro-normates assume that a person who is not looking is not paying attention 
to and thus is not interested in them. This oblique gaze is not unique to Fritz: “It was 
typical of Fritz, as of all similar children, that he seemed to see a lot using only 
‘peripheral vision’, or to take in things ‘from the edge of attention’. Yet these children are 
able to analyse and retain what they catch in such glimpses” (49). As Frith points out, 
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Kanner’s profile of Virginia who “stood listlessly, looking into space” would fit also fit 
this description, even though Kanner does not attend to autistic gazes (Asperger 42n1).  
As this example shows, Asperger remains perplexed by many autistic behaviors, 
unable to understand the cause or reason behind them. Asperger does not know why 
“[l]ittle things drove [Harro L.] to senseless fury” or  “what had struck him as funny” (51, 
52). He focuses particular attention on what he perceives to be aggressive and malicious 
behaviors and the lack of respect for authority displayed by his patients. Some of these 
children fight often, and in particular, Fritz “lacked distance and talked without shyness 
even to strangers.  Although he acquired language very early, it was impossible to teach 
him the polite form of address (‘Sie’)” (40).  The respect that would typically manifest 
itself through language is absent in Fritz’s case, a trend that repeats itself throughout 
Asperger’s article. He extrapolates these findings to suggest that autists “treat everyone 
as an equal as a matter of course and speak with a natural self-confidence” (81).  They act 
“without any regard for differences in age, social rank or common courtesies,” a quality 
that Asperger does seem to value for its egalitarian nature. 
Even though Asperger interprets many autistic behaviors as malicious, he 
contradicts himself by acknowledging that “[t]hey do not show deliberate acts of cheek, 
but have a genuine defect in their understanding of the other person” (81). Yet, 
Asperger’s earlier comments suggest that it is not only autists who do not understand 
neuro-normates; the reverse is true as well. To them, an autist can appear to be an 
incomprehensible but “intelligent automata” (58), “like an alien, oblivious to the 
surrounding noise and movement, and inaccessible in his preoccupation” (78). Asperger’s  
valuable scientific work provides a more complete understanding of autism and begins to 
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suggest “that autistic people have their place in the organism of the social community” 
(89).  He does not indicate exactly what exactly this place is, but it seems to be integrated 
with neuro-normative society, not partitioned off from it.  
 
The Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)  
Published by the American Psychiatric Society (APA), the DSM has gone through 
five editions. The first DSM was published in 1952, and it has gone through six versions 
since then: the DSM-II (1968), DSM-III (1980), DSM-III-TR (1987), DSM-IV (1994), 
DSM-IV-TR (2000), and DSM-5 (2013). Autism first appeared in the DSM-I and the 
DSM-II only as a symptom of childhood schizophrenia, which is interesting given that 
Bleuler discussed it in relation to both adults and children. When the DSM-III was 
published in 1980, autism appeared for the first time as a diagnosis separate from 
schizophrenia—more than thirty years after both Kanner and Asperger published their 
first articles.   
In the DSM-III, what the APA calls “Infantile Autism” is still defined in relation 
to schizophrenia, in that these children should not display schizophrenic characteristics 
that include “delusions, hallucinations, loosening of associations, and incoherence.”9 It 
should affect children before age three, unlike schizophrenia, and the remainder of the 
disorder’s characteristics are heavily influenced by Kanner. For example, autists should 
demonstrate a “pervasive lack of responsiveness to other people” and delayed language 
with disordered use, two areas that Kanner’s article emphasized. Finally, they should 
have “bizarre responses to various aspects of the environment, e.g., resistance to change, 
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peculiar interest in or attachments to animate or inanimate objects,” all of which were 
part of Kanner’s profile.    
With the DSM-III-TR, “Infantile Autism” becomes “Autistic Disorder,” a much 
more detailed diagnosis that covers an individual’s lifespan. It includes a variety of 
interesting examples with each criterion that give more detail about how the APA 
understood each impairment at the time. For example, under “gross impairment in ability 
to make peer friendships,” the APA includes “demonstrates lack of understanding of 
conventions of social interaction, for example, reads phone book to uninterested peer.” 
Examples like this one carry a note of the ridiculous and implausible, which correlates 
with the presence of language rife with judgments oriented toward neuro-normates.  
According to the DSM-III-TR, autists should display “[m]arkedly abnormal nonverbal 
communication,” “[u]nreasonable insistence on following routines,” and “[m]arked 
distress over changes in trivial aspects of environment.” They would also make “frequent 
irrelevant remarks.” In each of these phrases, I have italicized language marked by such 
judgments. Despite these problems, the DSM-III-TR provides more detailed criteria that 
the DSM-III, finally taking autism seriously as a disorder.  
The DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR contain no new criteria, only revisions of the 
criteria from the DSM-III-TR.  The three major areas of impairment remain the same: 
social interaction, communicative language, and “restricted, repetitive, and stereotyped 
patterns of behavior, interests, and activities.” While individuals still need to exhibit half 
of the listed symptoms, that now only means six of twelve symptoms, whereas with the 
DSM-III-TR they needs to demonstrate eight of the sixteen. In an important move, the 
DSM-IV contains fewer absolute judgments or criteria that seem impossible to verify 
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scientifically, such as the “[a]bsence of imaginative activity” in the DSM-III-TR.  It also 
eliminates much of the language that privileges neuro-normative experience, which I 
detailed above.  Interestingly, the APA drops several of Kanner’s central findings in the 
transition from the DSM-III-TR to the DSM-IV. No longer does it talk about individuals 
with autism as displaying “impaired imitation,” except in regards to their propensity to 
engage in parallel rather than integrated play. Nor does it present them as having trouble 
with pronoun usage or a “[m]arked lack of awareness of the existence or feelings of 
others,” both of which were present in the DSM-III  However, it does still maintain a 
connection to Kanner in the “[p]ersistent preoccupation with parts of objects (for 
example, sniffing or smelling objects, repetitive feeling of texture of materials, spinning 
wheels of toy cars).” The DSM-IV drops any reference to the unusual “volume, pitch, 
stress, rate, rhythm, and intonation” employed by autists and their “lack of interest in 
stories about imaginary events.”  
The 2013 transition from the DSM-IV-TR to the DSM-5 is important for two 
reasons.  First, the category of Autism Spectrum Disorders now includes Autistic 
Disorder, Asperger’s Disorder, Childhood Disintegrative Disorder, and Pervasive 
Developmental Disorder—Not Otherwise Specified (PDD-NOS).  This absorption has 
been controversial, sparking much debate from both the autism and Asperger’s 
communities. Second, the criteria for Autism Spectrum Disorders now include references 
to the unusual sensory experiences of these individuals.  According to this criterion, 
individuals with ASDs should display “[h]yper-or hypo-reactivity to sensory input or 
unusual interest in sensory aspects of environment; (such as apparent indifference to 
pain/heat/cold, adverse response to specific sounds or textures, excessive smelling or 
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touching of objects, fascination with lights or spinning objects)” (American Psychiatric 
Association). This criterion takes into account what researchers since Bleuler have 
noticed, a very belated inclusion.  
 
Uta Frith and Weak Central Coherence 
Uta Frith first presented her theory of weak central coherence in a chapter of 
Autism: Explaining the Enigma (1989) entitled “A Fragmented World.” This placement 
draws attention to the prominent role that the fragment plays in Frith’s theory. In Frith’s 
initial characterization, autists display a deficit in drawing connections among elements 
within their environments that reveals “the lack of a drive for meaning” (Autism 152). 
She suggests that autists are more interested in attending to a single aspect of an 
environment or situation, contrary to neuro-normates, who look for the object or force 
that will turn this information into an organized whole. Autists are missing a motivation 
that she considers fundamental to human experience and uses here as a cause for 
pathologizing an autistic cognitive style. Instead, Frith suggests that autists attend to 
individual elements—“details”—before looking for a connection between them. 
The word “details” is frequently used in literature that discusses the ways autists 
process information. Details are the particulars—the individual elements—that make up 
more complex wholes, and this subordinate relationship suggests that they are more 
comprehensible, easier to process than wholes. They are also often thought to mean less 
as elements than when combined to form gestalts, to be less important than the whole 
itself. This belief is supported by the common mistranslation of Gestalt psychologist Kurt 
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Koffka’s claim “The whole is greater than the sum of its parts.”10 Therefore, it can be 
either criticism or praise to tell someone that she has written a detailed narrative.  
An implicit relationship between a whole and the parts into which it can be 
broken up goes back to the word’s etymological origin in the French détailler. In its 
literal sense, this word describes the action of cutting something into smaller pieces (a 
side of beef, for instance). Though “detail” as a verb does not have quite the same 
meaning in English, this origin continues to influence both the importance we commonly 
assign to details—as subordinate to the whole—and the way we conceptualize cognition 
as a process in which we begin with a whole which is subsequently broken up into 
smaller pieces, or “fragments.” Thus, there is an intrinsic and important connection 
between “detail” and “fragment,” though the word “detail” does not have the same sense 
of loss inherent in “fragment.” 
In later years, Frith softens her language by describing weak central coherence as 
“a processing bias towards features rather than a processing deficit for wholes” (Frith and 
Happé 14; emphasis added).11 Such features are now positioned as “discrete units, 
distinct from the field as a whole” (16). This language is more spatially precise than 
Frith’s earlier “details,” yet it does not introduce depth into her model. The revision does 
acknowledge that autists have the ability to see gestalts; they do not lack this interest 
entirely as she suggested earlier. They can overcome a tendency toward weak central 
coherence using intellect (6), or as Asperger describes, through “an effort of the will” 
(qtd. in 15). Thus, autists can transition to global processing if they have explicit 
instruction or sufficient time. Yet, Frith and Happé’s revised word choice still stigmatizes 
autists who are not “strong” or “focused” enough to alter the direction of their attention. 
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It also continues to use the flat language of part/whole that is intrinsic to weak central 
coherence.   
As evidence to support her theory, Frith cites studies that use the Children’s 
Embedded Figures Test (EFT). Designed by Witkin, this instrument measures a person’s 
level of field dependence by asking them to locate particular shapes within more complex 
constructions.12 Figure 2 provides a sample EFT. As Francesca Happé summarizes, 
“People with ASD are often extremely good at the EFT” (1077). More specifically, 
children with ASDs are “faster and more accurate than normal children of the same 
mental age” at locating a particular shape embedded within a picture (Frith, Autism 153). 
Despite the positive nature of these findings—autists have a distinct skill on which they 
can rely—Frith and Happé still choose to locate this skill as one of the reasons for which 
autism is pathologized.    
They treat this skill as a deficit because it does not align with neuro-normative 
tendencies.13 For neuro-normates, according to Frith, “fragments, once assembled into a 
single picture, lose their meaning as fragments and are only meaningful as part of the 
greater unit they belong to, the whole picture” (Autism 152). The effect of context 
overpowers the components themselves. From this perspective, neuro-normates could 
themselves be pathologized for displaying interest only in the overall field and not 
individual elements, for treating these details as a means to an end. However, Frith takes 
the opposite approach, describing neuro-normates’ drive for meaning as a “natural 
tendency” (154), thereby pathologizing autists’ cognitive style as unnatural.   
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The puzzle appears in Frith’s discussion as a spatial metaphor that she somewhat 
unexpectedly takes from Georges Perec’s Life, A User’s Manual (1978)—one that 
reappears frequently in discussions of autism. As Perec writes: 
The only thing that counts is the ability to link this piece to other pieces…The 
pieces are readable, take on a sense, only when assembled; in isolation, a puzzle 
piece means nothing—just an impossible question, an opaque challenge. But as 
soon as you have succeeded…in fitting it into one of its neighbours, the piece 
disappears, ceases to exist as a piece. (Perec 216)  
Perec’s narrative provides an explanation of and a justification for Frith’s argument about 
information processing among autists. The goal of solving the puzzle, “trying all the 
plausible combinations one by one” (218), becomes “the only thing that counts,” the only 
worthwhile goal within this context. Frith does not acknowledge that this is a value 
judgment, one that depends on the privilege given to a particular outcome—completion—
or that this goal may be more difficult for people using different cognitive styles to 
achieve.   
Frith’s use of this metaphor introduces a relation between the EFT and a game 
that many people with ASDs enjoy. In fact, the puzzle has come to symbolize autism 
through the Autism Awareness Ribbon distributed by the Autism Society of America. 
Such toys challenge a person’s “ingenuity,” her creative abilities, but they also challenge 
a person’s ability to process information. Though Tito Mukhopadhyay becomes a 
celebrity within his village for completing puzzles, he refused to interact with what he 
calls “the massacred deer” the first time that he saw a puzzle with this picture on it. He 
writes that “[i]t hurt to see the deer in four pieces” (146). His “discomfort” here is 
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directly related to the “incomplete picture” as he cannot “tolerate things being out of 
place” (146, 147). This example and Mukhopadhyay’s drive for order complicates Frith’s 
suggestion that autists do not have an interest in bringing the pieces of an image together.   
The EFT has distinct similarities to another instrument, called the Navon Task, 
which measures the effects of the so-called “global precedence” effect (see Figure 3).14 
As they perform this pattern-based task, “participants are briefly presented with a large 
letter shape made up of smaller letters of either the same kind (compatible condition) or a 
different kind (incompatible condition), and are required to identify the letters at the 
global level and/or local level” (Plaisted, Swettenham, and Rees 736). When using this 
tool, Kate Plaisted, John Swettenham, and Liz Rees found that “[t]ypically developing 
children made most errors when the target appeared at the local level whereas children 
with autism made more errors when the target appeared at the global level” (733). 
Therefore, individuals on the autism spectrum are not affected in the same way as neuro-
normates by the so-called “global precedence” effect, which suggests that among neuro-
normates “global information is processed faster and is therefore available earlier than 
local information” (734). What could be conversely called the local precedence effect 
overlaps with strong field independence, the term used by Frith.  
This task developed out of research by psychologist David Navon who captures 
the cognitive style shared by neuro-normates with a common metaphor: these people 
“perceive the forest before the trees.”15 Though it is more than thirty years old, this 
article provides useful information about how top-down processing is assumed to 
function within a normative population—information on which research about the 
cognitive styles employed by autists is based. According to Navon, for a neuro-normate 
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“a scene is decomposed rather than built up. Thus the perceptual system treats every 
scene as if it were in a process of being focused or zoomed in on, where at first it is 
relatively indistinct and then it gets clearer and sharper” (354). Here, the word 
“decompose” suggests that the perceiver begins with a complete unit and then breaks it 
down into the elements that constitute it; it provides the conceptual basis for the “top-
down” name given to a normative cognitive style. But, as “zoom” suggests, the person 
using this style will not be able to see all of these elements because the process continues 
“without losing focus” (OED). The distribution of fading within the scene merely 
changes. As one zooms, some features automatically “dominate” others based on our past 
experiences, which create cognitive predispositions (354). This process could continue 
until little recognizably remains of the original figure, as in the decomposition of a body; 
however, as a perceptual process, decomposition rarely reaches this stage because of the 
constantly changing nature of our environments.  
Navon’s findings largely support Frith’s argument about the way that perception 
works for neuro-normates; in fact, several of his major points overlap with hers. For 
neuro-normates, “perceiving the whole facilitates the perception of its parts,” and 
“[d]etails are detected only to the degree that they are essential for determining contents,” 
according to (356). However, he diverges from Frith by using language that makes his 
theory of perception three-dimensional (as it should be since the worlds in which we live 
have at least this many dimensions). Navon acknowledges that a top-down approach is 
“limited” in its “depth” (368), which is a necessary result of the “economy of processing 
resources” (381). He also acknowledges that people can employ different cognitive 
styles; they are not restricted to one. As he recognizes, “[t]he visual system seems rather 
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to have made a decision to neglect the processing of the elements in view of the structure 
of the task, although it might have had enough capacity for performing a more thorough 
analysis” (368). These researchers use different instruments and terms and frame their 
findings with different language, yet these researchers arrive at generally complementary 
conclusions regarding the way autists and neuro-normates distribute attention.16 
When reading Navon with Frith, it can be extrapolated that neuro-normates are 
more distant from the trees, or local features, whereas autists are closer. The latter 
employ a “bottom-up” model according to which “the tree is seen foveally whereas 
everything else is seen peripherally” (380). To ascertain depth in this model, one is 
assumed to be always moving “downwards, or inwards” (OED). By beginning at the 
bottom of the figurative pile of stimuli, one could be in immediate contact with whatever 
is at the lowest elevation—the information toward which the top-down processors are 
ultimately moving. However, a spatial analysis reveals that there is still depth in bottom-
up processing, but it must be considered differently if one starts at the lowest level 
accessible within a given dimension. Ultimately, both models are restricted in the depth 
they can achieve As descriptors for cognitive styles, the terms “top-down” and “bottom-
up” impose misleading restrictions on the cognitive styles they describe.  
Technological developments like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) 
have produced information that supports psychologists’ theories that autists process 
information differently than people without this diagnosis. This disclosure, though, adds 
depth to descriptions of the cognitive styles developed by psychologists like Frith and 
Navon. Based on maps charting the movement of energy, a growing group of studies 
show that autists’ brains exhibit more neural connectivity within particular regions than 
 49 
neuro-normates and less or “abnormally patterned” connectivity between regions 
(Courchesne and Pierce 226).17 Because of these structural differences, information 
moves through autists’ brains differently than it does for neuro-normates.  
In fact, cognitive neuroscientist Eric Courchesne, director of the UCSD Autism 
Center of Excellence, and his colleagues have found that individuals with autism do not 
shift their attention between stimuli presented in different sensory modalities as quickly 
as neuro-normative controls. Autists need more than the 2.5 seconds that it takes neuro-
normates to switch their “spotlight of attention” (858, 849). Additionally, Matthew 
Belmonte and Deborah Yurgelun-Todd have found that autists experience delays when 
shifting attention “between spatial locations, and between object features” (651).18 
Because they do not transition as smoothly, autists receive a less continuous flow of 
information from their environments than neuro-normates. This may explain why they 
often have difficulty transitioning between tasks or, as I examine here, between different 
topics within a literary text.  
Matthew Belmonte and Deborah Yurgelun-Todd clarify how “the pattern of 
information flow” differs among autists and neuro-normates. As a result of their similarly 
structured cognitive pathways, autists experience “(1) hyper-arousal, that is, primary 
sensory processing that is abnormally intense and abnormally generalised across 
anatomical regions and functional systems and (2) impaired early selection of relevant 
stimuli, leading to (3) overloading of higher-order processes” when compared to neuro-
normates (660). Courchesne et al. provide support for the second criterion with their 
suggestion that autists employ a narrower “spotlight of attention” than neuro-normates 
(849), while Stevenson et al. respond to the first and third criteria with their proposal that 
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autists have “a wider temporal binding window” (695). Autists need more time than 
neuro-normates and, often, specific instruction to shift their attention between stimuli—
particularly from one modality (i.e., sight) to another.  
The cognitive style common among autists contributes to their production of 
images—and, I argue, texts—that may look like they exhibit weak central coherence 
when judged from a normative perspective. These artists distribute their attention 
differently than neuro-normates may expect, focusing on stimuli that may be considered 
trivial as they produce literary texts that may look disjointed to neuro-normates. Framed 
more constructively, these individuals distribute salience differently, assigning 
importance to objects or stimuli that may not interest others and creating innovative 
connections among them. People who employ an autistic cognitive style may seem to 
lack control over their cognitive processing; however, the texts under analysis here 
demonstrate that the authors—particularly, Mukhopadhyay—deploy a significant amount 
of self-control when processing information and also when crafting their literary texts.   
My analysis in this chapter strives to demonstrate that the cognitive styles 
attributed to autists and neuro-normates each have both advantages and disadvantages. As 
Bebko and Brown summarize, “children with autism may be preferentially attending to 
specific aspects of stimuli, which can lead to overselectivity, enhanced discrimination, 
poor generalization, and poor categorization” (734). Unexpectedly, this description 
gestures toward the strengths, in addition to the typically presented weaknesses, of an 
autistic cognitive style. For example, autists will be aware of sounds or details that neuro-
normates do not perceive, and they “may see every stimulus or object as novel unless it is 
exactly the same as a previously viewed stimulus or object” (736). As a result, autists 
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“perform better than typically developing individuals on visual search tasks” (736).19 
Such perceptual differences produce an image of the world that will not look the same as 
it does to a neuro-normate.  
In How Can I Talk?, Mukhopadhyay presents many different moments that reveal 
his particular style of processing in the stimuli to which he attends and also the language 
that he uses to represent these situations. Each of these moments suggest a different 
spatial model for cognitive processing, on which Mukhopadhyay elaborates in an 2010 
interview with Ralph Savarese. In it, he describes how: 
with my eyes, I may select a fraction of the environment—say “that shadow of a 
chair” or “that door hinge over there”—and grow my opinions and ideas around 
it. This creates a defense system for my over-stimulated visual sense organ. (Call 
it keen observation or any other name.) Maybe poetry happens to grow around 
these things. (Mukhopadhyay qtd. in Savarese; emphasis mine).  
Here, Mukhopadhyay proposes a multidimensional way of processing information 
focused on the adverb “around,” which characterizes the way that his thoughts move. His 
responses to an object coat its surface and expand in every direction, threatening at times 
to take a life of their own. However, this practice turns the object into a buffer of sorts 
that protects him from sensory overload. To “grow around” this object, his thoughts must 
be rooted in it, which means that it serves as an anchor for their multidirectional 
development. They move outward from it in a way that, while not rhizomatic, certainly 
does not produce the flat image proposed by Frith. Poetry itself becomes another layer 
coating the outside of the object and his ideas, which means to get at the object itself—or 
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the environment in which Mukhopadhyay encountered it—we must negotiate multiple 
layers of representation.   
 One of the moments that best reveals this cognitive style takes place in a railway 
station ticket office in Bangalore, a place with a “huge amount of movement and energy” 
(100). He visits the ticket office many times with his mother as he gains knowledge that 
helps him to form practical expectations for what he will see and experience there. Over 
these visits, he focuses on a static object: a mosaic. It operates as a literal and figurative 
anchoring point that helps him to make sense of the surrounding stimuli. He moves his 
attention outward in many directions like an octopus spreading its tentacles. When he 
looks at the situation retrospectively, he acknowledges the mosaic’s function and the 
intense perceptual emphasis he placed on it:   
Since I could now easily recognize the door as a door and the wall as a wall 
because I saw them so often, and since I no longer needed to stare at the design on 
the mosaic floor and wait for Mother to narrate to me what went around on me 
while I was staring hard at the floor till my eyes watered, I could look around me. 
I could see the crowd and smell the crowd. (101) 
The extended dependent clause with which the sentence opens captures the many trips to 
the railway station that took place before he reached this point; it takes the reader back to 
a moment when he could not arrive at these conclusions. Focusing on the mosaic while 
excluding other visual stimuli allowed Mukhopadhyay to integrate other stimuli into his 
field of vision gradually and determine their global significance at his own pace. It is one 
of the objects around which the author grows his ideas, and it comes to represent a 
defining moment in Mukhopadhyay’s development.  
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A person’s life is made up of what he calls “moments.” These segments of time 
are often assumed to be short, but they are actually indeterminate. In most cases, 
moments are “too brief to be significant,” but in others, they can represent something of 
importance or significance, such as “a turning point” (OED). Through its etymological 
connection to the Latin momentum, this word retains a sense that time is always moving; 
our environments are constantly changing, and we with them. Within this context, 
Mukhopadhyay specifies that “moments are defined by what your senses are compelled 
to attend to” (How 53), as each moment contains many different possible experiences 
within it. Neuro-normates are likely to define a moment using only one experience or 
stimulus, which rises swiftly to the surface of their perception. On the contrary, 
Mukhopadhyay finds it easier to recognize a moment’s plurality than its singularity.   
This cognitive relation comes through clearly in the poetic passage that follows 
the statement from Mukhopadhyay quoted above. Here, he proposes several different 
definitions for a single moment:  
A moment may include a shadow of Jack’s chair falling on the floor or a pen 
peeping out from the pile of papers, perhaps wishing to have a voice so that it 
could say aloud, “Here I am! Here I am!” And within the same moment, there 
may be a sudden sound of laughter that can dissolve the stories told by the 
reflections and the sullen silence of the chair’s shadow within its demanding 
noise, making you wonder which part of the funny story from Jack’s voice you 
missed listening to while you were watching the giant blades of the fan pushing 
out every story and sound away from it with air. (53)  
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Mukhopadhyay creates a tension between the two sentences in this passage, which 
reflects the tension between the cognitive styles attributed to autists and neuro-normates. 
He structures the first sentence as an either/or condition, which suggests that a moment 
cannot include both the shadow and the pen; the perceiver can only pay attention to one 
of these elements. However, both this sentence and the last are constructed around a 
modal verb (“may”). This word choice underscores Mukhopadhyay’s assertion that a 
moment has many possible definitions while appearing to contradict the structure of the 
first sentence. The length of the second sentence and the number of different sensory 
elements it contains also suggest how difficult it can be for one element to rise to the top 
of this multitude. As a result, the perceiver exists in a constant state of processing, though 
she will still miss elements, such as Jack’s story.  
 Though he begins this passage without reference to the perceiver, Mukhopadhyay 
indicates that he is not only talking his own embodied situation. He makes this transition 
by introducing the second person (“you” and earlier “your”) in the present participle with 
which the second sentence ends. Here, he places the reader in the position of the 
perceiver. This position has much less interpretive agency than that to which a normative 
reader may be accustomed. Making “moment” the actor within the first sentence gives it 
a power that may go unacknowledged elsewhere. It places the perceiver in a reactive 
situation, which Mukhopadhyay compares in the next paragraph to that of a circus actor. 
His “senses juggl[e]” stimuli like balls—or, in some cases, knives (53). Again, 
Mukhopadhyay inserts a physical distance between himself and the event; it is his senses 
that juggle the information, not he himself. Professional jugglers are assumed to have 
complete control over their tools based on their ability to predict the movements of these 
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objects. If the objects become less “predictab[le],” the situation becomes less 
“comprehensi[ble],” according to Mukhopadhyay (53), and thus more dangerous.  
 He finds such a situation less comprehensible because it has become “more 
fragmented and difficult to collect all the pieces and combine them into a complete 
picture of the real environment” (53-4). At this moment, Mukhopadhyay reveals that he 
may have internalized neuro-normative judgments of his cognitive style. This assessment 
is supported by a later moment in which Mukhopadhyay clarifies that it is only “[w]hen 
[his] senses get used to a situation or a circumstance, the real image or picture starts 
forming….The more exposure, the better the visual image” (115). Both of these 
statements imply that his first impressions were false because they were incomplete; only 
the later image in which the environment that does not appear fragmented is “real.” 
Though Mukhopadhyay does not provide clarification, the real environment and image to 
which he refers here seem to be those seen or formed by neuro-normates.20 Like a 
photograph, he needs “exposure” to assemble the different elements, but this process can 
leave him “without shelter or defense,” unprotected and vulnerable to overload (115; 
“Exposure,” OED).21 
To avoid cognitive overload, Mukhopadhyay engages in activities like turning 
light switches on and off—a common interest among children with ASDs. He focuses 
specifically on this interest in How Can I Talk? and its role in helping him to manages the 
stimuli that he confronts. It allows him to “overlook” many sensations of which he is 
conscious while “eliminate[ing] other visual distractions like shadows, reflections, and 
the movement of the blades of the fan” (54). Like many of the words of which Derrida 
was so fond (e.g., pharmakon), the word “overlook” encapsulates a perceptual paradox in 
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its two seemingly contradictory senses. A person who overlooks a scene can be said to 
survey it “as if from above” (OED). This high vantage point suggests that (s)he can take 
in the scene as a whole without missing anything. Yet, “overlook” can also mean to leave 
something out, “to fail to see or observe” it (OED). It is this negative connotation for 
which “overlook” is conventionally recognized, but here the failure to see paradoxically 
allows Mukhopadhyay to see; he can only form a “complete” picture by leaving 
something out. With his use of this word, Mukhopadhyay indirectly refutes the normative 
belief that a person should be able to recognize all aspects of a situation [at once].  
Mukhopadhyay recognizes that as early as age three, he used what he calls 
“selective vision”: “I could look at certain things but not at others. Things that calmed my 
senses were easier to see, while things that stressed my vision were not easy to look at.” 
(13). Here, he positions selective vision as an ability particular to him and not others; 
however, all humans rely on selective attention to manage the perceptual information that 
they encounter. With this phrase, though, Mukhopadhyay draws attention to the aversive 
response that his body produces when he looks at particular objects. A neuro-normate’s 
nervous system is likely to manage this decision for him, drawing his attention away 
from this stimulus and toward another without such palpable protest. Rather than 
managing the decision for him, Mukhopadhyay’s system seems to leave him to deal with 
it himself, and sensory processing thus requires more conscious attention. 
These circumstances help to explain why Mukhopadhyay characterizes perception 
as a fragmented, confusing “sensory battle that was taking place within [his] nervous 
system” (How 6). In this metaphor, neurons can be read as soldiers and the action 
potentials that they emit as munitions.  Though the battle is happening inside his body, 
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Mukhopadhyay appears disconnected from it because he does not position himself as an 
actor within it. He only gains agency within this battle by controlling particular aspects of 
his environment, such as the light. In so doing, he make it “predictab[le]” and thus easier 
to process because he has prior knowledge on which he can base his decisions (52). As he 
acknowledges explicitly later, “when I can predict, it is easier to attend” (98). Another of 
Mukhopadhyay’s preferred activities—spinning underneath a fan—has a similar effect; it 
allows him “to feel sure” (60). The feeling of safety created by actions like flipping a 
light switch or spinning helps to prevent sensory attack. Both actions give 
Mukhopadhyay control over his perception as he can make a room light or dark, 
“blurred” or clear (60).  
Situations lose their predictability when new variables are introduced and 
Mukhopadhyay cannot control his contact with them. In one example, Mukhopadhyay 
remembers a pair of white leather shoes that he had when young:   
New shoes made my feet look detached from the rest of me. My senses got so 
strained that I refused to lay my feet on the ground. I was not more than two years 
old then. And I remember it through the intensity of that experience, which 
accumulated my senses, all at once, merging together with banging stress. I 
refused to lay my feet on the ground. (85; emphasis mine) 
These shoes pose a problem for Mukhopadhyay because they make a part of his body 
with which he should be familiar look strange. They seem to possess this body part in the 
act of covering it up, physically removing it from Mukhopadhyay’s control. Such a 
response is not surprising given the difficulties that many autists have with 
proprioception, the sense that allows us to feel where our bodies are in space. The act of 
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spinning mentioned earlier is one strategy that he uses to produce a more positive sense 
of body feeling.  
The shoes become a constant presence that he cannot escape, no matter how 
uncomfortable they make him. When paired with their unfamiliarity, this constant 
presence increases the force with which Mukhopadhyay experiences stimuli in such 
situations. He looks to an unusual turn of phrase to describe why this situation becomes 
so intense: it “accumulated [his] senses.” His earlier use of “senses” suggests that here he 
again refers to his sensory modalities, not the meanings that he has collected. Yet, he 
seems to play on both meanings of the word. The content of this situation suggests that as 
his senses—individual sensory modalities—themselves begin to get confused, stimuli 
from his environment begin to build up because it is more difficult for him to deal with 
their heightened power. The result is a heap of information shot through with “banging 
stress,” or stress so powerful that it cannot be avoided. The onomatopoeia here aurally 
amplifies “stress,” turning an internal experience into an explosive event that can be 
heard by both Mukhopadhyay and the reader. It is not only Mukhopadhyay who is out of 
control here, but the moment itself.  
Such moments “became unpredictable and too large for [his] senses to accumulate 
all that they involved within their field” (52). Though this description comes from a 
different place in the text, Mukhopadhyay again turns to the verb “accumulate” to 
describe the way his sense collect information from their environment. Craig Romkema 
attributes a similar cognitive style to autists in his poem “All Circuits Are Busy,” 
juxtaposing it with a neuro-normative cognitive style. He opens the poem by 
summarizing the position that he assumes his neuro-normative readers occupy. They  
 59 
Begin at the beginning  
then continue on to the next page,  
sequentially adding…   
building blocks of knowledge. (1–4) 
These individuals process progressively, moving forward or upward from an initial 
foundation, which Romkema equates with the conventional way of reading a book. The 
spatial presentation here sounds much like the top-down processing model. These neuro-
normates effortlessly “add” information to already existing knowledge, “piling fact on 
fact” in a calm and comprehensible manner (9).  
This contrasts with the perceptual position in which Romkema locates autists, 
whose “senses pull information into / overloaded circuits” (10–11). Because of circuits’ 
circular shape, energy cannot exit them once inside; therefore, “overloaded circuits” 
would be characterized by a lack of movement caused by a “pile-up” of information. To 
prevent occlusion, Romkema must actively sort through an alliterative “plethora of 
puzzling sensations” (12). In this case, the number and kind of sensations has a pejorative 
inflection, as plethora does in its medical sense, referring to vessels too full of blood. If 
they are unable to keep up with this information, processing it as it comes, we assume 
that autists receive the error message contained in the title: “All Circuits are Busy.” In 
such situations, individuals feel “befuddled” (15); they cannot think clearly because of 
the build-up of stimuli.  
This is a danger of the tendency described by Mukhopadhyay “to overinclude 
many components within or outside the limits of [his] surroundings into the permeability 
of [his] mind” (203). He composes mental maps that are too complex; they contain too 
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many parts, too many connections rather than too few. Mukhopadhyay directly relates 
this cognitive style to the way he processes sensory stimuli elsewhere in How Can I 
Talk? He proposes that he “either over-see[s] or under-see[s] the components of the 
environment” (98). This description indirectly compares Mukhopadhyay’s processing 
bias to a standard style whose employer would see just enough. Based on his suggestions 
elsewhere, this standard appears to be set by neuro-normates. Thus, he devalues his 
perceptions on the basis of their accordance with the way in which neuro-normates would 
see the same environment. They are either excessive or insufficient and “can be very 
different from what my body is supposed to experience in my physical environment” 
(208).  
Romkema captures an affective response to this situation in “Frustration,” which 
describes the author’s continuous efforts to prevent overload. In this poem, the author 
compares the narrator’s cognitive style to “looking for needles in / Gigantic haystacks” 
(22–23), a conventional simile that conveys the seemingly endless nature of processing 
information for him. The narrator of this poem wants but does not have control over this 
environment, and as he strives for it, he lives in a state that he likens to “an eternal spring 
cleaning” (11). Most people undertake this project once per year because it requires so 
much time and effort, but the narrator—and other autists, by implication—are always 
spring cleaning, never just “cleaning” or existing in a clean space.  
In keeping with this domestic metaphor, Romkema compares a person’s “mind” 
to his bedroom (8). The narrator arranges details like objects in this room and keeps 
returning to ensure they have not moved. This is “the only way [he] can sleep” or relax 
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(27), for as Romkema underscores at the poem’s close, “playing my nailing-down-each-
thing-in-the-room game / Isn’t a game” (25–26); it is much more serious. 
 You see, we know every detail  
In the pictures of our minds,  
Thousand of details to sort out,  
Keep organized… (7–10) 
The magnitude of this situation lies not just in the number of stimuli to be cataloged but 
also in the importance of existing in a predictable environment. Autists engage in this 
behavior because, according to Romkema, it “keep[s] us sane” (29). The consequences of 
allowing one’s room, i.e., mind, to fall into disorder are dire, so despite how “exhausting” 
it can be (18), the spring cleaning must continue indefinitely.  
When Romkema cannot keep his room organized, cannot keep up with the stimuli 
that must be processed, he finds himself “left behind,” a situation that he describes in 
“Free-Fall”: 
In the hurry-up of this world, 
people like me get left behind. 
Conversations are about speed, 
… 
I cannot jump in fast enough before 
They are off to the next topic. (4–6, 8–9) 
The narrator stands out in this environment characterized by “speed,” urgency, and 
confusion. “People like him” cannot move quickly enough to keep up with the flow—
they are too slow—so they are discarded and forgotten. At the poem’s end, Romkema 
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uses a more specific metaphor to capture the different literal and figurative ways in which 
neuro-normates and autists move; he writes, “I live in free-fall; they are taking the 
Concorde” (17). In this line, neuro-normates move much faster than autists toward 
socially valued goals, protected by convention and their cognitive style, which function 
respectively as a plane’s hull and a pilot with experience navigating the route. 
Conversely, autists are more vulnerable, out of control, influenced more immediately by 
the physical conditions of their environment.  
 Neuro-normates are accustomed to having their perceptual systems actively 
control the stimuli that they recognize. Many of the stimuli present in their environments 
are automatically identified as irrelevant and thus minimized. Among those stimuli that 
they actively recognize, neuro-normates typically arrive at similar assessments regarding 
the importance of these elements. This occurs because they share a common style of 
cognitive organization and because these structures allow them to access the social world 
in similar ways and on similar timelines. In most cases, such attributions of relevance are 
relative, though recognizing danger is one area where these subconscious assessments 
have inherent and innate value.22 Neuro-normates are so familiar with having their 
determinations affirmed by those around them that they are easily surprised when another 
person questions their attributions. Aggressive reactions are not uncommon because such 
questions undermine the social contract that places these basic agreements beyond the 
realm of doubt.  
As they describe in their literature, autists like Mukhopadhyay and Lawson are 
familiar with such reactions, and they respond with the same surprise when others 
question their own attributions. For instance, Lawson describes a situation in which a 
 63 
teacher reprimands her for not paying attention to the content being discussed in her math 
class: “Ms Smith’s words made no sense to me. I was paying attention, I thought. I was 
paying attention to the tree outside the window. Its leaves were all shiny in the sunlight” 
(33). What Lawson does not recognize at this time is the implication behind the teacher’s 
statement—she is not paying attention to the lesson, which is more important. No doubt 
Lawson would have disagreed with this assessment, but because the teacher holds a 
position of authority, ultimately it is her assessment that matters. Many children without 
autism diagnoses are caught in similar situations. They can and are physically paying 
attention, but they are not attending to the object or information valued by the authority 
figure.  
Similar moments in which Lawson distributes salience differently than others 
assume she will appear at two other points in Life Behind Glass. First, Lawson crafts a 
vivid passage in which she presents “bath time” as “a wonderful dreamscape” (34). 
Despite the obvious pleasure the experience has given her, the passage opens with her 
mother chiding her for not accomplishing the ostensible goal of a bath: cleaning her 
body. The author still tries to explain why she has not done what her mother expected: 
“Mum, see how round the bubbles are. Just look at the colours!” (34). Lawson does not 
describe the result of her supplication to consider the bubbles’ sensory aspects; however, 
one can imagine that the response was less enthusiastic.  
At another moment, Lawson must sit for a school exam while hospitalized. She 
remembers being “told it was important to [her] education that [she] concentrate and 
work to the best of [her] ability” (42), but no one clarified why this test was important; 
neither did they explain how she should complete the test. Instead of taking it, she “drew 
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on the paper, played ‘noughts and crosses’ and felt very anxious” because she “had told 
one of the nurses earlier that [she] would roll some bandages for her and [she] felt that 
really was important” (42). Again, Lawson does not understand the reason why this event 
should matter to her. Therefore, she does not give it the same consideration as a neuro-
normates would.  
Mukhopadhyay describes a similar moment where he attended to stimuli that 
interested him because they made him feel calm. In reflecting on it, he recognizes the 
difference between his approach with that which a neuro-normate is likely to take. He 
writes: 
Once, in Bangalore, I visited a house and sat on a comfortable sofa in the drawing 
room. People who knew of my love for magazines would keep magazines for me 
because I loved to turn and touch those smooth glossy pages. On that day, I was 
sniffing each page of every magazine. I was so absorbed in smelling the pages 
that I missed seeing the piano, framed photographs, and lace curtains. I realized 
their presence, long after we had left that room… (98-9).  
When visiting someone’s home, most neuro-normates would not sit looking at a 
magazine without talking to anyone. But, Mukhopadhyay is not even looking at the 
pages—he is smelling them. He does not acknowledge here that this is not a normative 
approach to interacting with a magazine, but the final list of other objects present in the 
same room, objects that would attract the attention of many neuro-normates, indicates 
that he does recognize the unconventional direction of his attention. Other people would 
look at the different objects present in the room. Instead, Mukhopadhyay focuses his 
attention on a single object.   
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His unusual sensory interaction with this magazine is not the only instance of 
such behavior. He takes a similar approach to reading a book: 
I might turn the pages and sniff each page first before looking at the pictures in it 
because I believe in finding out first, as a ritual, how old that book is and how 
many hands have turned the pages of that book before me. Someone else with 
autism may tear a page or two, for who knows which dominant unit of experience 
is taking place in his perception. Another person with autism may totally ignore 
the presence of that book because his perceptions would be directed toward some 
other aspect of the environment. (202)  
In this passage, Mukhopadhyay recognizes the diversity of interests among individuals 
with ASDs, while uniting them based on the fact that they all distribute their attention 
according to different rules than neuro-normates. When encountering a book, neuro-
normates default to sight: read a few pages in the middle, look at the title and publication 
information, or scan the author’s biography. The book’s smell interests Mukhopadhyay 
more than the semantic content of its words, an unconscious preference that many neuro-
normates will not understand.  
Despite the attractive power of these examples, the distinctness of 
Mukhopadhyay’s cognitive style also comes through in way that he structures the 
language that uses to describe his processing. Let us return to the first sentence that I 
examined as a moment that captures the author’s processing style (see page 17 of this 
chapter); it describes the culmination of many trips to the railway ticket office—the fact 
that Mukhopadhyay can now “look around” (101). This sentence merits further attention 
when compared to other sentences in the text, which contrast in style. The authors of The 
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King’s English (1906) suggest that “a gathering of commas (except on certain lawful 
occasions, as in a list) is a suspicious circumstance” (H.W. and F.G. Fowler. qtd. in 
Lukeman 53), and their analysis provides the instigation for this examination.  
Sentences like this one are uncommon within How Can I Talk?, where sentences 
typically contain a single independent clause, such as: “I would continue to think about 
the mirror” or “I would wonder about the mirror upstairs” (8). When Mukhopadhyay 
makes sentences more complex, they are typically compound sentences: two independent 
clauses with only one comma or a sentence with a single modifier, such as a relative 
clause or a participle phrase—as in, “My voice would scream, and I would wonder 
whether the mirror upstairs was aware of my screaming” (8). This consistent grammatical 
approach makes more complex sentences with multiple commas stand out. As with the 
sentence about the ticket office, these unusual sentences typically capture moments where 
Mukhopadhyay describes his cognitive processing. The dependent clause stretches out, 
representing the extended time in which he stared at the mosaic in 63 words. It contrasts 
markedly with the five-word independent clause that capture the simple conclusion at 
which he has arrived. The first part of the sentence includes information that could 
normatively be described as parenthetical, or beside the point, but it captures the long 
period of time that Mukhopadhyay focused on the mosaic.  
Another sentence whose structure reflects the time Mukhopadhyay devotes to 
sensory processing captures the aural experience of living in Bangalore. The Fowlers 
identify lists as more “lawful” uses for many commas, yet this one presents eight distinct 
sounds that are more detailed than the reader may expect for their presentation within a 
single sentence. As Mukhopadhyay writes,  
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the sounds of any day would be the sound of traffic on the main road outside the 
houses, the sound of the temple bell ringing across the street, the sound of a 
loudspeaker announcing the coming of a political leader, the sound of a vegetable 
vendor, the sound of women bargaining with a vendor from an open window, the 
sound of someone’s television set, the sound of an infant crying along with the 
sound of street dogs arguing about some sensitive issue around an open garbage 
can. I mixed in that sound, the music from my tape recorder and the faint sound of 
the ceiling fan. I could not hear anything less. (How 67) 
As Mukhopadhyay presents them here, these sounds do not create the cacophony that one 
might expect. The structure of the first sentence—as an eight-sound list—suggests that he 
hears each one distinctly and recognizes them in a linear fashion, one after the other. The 
commas create a space between each sound and a pause that represents Mukhopadhyay’s 
transition from processing one to the next. The sounds presented in the first sentence 
become one in the second, as suggested by their grammatical merger into “that sound.” It 
is unclear whether they become the same kind of singular entity when consciously 
“mixed” with two others after, but Mukhopadhyay’s word choice suggests that the 
elements remain distinct in their combination.  
Mukhopadhyay explicitly contrasts his cognitive style with a more neuro-
normative style—embodied here by his mother—within the chapter “How Do You 
Perceive a Linear Situation?” The title of this chapter evokes a question that the author 
was asked, yet it introduces a pivotal direct object here: “linear situation” (How 93). This 
spatial phrase has particular relevance here. In mathematical terms, the adjective “linear” 
suggests that a pattern exists among the different elements of which the situation is 
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comprised; they share a unifying element that turns them into a line. Yet, this word also 
suggests that the situation is one-dimensional; it lacks depth as does the line that 
constitutes one side of a figure or a line of text. Within this context, the question with 
which Mukhopadhyay opens the chapter implies that a linear situation is basic, not 
complex, flat. By comparing the ways in which he and his mother process information, 
though, he reveals that few situations are linear, and to locate a line, one must see only 
one dimension.  
In this chapter, Mukhopadhyay asks the same question of his mother, placing his 
mother’s description of the way she processes information adjacent to his own.23 The 
differences between them introduce depth into what could be read as linear situations. 
First, he represents the many different thoughts or feelings that his mother had “when she 
saw a book” in the form of a bulleted list (94). This method of presentation (which the 
author uses no other place in the text) creates an effect similar to but different from lists 
presented within a single sentence, such as the list of sounds discussed above. Both 
methods are linear, but the bulleted list introduces more physical separation between each 
piece of information than a comma does within a sentence. This spacing contributes to 
the function that bullets often serve: increasing access to information by (hypothetically) 
increasing the speed with which it can be processed. Yet, this format directs the reader to 
move from the top of the list, where the author provides framing information, to the 
bottom, while a sentence asks the reader to move from left to right, and then to begin 
again directly below.  
When Mukhopadhyay presents a wide view of his own cognitive style, he again 
turns to a more complex sentence structure, as discussed earlier.  
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When I enter a new room, which I am entering for the first time, and look at a 
door, I recognize it as a door, only after a few stages. The first thing I see is its 
color. If I do not get into a deeper cogitation of its color by defining it as 
“yellow,” and mentally lining up all the yellow things I know of, including one of 
my yellow tennis balls when I was seven years old, I move to the shape of the 
door. And if at all I lay my eyes on the door hinge, I might get distracted by the 
functions of levers. However, I pull my attention from there and wonder about the 
function of that yellow, large rectangular object, with levers of the first order, 
called a hinge. 
Why is that yellow, large rectangular object with levers there? I mentally 
answer the question, “It has allowed me to come inside that room, and can be 
opened or closed. And what else can that be other than a door.” My labeling is 
complete. And I move onto the next object in the room to find its characteristics, 
then define and label that object. (94-5)  
In this passage, Mukhopadhyay presents his cognitive style as a linear process in which 
he moves through a series of “stages.” When applied literally, this word refers to a story 
within a building, a step on a ladder, or another “horizontal partition” within a structure 
that is ultimately vertical (OED). The stages that he outlines here begin with color and 
then move onto shape and function—an object’s “characteristics”—before he finally 
arrives at a name for the object. “Stage,” as a word choice, along with the sentence-style 
presentation, makes Mukhopadhyay’s description seem to follow the spatial progression 
suggested by “bottom-up” processing. 
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 However, this application is too simple. As Mukhopadhyay charts the overall 
direction of his cognitive movement, he also notes the places where he may pause in his 
progress. It is easy to feel the power of Mukhopadhyay’s associative powers here, for 
even as he describes the act of not pursuing associations, he provides a very specific 
example of the kind of association that he would make in the memory of his old tennis 
ball. At this moment, he would “mentally lin[e] up” objects that shared a characteristic 
with this one. Neuro-normates would call this pause in his movement toward the object’s 
name a digression—particularly as Mukhopadhyay’s line extends in a different direction 
than the path that the had been following. As he suggests by describing this moment as “a 
deeper cogitation,” such reflections add depth to the process and separate it from the 
simplified idea of “bottom-up” processing.  
Such multidimensional excursions evoke a section from Temple Grandin’s 
Thinking in Pictures: My Life with Autism (2006) in which she contrasts her cognitive 
style with a style more common among neuro-normates. According to Grandin, “Unlike 
those of most people, my thoughts move from video-like, specific images to 
generalization and concepts. For example, my concept of dogs is inextricably linked to 
every dog I have ever known” (12). Based on this description, Grandin advances from the 
specific to the general, whereas neuro-normates move from the general to the specific; 
they “see a generalized generic church rather than specific churches and steeples when 
they read or hear the word steeple” (11). Because she can recall precise instances, 
Grandin compares her memory to “a CD-ROM disc” and each memory to a “video” on 
that disk that she can replay at will (8). Her description of this cognitive style sounds not 
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unlike Mukhopadhyay’s earlier presentation of his own, when he could list “all the 
yellow things [he] know[s] of,” though he does not.   
Grandin explicitly treats this cognitive style as a virtue of “[b]eing autistic” 
throughout Thinking in Pictures. Of all of the authors whose literature is analyzed here, 
she is the most emphatic in her proposal that while different, this cognitive style is neither 
a deficit nor a reason to pathologize autists. In fact, she implicitly criticizes neuro-
normates for “naturally assimilate[ing] information and tak[ing it] for granted” (8). 
Within this context, it is surprising that Grandin cites a line from an autism memoir by 
Charles Hart without questioning the way it frames autistic processing. According to 
Hart, his son “Ted’s thought processes aren’t logical, they’re associational” (qtd. in 
Thinking 9). Grandin does not question the false distinction that Hart sets up here 
between association from logic, though it undermines her perspective. The quotations 
cited in this chapter from Mukhopadhyay, Lawson, and Grandin demonstrate that autists 
do employ a particular form of associative logic, though it may not be a normative one. It 
does not move the same way that neuro-normative logic is assumed to move.  
 This unconventional way of moving is also captured in the way Seth Chwast, a 
visual artist with an ASD, describes his art. When he completes a piece, he writes a 
formulaic description that lists the different colors present in this image. In his mother’s 
memoir, An Unexpected Life (2011), these descriptions look like Mukhopadhyay’s sound 
sentence; however, this image (see Figure 4) from his blog demonstrates that at least in 
this instance the statement includes a cluster of words that defies the linear progression of 
his text sentences. He could have indented the words that begin the lines layered above 
and below “reds, pale vermilions, oranges,” but he does not. This method of presentation 
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breaks the conventional sequence of the sentence with a mass of words. From a neuro-
normative perspective, it looks like a blood clot within a vessel, blocking the sentence’s 
linear progression as the text swells around it.   
 Many neuro-normates display serious concern about such blockages in an autist’s 
forward progress. Mukhopadhyay captures such concerns in another part of his interview 
with Savarese, when talking again about his cognitive style: 
I may say this about my processing—it may make me disassociate myself from 
the totality of the situation and select one aspect of it. After that I may be 
completely within a labyrinth with my overindulgence or overassociation in that 
single aspect of the environment that has multiple aspects, making me ignore the 
other parts of the situation. (Mukhopadhyay qtd. in Savarese) 
As he demonstrated earlier, Mukhopadhyay has a tendency to focus on one element 
within an environment and use it as an anchoring point for his attempts at global 
processing. Normative concerns about this method are reflected in the negative inflection 
of several words that he uses here—in particular, “disassociate,” “labyrinth,” and the use 
of “over-” as a modifying prefix. All of these establish his style as non-normative and as 
having potentially harmful effects, mostly related to his ability to engage with plurality.    
Yet, other examples from the text show that Mukhopadhyay has no issue pursuing 
associations to other ideas or objects from this anchoring point; however, he may not 
arrive at the conclusion valued by neuro-normates. This issue appears prominently in an 
encounter Mukhopadhyay describes with the equation “4 + 2 = ?” at an American school 
(154). He mentally turns these numbers and the operations sign into points plotted on an 
x-y axis and locates coordinates that would make them a line. In the process, he discovers 
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“a whole story of number characters other than merely 2 and 4, competing, quarreling, 
and asserting themselves to be written down” (How 155). While he does write an answer 
for the equation above, it is not the one that the teacher wanted: a normative reading of 
this line. Yet, this seemingly simple addition equation opens a multidimensional 
(specifically, four) field of coordinates, “which kept [his] mind and sense entertained for 
the rest of the day” (156). Though it may be a “labyrinth” with the danger to segregate 
him from normative conclusions, it is full of creative ideas and productive ideas that 
throw off the restrictions imposed by conventional cognitive styles.  
 Like labyrinths, literary texts that do not follow the conventions of their genre can 
equally bewildering to their readers. Most of the texts under analysis here appear to be 
written as novels—prose that follows a chapter-based format—though Romkema’s work 
is a notable exception. Their approach begins with an element as basic as the table of 
contents, but one that is important in this analysis of spatial processing and textual 
distribution. Typically, this element provides a summary of the text’s content and outlines 
the trajectory of events as they unfold. One of the objectives behind assembling this 
element is to make the text’s content more accessible to the reader. As Pliny the Elder 
famously argued, “the public good requires that you [the reader] should be spared as 
much as possible from all trouble,” and within this context, a table of contents ensures 
that the reader can exert less effort in understanding a) what information each chapter 
contains and b) how the different chapters fit together. It (assumedly) gives the reader a 
sense of the whole that enables her to more effectively navigate the text.   
As a textual element, the table of contents operates based on a series of 
assumptions regarding the way in which the reader will process the information contained 
 74 
within the text. Many textual norms, such as the table of contents, are assumed to present 
this information in the most “manageable” way. Traditionally, chapters may be labeled 
with only numbers or with text that summarizes their contents and/or attracts the reader’s 
attention. When writing these titles, the author must assume that she knows what the 
reader will look for within the text and what will attract his or her interest. The 
organization of these titles within the table itself reflects the overall organization of 
information within the text. Chapters may be organized based on chronology or common 
themes as “a main division” of information within a book (OED). This definition 
suggests that a chapter should contains significant content, in the sense that it is important 
to the overall trajectory of the book and/or meaningful in size.  
As narratives, Wendy Lawson’s Life Behind Glass and Temple Grandin’s 
Thinking in Pictures are arranged according to more traditional formats than Tito 
Mukhopadhyay’s How Can I Talk?. For instance, Lawson’s text adheres more closely to 
the bildungsroman-esque narrative expected of memoirs. It begins with an introduction, 
“This Is My Story,” then moves onto chapters whose titles chart her chronological 
development through conventional major life events: “My First Take On Life,” “School 
Intrudes,” “Teenage Dreams And Fears,” “Farewell to Childhood,” and so on. Though 
these chapters contain information composed in ways that readers may not anticipate, the 
table of contents itself suggests that this may be just another coming-of-age story. Yet, 
Lawson does not get to her birth until the third chapter. By this point, she has already 
talked about her father’s death (when she was an adult), her difficulty making friends, 
and her sensory preferences, among other topics.  
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Grandin’s Thinking in Pictures follows a more conventional structure; as 
suggested by the table of contents, it is organized thematically according to major topics 
like empathy, religion, and relationships. Also evident in Daniel Tammet’s Embracing 
the Wide Sky, this approach evokes the format more often used by academic research, 
though the texts themselves show that Grandin and Tammett still introduce information 
about themselves within this format. Analysis of Grandin’s text also reveals that her 
chapters contain many different sections. One of the most extreme instances of this 
practice occurs in the third chapter, “The Squeeze Machine: Sensory Problems in 
Autism.” Here, Grandin breaks the text into 13 different sections, which equates to about 
two pages per section (in reality, the distribution is more variable). Introducing sections 
can help the reader to navigate the information a chapter contains, but they can also break 
the flow of the narrative. It is particularly intriguing that this chapter contains so many 
sections since Grandin’s information processing is where I see this organizational 
tendency originating.  
The most unusual text within this context is Mukhopadhyay’s How Can I Talk?, 
which contains 211 pages separated into 59 chapters, with an additional foreword, 
author’s note, and an epilogue of sorts. That is roughly 3.5 pages per chapter—a very 
small number of pages, in conventional terms, to be separated into distinct chapters. In 
part because of the number of chapters, the table of contents can be overwhelming for a 
reader. The complexity of the chapter titles also compounds the feeling of confusion a 
reader is likely to experience as most chapter titles (41) contain four words or more. 
Additionally, Mukhopadhyay does not use a consistent grammatical format throughout. 
Some proximate chapters have similar formats, such as “The Color of Basic Words” and 
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“The Color of My Scream” or “Perceiving Faces” and “Everyday Faces.” However, the 
most consistent link between these titles is their reflection of the topic treated within the 
chapter. Neither this topic nor the way in which Mukhopadhay treats it may be apparent 
from the chapter title itself, which means that the connections between the chapters 
themselves will not be obvious to most readers until after they complete the text.24   
Beginning with their tables of contents, these texts highlight a consistent theme 
that runs through much literature written by autists: these texts may feel uneven to 
readers accustomed to more normative narratives. I mean this in the sense that these texts 
appear to be constantly changing topics, full of non sequiturs, lacking the segues or 
transitions that one may expect from such narratives. This approach may make their texts 
appear to fit the model of weak central coherence proposed by Frith; however, close 
analysis reveals that the authors follow particular logics that—while they may be more 
personal and less communal than normative logics—are locatable if the reader devotes 
time to serious analysis. This is the same kind of extended engagement that autists pursue 
on a daily basis in environments structured by and for neuro-normates.  
Another aesthetic approach taken by Lawson, Mukhopadhyay, and another 
author, Dawn Prince-Hughes, have an effect similar to Grandin’s use of sections; these 
authors move with more (Mukhopadhyay) or less (Lawson) frequency between poetry 
and prose. These transitions are different from moments when, for instance, Prince-
Hughes quotes the first poem she wrote within her text. In that case, the poem was an 
artifact related to a story that she was telling. The first three poems in her text are treated 
as such, as objects from the past that further elucidate the plot she is conveying, as are 
some later poems (137). Gradually, however, she begins to integrate them more into the 
 77 
text so that they function as a continuation of the narrative in a different genre (64-5, 68, 
107, 123-24).  
Unlike Prince-Hughes, Lawson does not frame the appearance of a poem with a 
description of its relation to the narrative; the text merely flows from prose to poetry (81, 
104, 128) and often back again (98, 101-2, 106-7, 111-112). As the citations indicate, 
these moments of generic fusion are concentrated toward the end of Lawson’s text. This 
poetic development may unfold thus for one of several reasons: By this point in the 
narrative, Lawson herself may have become more comfortable with the writing process 
and as a result more comfortable experimenting with the form in which she presents her 
narrative. This explanation is likely too simple because she no doubt revised the text and 
could have returned to the earlier sections to add poems. Another possibility is that 
Lawson feels by this point in the narrative she has established her credibility as a writer 
sufficiently that she can begin to experiment without her reader questioning her mastery 
of prose. As the text’s title suggests, Lawson feels public scrutiny acutely. Finally, these 
poetic experiments begin to appear with the birth of Lawson’s first child, which seems to 
mark a turning point of sorts for her.  
As often happens, the author who takes this literary technique to its most extreme 
is Mukhopadhyay, and he reflects on the use of this technique in an interview with Ralph 
James Savarese, who has worked extensively with the author. Savarese asks him to 
“account for the practice of ‘interrupting’ prose with a fragment of poetry,” and 
Mukhopadhyay provides the following response:   
I use verse when I get bored of writing a dragging paragraph. I usually do. 
Sometimes the topic becomes too thick and intense to write. I get nagged by this 
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boring state that the topic holds for me. Because of that, I seek a way out to 
recharge my senses. A verse makes me free. A verse recharges my senses. And a 
verse can distract the eyes and ears of a reader. It is easy to read it that way. (qtd. 
in Savarese, “More”) 
In this passage, Mukhopadhyay proposes that he switches from prose to verse when 
writing about a subject that “bore[s]” and “drag[s],” yet “nag[s]” him (note the rhyme 
that connects the second two words). His language here transforms an abstract idea into 
an object that requires more effort than normal to move. Because of the time and energy 
required, he is likely to lose interest in the task of representing this information, yet he 
has trouble leaving it behind. It eats away at him25; he cannot escape it, and it becomes 
even more difficult to address as it gains intensity. 
Mukhopadhyay aligns intensity with “thickness,” which is typically considered an 
attractive characteristic. Thick ideas are interesting because of their depth, and thin ideas 
reciprocally are boring because they lack this quality. It is less conventional to find 
something thick boring, as Mukhopadhyay does; yet, he appears to be playing on the dull 
but persistent quality that unites “bore” with “nag.” He cannot escape the topic because 
of its depth, because it contains innumerable possibilities, which cause it to become too 
intense to manage in prose. Within this context, switching to a different literary genre has 
the potential to liberate both Mukhopadhyay and his language. The transition to poetry 
releases Mukhopadhyay from the restrictions imposed by prose itself—having to form his 
words into complete sentences, for instance. He can then treat the topic from within a 
system with different conventions for language use. It also provides an escape 
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mechanism whereby Mukhopadhyay’s senses, weakened by the experience of processing 
information related to this topic, can regain their strength through this apparent diversion.   
Within this context, Savarese’s decision to frame Mukhopadhyay’s transition 
from prose to poetry with the word “interrupt” is a curious one.26 This verb has a 
pejorative sense in which interruptions should be avoided, particular within a social 
context. Though perhaps inadvertent, Savarese positions Mukhopadhyay’s stylistic 
approach as one that breaks the flow of the text in a negative way. From the author’s 
description, though, this literary technique continues the text’s flow. It redirects the flow 
of language through another conduit for, in most cases, the short poems recapitulate the 
ideas presented earlier in the prose. This analysis of Mukhopadhyay’s statement makes 
sense because the greatest number of poems in How Can I Talk? appear within chapters 
(20), while even those that end (13) or begin (5) a chapter can be said to continue the 
narrative’s flow.   
Mukhopadhyay’s reflection here provides insight into a similar approach taken by 
Prince-Hughes and Lawson. The literary technique of moving from prose to verse and 
back appears to help these authors transition from one idea or topic to the next, to leave 
one behind in favor of another. As the etymology of this term reminds us, a transition 
helps the reader to cross the physical gap that separates one chapter or paragraph from 
another. From this perspective, they can be thought of as bridges or as the “the glue that 
binds the components of your argument or discussion into a unified, coherent, and 
persuasive whole,” according to the Writing Center at the University of North Carolina 
(“Transitions”). These moments are often indicated by specific words, including “for 
example” and “however,” and they may grow to include an entire idea that connect one 
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discussion or concept to another.  By uniting different parts of a text, “transitions tell 
readers what to do with the information you present to them” (“Transitions”). In other 
words, they communicate to your reader how she should process and organize this 
information.  
Individuals with ASDs are frequently described as having difficulty making 
transitions from one activity to another, and literary transitions have an important relation 
to this discussion. Lawson explicitly addresses this issue: “I am always surprised when 
something comes to an end….While the event is occurring I feel part of it, but when it 
ceases then I cease to be too” (107). The consequences that she depicts here are severe, a 
disintegration akin to death; thus, it is no wonder that Lawson and other feel anxiety 
around transitions if they experience these events so negatively. Therefore, the high 
stakes in something that may seem as simple as moving from one topic to another may 
require extreme aesthetic strategies—such as the transition to verse.  
With a behavioral example that is similar to but not the same as this literary 
example, Lawson recognizes one strategy that she uses to mitigate her anxiety: “I will 
keep some parts of a situation before change occurs, and take them with me into the 
change. This way, the change is felt as less powerful and I am still in control. For 
example, I might choose to wear my leather and canvas runners and my red socks, even 
though the weather forecast is 30ºC” (109). As in this case, Lawson has learned to 
physically manipulate aspects of her environment over which she has control to create 
continuity and make herself more comfortable. Such continuity makes change more 
manageable, and this is exactly the kind of description that one could apply to a 
normative transition in narrative form. The writer takes some part of the topic with him 
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into the change to make the passage smoother, to create continuity. Still, convention 
dictates that an author relinquish it soon after the transition happens, which is where 
Lawson’s strategy goes too far for normative tastes. When confronting these strategies in 
person, Lawson’s motivations may seem strange to a normative reader. Though she may 
be overheated by her clothing choice, she will be comforted in other ways.  
Life Behind Glass contains many instances in which Lawson changes topic in 
what may seem to many an abrupt manner. For instance, in the first chapter, she moves 
from food textures to autistic children who do not recognize danger when they should and 
then back to sensory appreciation. In other areas, she moves from eye contact to 
conventional interpersonal relationships, misunderstandings with her family to her 
difficulty making friends as a child, her father’s refusal to visit her in the hospital to her 
difference from other people, and metaphor to human relationships. From their adjacent 
and simplified presentation here, these topics may not appear as disconnected as they 
seem within the text. Many of these absent transitions are marked with a single dot, 
which serves as a section break (or dinkus) and a visible indication that the author is 
changing topics. As the book proceeds, Lawson uses these breaks more sporadically. This 
decision has the effect of placing different sections of text in closer proximity and making 
their difference more surprising.  
 Before Lawson phases out the section break, she chooses not to place one in an 
area appears where I would have assumed to see it. She is concluding a story about 
leaving her house to walk to the beach as a small child. Lawson writes,  
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Jenny walked over to the damp remaining seashore and picked me up. I had not 
noticed that while I was sitting there, the tide had come in and my isolated sand 
dune was now the only sand visible above sea level. 
 
I always needed to be on the move. Even when I was made to sit still on a chair, I 
had to rock it. If I sat on the floor, I needed to rock myself and suck the roof of 
my mouth… (24) 
The space between these two paragraphs marks a missing transition between Lawson’s 
two-page story about her trip to the ocean and the intensity of her need to move. These 
two topics could be connected by the rationale that Lawson left the house to go to the 
ocean because of her need to move; however, she does not make this connection clear as 
a normative reader would expect in the immediate movement between paragraphs. 
The space between these two paragraphs is magnified by the looming presence of 
the hors-texte: that which Lawson leaves unsaid. The event that she describes was a 
potentially traumatic one; thus, the space could be read psychoanalytically as all that she 
is repressing here. Yet, such spaces appear throughout the text because of its block 
format, which is more typical of a business letter than a literary text. Because of the 
physical separation this format introduces between each paragraph, it gives the 
impression that the paragraphs are even more conceptually disconnected, each dealing 
with a new, different, and—by the end of the paragraph—complete idea.27 Whether or 
not the reader consciously recognizes it, this aesthetic choice suggests that these 
paragraphs may have a different relationship to each other than those in a normatively 
constructed text.   
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 Despite the prevalence of such absent transitions, Lawson also demonstrates that 
she knows how to use normative transitions. For instance, the first page of Life Behind 
Glass’s introduction contains the following passage: 
Throughout my life I have been unable to identify, understand and express my 
emotions, and so have always felt misunderstood and alienated from those around 
me. Because I appear to be “different”, confused and a misfit, I have been often 
treated as if I am either deaf or stupid. 
I am neither. I simply find the world around me difficult to comprehend… 
(i). 
Here, Lawson connects these two paragraphs according to a normative logic. She closes 
the first paragraph with an assumption that other people have about her and then opens 
the next by refuting this assumption and providing an alternative explanation. This 
strategy draws attention to her voice in a situation where others have historically defined 
her, as does the three-word sentence, which stands out among so many more complex 
sentences.  
 Though How Can I Talk? follows a more topical course, it conveys a restlessness 
that is similar to the feeling a normative reader is likely to experience when reading Life 
Behind Glass. Some chapters are connected by Mukhopadhyay’s interest in staircases, for 
example, light (shadows, light switches), or clothing (shirts, specifically). Others exhibit 
much less continuity between them, as with the movement from a doctor’s office visit to 
learning to play with blocks (42-3). Though his text contains many of what could be 
called digressions, they feel much less like digressions because the text itself follows a 
less conventional structure that Lawson’s; it indicates from the outset (i.e., the table of 
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contents or the foreword) that some work will be necessary to follow the author’s train of 
thought. For instance, as he tells a story about climbing stairways in an Indian railway 
station, Mukhopadhyay spends a paragraph discussion the function of railway porters in 
India (38). He then returns without a second look to his story about stairways and 
shadows. Such topics or events are accorded importance by virtue of their inclusion in the 
text, but the author often does not specifically indicate why they are important or for what 
purpose.   
Like Lawson, Mukhopadhyay also demonstrates that he has the ability to craft a 
normative transition. This ability manifests itself at the end of the chapter 
“Unpredictability,” where Mukhopadhyay continues to focus on his interest in light 
switches. He closes it by describing how his “fancy had moved toward ceiling fans” (58). 
The next chapter’s title, “The Power of a Ceiling Fan to Make Me Feel Sure,” reflects the 
expected shift in the narrative’s focus, as do the first two lines: “India is a tropical 
country. Most of the year, ceiling fans are needed” (59). These objects are the focus of 
the next two chapters and an element in the third. Mukhopadhyay concludes the last by 
circling back his prior interest: “And what happened to the remaining part of my story 
about the fan? Nothing further…because I was invited that monsoon month of July to the 
United States, never again to be bothered by power outages and suffocating heat” (69). 
Though it diverges from his discussion of tape-recorded music, this topical return 
provides closure to his discussion of this interest, and a transition to stories about his life 
in the United States feels imminent. Despite this expectation, the next chapter is about 
Mukhopadhyay’s food-related sensory preferences. Within the span of fifteen pages, 
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Mukhopadhyay presents both conventional and unconventional transitions, meeting and 
defying normative expectations.   
This compositional trend reflects the fact that Mukhopadhyay and Lawson often 
pursue non-normative logics, which can make the connections that they draw between 
particular ideas or topics look like non sequiturs. For instance, Mukhopadhyay’s third 
major interest—which appears in the chapter discussed above—has a more obscure 
relation to ceiling fans than light switches do. The fans allowed Mukhopadhyay to tell at 
a glance or by feeling the movement of air whether the power had turned off, and power 
was essential for the switches to function properly. As with many of his textual 
transitions, though, the relation between ceiling fans and “music from tape recorders” 
may not be as obvious to the reader as it is to Mukhopadhyay (66). He tells the reader 
how he could hear the ceiling fan in the background of the music to which he listened on 
tape recorder at home. By providing this information, Mukhopadhyay lays bare his logic 
here for the reader’s benefit. 
 This example of a personal logic at work closely resembles an example Leo 
Kanner provides in his seminal article, “Autistic Disturbances of Affective Contact” 
(1944). Kanner draws attention to instances in which statements made by his subjects 
“could not be linked up with immediate situations” (227). When summarizing one child’s 
case, Kanner presents a situation in which “At the sight of a saucepan he [Paul] would 
invariably exclaim, ‘Peter-eater’” (227). This association does not make sense to Kanner 
or the child’s mother, until she “remembered that this particular association had begun 
when he was 2 years old and she happened to drop a saucepan while reciting to him the 
nursery rhyme about ‘Peter, Peter, pumpkin eater’” (227). Though the saucepan and 
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nursery rhyme may not seem related—and are thus dissonant when considered 
adjacently—knowing the child’s history enables Kanner and the mother to see a 
connection between the two events.  
Such a personal logic also connects the chapters “Everyday Faces” and 
“Magazine Pictures” in How Can I Talk?. The former presents the way that 
Mukhopadhyay experiences the presence of two people who have played important roles 
in his life: Deepa, his speech language pathologist, and his teacher in Austin. He 
experiences the presence of the latter as a particular image—“a yellow plastic bowl with 
a wide circumference” (111)—and the next chapter focuses on physical images. In the 
opening of the latter, he indirectly compares static images to the perceptual images he 
forms in interactions with particular people, which draws out the “threatening” nature of 
the latter; they are threatening because they “expec[t] a dialogue” (112). To follow this 
comparison, the reader must accept the fact that what we perceive when interacting with 
a person, the sensory image or map that we receive, is an interpretation of that person, 
which means that they can radically differ on an individual basis. The image need not be 
visual or even representational in the way to which we may be accustomed.     
The literary texts discussed in this chapter demonstrate that autists occupy a 
complicated position: they have different sensory interests than neuro-normates, of which 
they are often aware, and their cognitive structures predispose them to sensory overload, 
making it difficult to assemble a mental map that mirrors those created by neuro-
normates. Consequently, autists are left “juggling” sensations (53), in Mukhopadhyay’s 
turn of phrase, as they try to keep their own balance while balancing the relations 
between their sensations and relations with other people.   
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One of the central goals of this section has been to clarify the ways in which the 
artists with ASDs in this minor literature describe their own processing styles—often, in 
relation to neuro-normates—and the images that they form of their environments. 
Consequently, the kind of coherence that is valued by neuro-normates is more difficult 
for them to achieve and requires more conscious effort. According to these norms, we 
should be constantly looking for the big picture, integrating a stimulus with others within 
a very particular frame and widening our focus in specific ways. Such a perspective 
presumes that perception is uncomplicated and effortless, that particulars are unimportant 
except as means to an end. Even though autistic images of their environments appear 
fragmented according to neuro-normative standards for perception, authors like 
Mukhopadhyay and Grandin demonstrate that they contain information that can lead in 
many different dimensions.  
Perception is a complex process whose end goal is considered by neuro-normates 
to be the resolution of dissonance to produce harmony, an effect that neuro-normative 
cognitive structures are designed to produce. Consequently, neuro-normates forget that 
the world is a cacophonous place, and texts written by autists lift the veil of coherence 
dropped by neurotypical cognitive structures. At the close of his poem, “Frustration,” 
Craig Romkema asks: “Which of us has the best view?” (18). Is it the neuro-normate 
taking the Concorde or the autist falling straight down? The airplane provided a luxurious 
form of travel to the (economically) privileged few, a situation that would be much more 
comfortable for certain travelers. Yet, the free-fall takes place in the open air, without any 
barriers to seeing the environment in its entirety.  However, Romkema’s question lacks a 
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clear answer because the criteria for making this judgment are themselves unclear—what 
would the best view look like?  
This question is commonly asked or invoked by the modernists who appear in the 
next chapter, particularly in their assessment of the literary style that will present the best 
view. In this case, Romkema leaves it to the (neuro-normative) reader to answer this 
question, though no doubt he assumes she will choose the Concorde. For, what is the 
reward for braving the danger associated with the cognitive style common among autists? 
The texts analyzed here suggest it is access to dimensions unavailable to neuro-normates.  
 
1 This chapter includes material that was previous published in Barber-Stetson, “Slow 
Processing.” 
2 This descriptor has since been deleted, but the DSM-5 still includes “highly restricted, 
fixated interests that are abnormal in intensity or focus,” which can include this theory 
and the former descriptor. 
3 For Rapaport, introversion and autism are distinct because “autistic strivings may also 
be directed outward, as for instance in the schizophrenic world-reformer who wants to 
remold society,” while introverts only look inward (399-400). This distinction does not 
hold true for definitions of autism in later scientific and psychiatric research, such as the 
work of Leo Kanner. 
4 Except through second-hand summaries and his Textbook of Psychiatry (1924).   
5 Frith is skeptical of this “coincidence” (Autism, 5).   
6 German psychiatrist Emil Kraeplin’s findings on the onset of schizophrenia support 
Kanner’s distinction. “Kraeplin, the first psychiatrist to describe the disorder that we now 
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call schizophrenia, reported that 94 percent of his sample of over 1,000 cases had onset 
after the age of 15” (Frith, Autism 69).  Hans Asperger, whose work will be discussed in 
the next section, proposes a similar distinction between schizophrenia and autism.  For 
him, autism lacks the “progressive deterioration that would be expected for psychosis.  In 
essence, [individual with autism] remain the same throughout their life, though there is 
often improved adaptation, and many can achieve a reasonable degree of social 
interaction” (86).  
7 This inflexible language use has been picked up by the scientific literature about autism 
and has become an indicator of an un- or underdeveloped sense of self. 
8 Asperger makes a similar recognition in the case of Ernst K.  “Ernst talked incessantly, 
regardless of the questions he was being asked.  Everything he did was accompanied by 
elaborate explanation….Some of these ‘asides’ were quite remarkable, not only in the 
sense that they were very adult in diction, but also because they showed good 
observation” (61).  
9 All references to the DSM I-IV take their language from Grinker.  
10 Koffka supported a different translation, with a different meaning in English: “The 
whole is other than the sum of its parts.” 
11 Frith and Happé also revise Frith’s claim from Autism: Explaining the Enigma that 
weak central coherence causes or explains the social difficulties that individuals with 
autism experience. After the publication of this text, she encountered research that adults 
without social difficulties and autists with a functioning Theory of Mind both display 
detail-focused processing (6, 17). While weak central coherence likely does not cause 
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autistic social deficits, “it seems plausible that detail focus might further interfere with 
already abnormal social functioning” (17).  
12 See Witkin and Goodenough. Francesca Happé provides a useful summary of the role 
the EFT has played in autism research in “Embedded Figures Test (EFT).”  
13 She relies on an earlier study, conducted by Shah and Frith. Such tests have since been 
replicated in many different forms, as with Shah and Frith’s use of the block design test 
from the Weschler Intelligence Scale.   
14 Daniel Tammet also cites the Navon Task and Frith’s theory in describing his cognitive 
style (Embracing 173). 
15 Reciprocally, autists are commonly said to perceive the trees before the forest. Articles 
that use this metaphor are by Caroline E. Robertson et al. and Audrey Perreault et al.  
16 Laurent Mottron and Isabelle Soulières do underscore that “Global level has to be 
distinguished from holistic level, which is a pattern emerging only from the combination 
of local and global elements.” The outline of a face (global) is not the same as “the 
information that it is a face, which emerges only from the integration of parts and whole 
together” (1445).  
17 See also Belmonte et al. Past studies have proposed that autists’ brains exhibit either 
underconnectivity or hyperconnectivity, but more recent research has integrated these 
findings and located specific regions that exhibit these different forms of connectivity. 
For example, Uddin et al. focus on the “salience network,” a group of brain regions that 
“integrat[e] external sensory stimuli with internal states” and determine which deserve 
our attention (E2).  
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18 Rinehart et al. similarly conclude that “individuals with autism may have a problem 
with inhibiting local information and also a problem with shifting attention away from 
such stimuli” (76). In an additional twist, they found that individuals with Asperger’s did 
not encounter the same difficulty transitioning from local to global (76). “Essentially, it is 
being suggested that individuals with autism and Asperger’s disorder share a core visual-
perceptual anomaly (i.e. local bias), but that individuals with autism have an additional 
set-shifting anomaly which leads to greater functional impairment” (77). This finding 
requires additional support.  
19 See Mottron, Peretz, and Ménard; O’Riordan and Passetti; and Litrownik et al. 
20 It is surprising that Mukhopadhyay accedes to this hierarchy, even though he 
emphasizes in How Can I Talk? that he does not see his autism as a disease that needs to 
be cured (176). 
21 I will make a connection between this quotation and The Waste Land in the next 
chapter. 
22 Many autists do not recognize when they are in situations where they are in danger. For 
instance, Mukhopadhyay presents a situation where he became overwhelmed at a dinner 
party and left the host’s house, walking out into the street without even acknowledging 
that a street was there.   
23 Many autists write about moments when they asked this same question. For instance, 
Grandin “started asking other people [in meetings and at work] detailed questions about 
how they accessed information from those memories” (Thinking 4). Only from these 
encounters do Grandin and Mukhopadhyay, among others, recognize the kinds of 
differences between their cognitive style and a more normative one.  
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24 The table of contents in Embracing the Sky is less relevant to this discussion because it 
is a collection of poetry. Because these texts are often collections of distinct poems, they 
do not elicit the same readerly expectations for coherence among the different elements. 
Within this context, it may be surprising that Romkema’s table of contents reveals a 
connection among many of his poems: the titles for all but four (40) are nouns, and a 
fourth (10) of them end in –tion.  
25 See the similar etymologies of “bore” and “nag.” 
26 No source is indicated within the interview for the provenance of this word choice (i.e., 
it could have originated with Mukhopadhyay himself), so I conclude that these are scare 
quotes. I may contact Savarese to receive clarification.  
27 While it is true that Lawson herself may not have made this decision (it could have 
been introduced by an editor or typesetter at Jessica Kingsley Publishing), this format is 
not typical of the publishing house; therefore, I am inclined to suggest that it was 
Lawson’s choice. 
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Chapter 3 
Redefining Modernism: The Flattening Power of Fragmentation1 
 
In her article “Definitional Excursions: The Meanings of 
Modern/Modernity/Modernism” (2001), Susan Stanford Friedman recognizes that 
“Definitions mean to fence in, to fix, and to stabilize. But they often end up being fluid, 
in a destabilized state of ongoing formation, deformation, and reformation that serves the 
changing needs of the moment” (497). However, we often do not acknowledge the 
ongoing adaptations that definitions must undergo, instead accepting their terms as 
established after hearing them enough times.  
One way to imbue modernist literature with a new vitality is to re-examine and 
push back against established definitions for what modernism is or was. Such language 
limits the interpretations that we can produce, the connections we can locate between 
texts and ideas. It limits us to a particular space, one that has been trod and re-trod for 
almost 100 years. We need not leave such language behind altogether, but confine it for 
the moment to a state of suspended animation. For instance, literary critics often do not 
explore the implications of using spatial metaphors like “fragment” to interpret modernist 
texts. The use of this term in literary criticism of modernist texts is a symptom of a 
spatially limited reading, one that has been prevalent within modernist studies since at 
least the 1940s. The seventy years that have passed occasion a critical reflection on the 
ways in which we have defined modernist aesthetics and the kinds of relationships with 
the reader that these aesthetics foster. I came to question the use of this term to describe 
modernist texts after confronting the spatial limitations of Uta Frith’s weak central 
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coherence, which is why this chapter follows the previous one. Taking my cue from the 
texts themselves, I pursue an approach motivated by the interest within both disability 
studies and modernism in drawing attention to that which may have proceeded before 
unquestioned and unexamined. 
Fragments are small, too small at times to be significant, which may explain why 
the term itself has largely escaped discussion. As a word and object, “fragment” carries 
within it a previous event—a rupture—upon which its existence depends. A fragment can 
be something that was never finished—an incomplete manuscript, for example, which 
became a fragment the moment the author stopped writing it. More often, though, a 
fragment is what remains after the rest of a larger object is destroyed, like the fragment of 
a Dead Sea scroll. Typically, they are important only as residue left by larger bodies that 
no longer exist. Fragments point elsewhere and are thus treated by normates as always 
already broken and lacking. As with the Dead Sea scrolls, fragments have their primary 
meaning in their ability to give clues about the whole that no longer exists; it is a means 
that leads us toward an end—closure. When we refer to objects as fragments, the cause of 
this event and the whole that preceded the fragment are often left ambiguous. We know 
only that which we have in front of us, which means we do not have all necessary 
information.  
Yet, as the previous chapter suggested, the logic of parts and wholes can be 
deceiving as it allows us to ignore the fact that fragments are wholes valuable in 
themselves. Talking about these texts in terms of fragmentation flattens the movement 
taking place within the texts and within readers’ brains as they process these texts. It 
removes topography from the spatial plane, recognizing only horizontal movement rather 
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both horizontal and vertical movement. In this way, it limits the spatial dimensions in 
which the texts make connections and thus the interpretations we can form of these texts. 
This critical treatment directly contradicts the innovations of modernist art, which C.S. 
Lewis described as “new in a new way, almost in a new dimension” (qtd. in Bradbury 
and McFarlane 20). It restricts them to two dimensions, and thus authors like Eliot are 
recognized more for what they show to be broken than for what they have created. 
Continuity is privileged, but only when it moves in particular directions, and the 
prevalence of “fragment” as an analytical term suggests that only two dimensions are 
being appreciated. The previous chapter questioned the restrictive assessment of 
processing styles that proceed in different directions, characterized spatially as “top-
down” or “bottom-up.” Though modernist texts may seem to thwart movement in one 
direction, they make other options and thus perspectives available; yet, readers must be 
flexible and willing to let go of their processing habits.  
The term emerges as important within modernism largely through the 
representation of this literary movement as an aesthetic response to historical conditions. 
European modernism has been characterized as “a paradigmatic shift, a major revolt, 
beginning in the mid- and late nineteenth century, against the prevalent literary and 
aesthetic traditions of the Western world” (Eysteinsson 2).2 Friedman specifically uses 
the phrase “radical rupture” to describe the relationship typically assumed to exist 
between modernism and “post-Renaissance Enlightenment humanism” (500-1). As one 
history of modernism goes, modernist texts respond to historical conditions different 
from those existing during the Enlightenment. Such conditions were often characterized 
as “the chaos of the modern world,” which was encapsulated in events like World War I 
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(Eysteinsson 8). People no longer felt confident in their own knowledge; their sense of 
self as a coherent entity had been ruptured, though they later realized (à la Lacan) that it 
had always been so. This figurative rupture translated to a literary aesthetic of rupture, 
manifested in the “poetics of fragmentation, parataxis, image, and idiosyncratic rhythms 
and sound patterns” often associated with modernism (501).  
Friedman focuses on parataxis as an essential part of modernism, both in its 
aesthetics and the conceptual paradoxes contained within the term itself. She defines it as 
“the juxtaposition of things without providing connectives” (494). The Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetics suggests Ezra Pound’s “In a Station of the Metro” as an example 
of the technique (Burt), while Edward Morris provides the simpler: “The sun is shining. 
Julius Caesar was killed on the Ides of March” (117). By placing together two sentences 
or ideas that appear unrelated, this technique “disrupt[s] and fragment[s] conventional 
sequencing, causality, and perspective” (Friedman 494), and because of this, Burt 
proposes that it “lends itself naturally to the rush and chaos of life as it is lived in the 
immediate first-person.” He no doubt proposes this connection because parataxis conveys 
a sense of urgency, as if the author or narrator did not have enough time to develop these 
connections.  
Morris takes his definition of the technique further by suggesting that it “is an 
indication of mental disorder” (117).  
[T]he normal mind, upon hearing two such sentences uttered together, 
instinctively gropes about for some situation, fanciful or humorous or grotesque, 
which will afford a glimpse of a rational connection between the two; so strong is 
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the habit of associating mere succession with relation…there is no such 
independence between successive groups of concepts. (117) 
Taking his definition to this extreme points yet again to the very close relationship 
between modern life and cognitive disorder. When confronted with parataxis, normates 
will seek connection between the seemingly disparate elements, whereas he suggests that 
those affected by cognitive disorders will not engage in this search, merely accepting 
parataxis at face value. Yet, defining parataxis as an act of juxtaposition and its elements 
as fragments produces just this result, refusing to acknowledge the very real possibility 
that they may be connected—however obscure this connection may be. Only 
“conventional sequencing” is fragmented, not sequencing altogether.   
Despite our understanding of parataxis, many critics take this surface at face 
value. For instance, in their entry on modern poetic innovations, Robert Hampson and 
Will Montgomery suggest that “the lasting power of The Cantos derives precisely from 
the failure to achieve closure and the engagement, instead, with uncertainty through the 
devices it deploys—the poetics of ellipsis and fragment, the suggestive collisions of the 
ideogrammatic method, and the speaking through citation and the voices of others” (76). 
In their assessment, these critics invoke the figure of the fragment to suggest that 
modernism paradoxically succeeds by failing, failing to achieve the closure provided by 
conventional literary forms. Such a negative reading is typical of modernist literary 
criticism, an approach that no doubt owes a debt to Friedrich Nietzsche and the negative 
dialectics of Theodor Adorno. Though they acknowledge the “uncertainty” fostered by 
modernist texts, they use critical language that forecloses the possibility that closure may 
be achieved—a possibility that these texts keep alive.  
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To capture the “uncertainty” that Hampson and Montgomery describe above, 
modernism often uses both its story and poetic composition to “interrupt the modernity 
that we live and understand as a social, if not ‘normal,’ way of life” (Eysteinsson 
6). Texts like Eliot’s The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock (1915) expose the constructed 
nature of the social world and the anxiety it causes many people. Reading modernist texts 
as fragmented also aligns with the conventional reading of the modern social subject as 
isolated from other bodies and lacking the relationships (interpersonal connections) that a 
body should have. Such interpretations focus on what these bodies do not have or do, the 
ways in which they differ from normates; therefore, one could argue that such texts 
present subjects disabled by the environment in which they live. In these texts, the normal 
stops being normal; familiar environments and people become radically unfamiliar, 
defying protagonists’ attempts to process them. Correspondingly, the poetics of such 
texts disables readers so that they may be more receptive to this kind of position. 
Treating modernism and/or modernity as a “radical rupture,” in Friedman’s 
words, or as an interruption, in Eysteinsson’s, requires that they be located in opposition 
to something other. There is little consensus regarding the “nature of the revolt” 
(Eysteinsson 2), though the amorphous concept of tradition typically stands in as 
modernism’s antagonist. Eysteinsson sees this as “the hall mark of modernism, the one 
feature that seems capable of lending the concept a critical coherence” (52). Such an 
oppositional framework retroactively positions tradition as a continuous and coherent 
entity, though this term can adapt to accommodate many different contexts. Literary 
realism often serves as a more specific adversary, no doubt due in part to the influence of 
Georg Lukacs’s “The Ideology of Modernism” (1957). Defining modernism through its 
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opposition to tradition or to literary movements as diverse as realism again positions it as 
organized around negative principles—what it is not rather than what it is or does. 
As concepts, tradition and the normal exist because they “den[y their] own 
production as a historical formation,” in the same way that Friedman argues that 
modernity does (504). “[T]he center” of such concepts—like the center of the literary 
texts under analysis in this chapter—“is scattered, interactive, and multiple” (507). 
Attempts to consolidate such concepts again reveal the same kinds of issues raised about 
Frith’s theory of weak central coherence. Coherence requires that certain elements be 
overlooked. Though “the (self)consciousness of modernity” may appear to “refus[e] the 
principle of historical continuity and evolution in its insistence on origin, newness, and 
revolution,” as Friedman suggests, that does not mean the texts themselves are 
discontinuous or that they are disconnected from history (504). In fact, they develop 
alternative forms of continuity that ground them historically in a way that suggests their 
relationship with tradition to be much more complex than a mere rejection or refusal. 
This chapter takes a different approach to modernist texts and modernism more 
generally, a more affirmative one motivated by disability studies’s rejection of 
interpretations founded on lack. It examines the negative language that has been used to 
frame modernist texts—such as “fragment,” “rupture,” and “isolation”—in relation to the 
structure and content of three texts: T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922), Hugh 
MacDiarmid’s Annals of the Five Senses (1923), and H.D.’s Palimpsest (1926). It then 
applies Deleuze’s proposal that texts in a minor literature be considered “adjacently,” as 
“always in contact…but also always repelled,” to the different parts of a single text—
ones which may not seem at times and to some people to have a definite relation to each 
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other. In this case, continuities become visible, which operate in direct contrast to but 
also in conjunction with conventional definitions of modernism. Though many 
protagonists and narrators are actively seeking coherence, rarely do they achieve it. While 
these texts do reflect the feeling of confusion and disorientation in their poetics, they also 
use techniques like allusion to produce paths that readers can follow; their directions do 
diverge, though, from normative expectations for the readerly movement that a text will 
produce.  
Such dissonance is visible in the definition of “modern” itself. As Friedman 
recognizes, “modern” as an adjective “signifies both revolution and evolution, both the 
break from history and its return” (505). The same issue applies to both “modernity” and 
“modernism,” which are “term[s] at war with [themselves]” (505). To give meaning to 
these terms, Friedman proposes an approach that aligns with Deleuze’s: she suggests we 
locate “a meaning produced liminally in between” by pursuing “a dialogic that pits the 
contradictory processes of formation and deformation against each other, each as 
necessary to the other” (505). This approach requires that we acknowledge the 
“centripetal and centrifugal forces in contradiction and constant interplay” (505), and it 
reflects the commitment to both continuity and contiguity displayed by Deleuze..  
Yet, Friedman is not the first to suggest such an approach in relation to 
modernism; the modernist slogan often attributed to Ezra Pound—“make it new”—
contains within it the paradoxical relation of the modern to the traditional. As Michael 
North points out, the slogan is actually Pound’s English translation of M.G. Pauthier’s 
French translation of the Chinese philosophical text Da Xue. I recognized the same issue 
with Pound’s translation as North does: Pauthier renders the Chinese as “fais-le de 
 101 
nouveau,” which is more literally translated as “do it again” (North, Novelty 164). The 
phrase, however, contains the potential for both translations within it, reflecting Jacques 
Derrida’s concept of iterability—repetitions are performances of the same, but with a 
difference. Understanding this literary history draws attention to the intimate connection 
between modernism and tradition: the movement is not merely a rejection of the 
traditional, but a response to it in which the traditional is repeated with a difference.    
 Harry Levin recognizes the importance of this interplay with his use of an 
example from Picasso’s life to suggest why modernist artists adopt the style examined in 
this chapter. As he summarizes, “Picasso was asked by a conventional person who 
admired his classical illustrations, ‘Since you can draw so beautifully, why do you spend 
your time making those queer things?’ He answered succinctly, ‘That’s why’ (610). 
When an aesthetic becomes conventional, it gains social acceptance and therefore value 
through the connections that an artist fosters with earlier works. Here, Picasso recognizes 
the importance of developing the ability to produce art conventionally acknowledged as 
beautiful before one attempts to break these rules. Understanding conventional aesthetics 
allows him to see how and where he can experiment; it gives him the tools to break the 
rules in addition to awareness where interventions can take place and will have the most 
impact. Yet, such training also suggests that work he produces will always be a response 
to earlier art, connected to it though such connections may at times appear to be absent.  
Like Picasso, the writers whose work is analyzed here are knowledgeable about 
traditional art and have already achieved the conventional by the time they create 
modernist art. Though they seek something new, their experiments are informed by the 
“historical sense” that Eliot describes in “Traditional and the Individual Talent” (1920) as 
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“a perception, not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence.” Though the new 
artist “must inevitably be judged by the standards of the past,” the standards of the past 
are reciprocally judged though the production and reception of his work. In their structure 
and content, such texts recognize the difficulty (even, impossibility) of creating art that 
wholly rejects the conventional, given the artist’s acculturation into this system.  
In Levin’s example, Picasso does not attempt to counter the description of his 
work as strange, and the use of the word “queer” here recognizes the threat that Picasso’s 
work poses to established aesthetic norms. Artists that Levin groups with Picasso, 
including Stravinsky and Joyce, all evince what he describes as a “metamorphic impetus” 
(610). This vague phrase refers to their motivation to pursue the development of non-
normative forms for presenting art in response to conventionally accepted aesthetics. 
More specifically, he describes it as a “reshaping spirit which must continually transpose 
its material and outdistance itself” (610). Levin’s word choice here reveals that a primary 
characteristic of modernism is visible in the order that writers present information. 
“Transpose” suggests that they “shift” material “from one place or time to another,” 
disrupting conventional expectations for how information should be presented both 
spatially and temporally (OED). Such shifts may be visible in irregular syntax—not 
unfamiliar in poetry—as with dyslexia, where individuals may transpose numbers, letters, 
or words. Yet, transpositions are only legible as such in relation to particular orders that 
have become conventional or normal. And it is only in relation to such norms that 
transpositions may be read as “corrupt[ions]” (OED).  
As such, Levin recognizes the same “dialogic” as Friedman did earlier between 
“the contradictory processes of formation and deformation.” In fact, he also characterizes 
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modernist aesthetics as a “systematic deformation” (610). The negative connotation 
assigned to “deformation” positions bodies with particular appearances as less 
beautiful—and, therefore, less valuable—than others. This descriptive term treats bodies 
assigned this label as always already in relation to those whose forms are aesthetically 
valued. Though deformations are typically treated as of worse quality, they only appear 
as such within a particular social and, in this case, literary context. Again, Levin’s 
assessment implies not just that modernist art lacks order but that it follows a different 
order, one that these artists find valuable in their current circumstances. For, in the words 
of G. Gregory Smith, who significantly influenced MacDiarmid’s work, “disorderly order 
is order after all” (5), and only “the breaking of outmoded images gives way to the 
making of fresh ones,” according to Levin (611).  
While the texts analyzed in this chapter may look like a “heap of broken images,” 
they display ambivalence about critical suggestions that modern life contains only radical 
disorder. These texts are radically allusive, their authors weaving explicit connections to 
earlier history or literature into their structure, and this practice complicates suggestions 
that they exhibit a “radical rupture from the immediate past” (Friedman 504). Often 
suggested as one of the forefathers of modernism, Gustav Flaubert wrote in a 1852 letter, 
“What strikes me as beautiful, which I should like to do, is a book about nothing, a book 
without external attachments, which would hold itself together by itself through the 
internal force of its style” (qtd. in Bradbury and McFarlane 25). Such a text would appear 
as a fragment within literary history, an island unto itself; yet, that is not how Eliot, 
MacDiarmid, and H.D. position their texts. Though they display an obvious debt to 
French writers of the nineteenth century, such as Charles Baudelaire, this quotation 
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indicates one way in which the works examined here differ from their innovative 
predecessors.  
Texts like those examined here are more likely than Madame Bovary or 
Sentimental Education to feel as if no force holds them together; the forces at work in the 
text—linguistic, formal, or the experiences they describe—appear to drive energy 
outward rather than to bind its elements more tightly together. One way in which authors 
produce this effect is through the use of allusion. Readers respond to allusions differently 
depending on the way in which authors include them in the text. One approach is to 
allude to texts or events that constitute common knowledge for a particular community, 
such as the Bible or the Gunpowder Plot of 1605 (Guy Fawkes). These allusions will be 
obscure to people outside the community, but they produce a different effect than 
allusions with more obscure referents. The former are more inclusive because the number 
of people who participate in these communities is larger, while the latter are more 
exclusive and less accessible. Another way to make allusions visible qua allusions is by 
explicitly identifying the text’s author or title, as Hugh MacDiarmid does in particular 
parts of Annals of the Five Senses. These two strategies quickly alert a majority of readers 
that this is an allusion, and because of the way in which authors present them, readers 
will be more likely to move forward without seeking more information about allusions.  
Two alternative approaches are to include the allusions without calling them out 
as allusions or to select allusions whose referents will only be easily locatable for a small 
community of readers. Modernist texts like The Waste Land are better known for making 
these kinds of allusions, often dealing with charges of plagiarism as MacDiarmid did, 
because they do not identify the information as written by another and because of the 
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number of allusions included in their texts. Critics like Levin have characterized this 
approach as producing a tone of “uncompromising intellectuality” in these texts because 
of the small communities to which it appeals (628), and some readers find it off-putting 
because of its exclusiveness. Approaches like these foster paradoxical and contradictory 
responses in which readers describe texts like The Waste Land and Ulysses as too dense 
to penetrate yet paradoxically fragmented. The latter metaphor suggests that the texts 
should be full of holes, places where readers can gain footholds, while the former 
suggests that none exist.    
Such modernist uses of allusion have the potential to alter the way in which a 
reader moves through a text. Neuro-normative readers are conditioned to move forward, 
word by word, line by line, through past experience. Yet, introducing allusions in these 
ways pulls readers in multiple directions at once. Readers may stop to meditate on a 
word, phrase, or line that reminds them of another text or whose tone sounds different 
from the rest of the text. This decision halts their forward movement and instead moves 
them outward on a line of flight that is still part of the text but which moves against the 
grain of conventional English-language reading practices. These authors send their 
readers on figurative trips to different time periods, geographical locations, and cultures, 
which sound not unlike the quest for the Grail that serves as one of The Waste Land’s 
primary allusions. Yet, readers conditioned by these practices are still compelled by habit 
to move forward in a conventional way. Here, we see the competing centrifugal and 
centripetal forces that Friedman referenced earlier. Employing allusion in this way asks 
readers to negotiate among different options and make decisions about which way they 
want to move.  
 106 
Approaching allusion in this way contradicts the oft-repeated trope that modernist 
texts move “towards introversion” in their representation of particular characters’ thought 
processes (Bradbury and McFarlane 26). Rather, it shows their intimate interconnection 
with particular environments, though these texts and events to which they connect may 
not be familiar to the readers. Literature written by autists contradicts the same kind of 
belief that the characters it depicts withdraw from the external world. Instead, it reveals 
this diagnosis to be a form of reading, a neuro-normative interpretation of autists’ 
behavior. In modernism, allusion becomes a way of increasing the number of external 
attachments that a text has. Though this method can be interpreted differently, texts like 
the three analyzed in this chapter are explicitly connected to the world outside 
themselves, just as autists are, but their connections are not manifested in a neuro-
normative way. Though their allusive practice can be read as excluding readers without 
the necessary education, it also multiplies the points of entry into these texts.  
Neuro-normates privilege particular kinds and ways of forming attachments, yet 
this chapter recognizes ways in which modernists devote cognitive and textual space to 
different kinds of attachments or different ways of forming attachments. Such 
attachments may be purely textual, as with allusions, or they may be interpersonal, as 
Eliot shows in The Waste Land. Particular environments afford particular attachments for 
people with different backgrounds and abilities. Talking about modernist aesthetics in 
terms of fragments refuses to acknowledge some of these strategies as legitimate or the 
directions in which individuals distribute their attention as worthy of recognition. This 
approach relies on the language of part and whole as a way to rationalize this exclusion 
and to continue assigning value to neuro-normative forms and ways of producing 
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coherence. As a spatial metaphor, the fragment restricts the dimension and scale in which 
readers can think about modernist texts and ignores the many ways texts like The Waste 
Land, Annals of the Five Senses, and Palimpsest reach outside of themselves.  
In so doing, such language ignores the complex interaction of time and space in 
modernist texts like those analyzed here. Levin recognizes that “[o]ne of the determining 
characteristics of modern man is his awareness of chronology” (620-21), and time is a 
well-known interest of many modernists and philosophers, including Henri Bergson, 
Marcel Proust, Wyndham Lewis, Virginia Woolf, W.B. Yeats, Pound, and Joyce. All of 
these individuals had experienced the turning of a century, which no doubt caused them 
to develop a different awareness of temporal and historical boundaries. Chronologies 
function as organizational schemes, and conventional ones cannot capture the 
“paradoxical state of feeling belated and up-to-date simultaneously” that Levin attributes 
to the interwar period (622). To capture this feeling, writers and artists adapt the way in 
which they present events, rejecting conventional chronologies as a result of Levin’s so-
called metamorphic impetus. One response was the Simultaneism for which artists like 
Robert Delaunay became known, which altered conventional forms to represent “things 
happening together” (Caws 142). Delaunay contrasts this aesthetic commitment with “the 
sequential,” for which “the railway train” serves as his primary example. This body 
moves only forward and backward, and to ensure that its movement proceeds smoothly, 
the tracks must be perfectly parallel, never intersecting or even deviating from a precise 
path.  
Such reactions against the sequential were not only part of Simultaneism but 
much of modernism, more generally, as Joseph Frank recognizes in his three-article 
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series “Spatial Form in Modern Literature” (1945). Following the theories of Gotthold 
Lessing, Frank distinguishes the way in which artists compose literature from forms like 
paintings. Artists “juxtapose” elements in paintings so that they can be perceived “in an 
instant of time” while literature is organized as “a succession of words proceeding 
through time,” or a “narrative sequence” (223). Frank judges these organizational 
methods as based on qualities inherent in the media that the artists choose (picture vs. 
language) and also “the conditions of human perception” (224). In its conventional form, 
a painting is assumed by Lessing to take a moment to process whereas a piece of 
literature takes more time as the reader must work his way through the sequence of 
symbols.   
Modernist artists do not respect these conditions, according to Frank, as they 
refuse Lessing’s distinction between a “time-logic” and “space-logic” (229). Space-logic 
relates back to the way in which symbols are arranged within a text, and time-logic 
captures the way in which the observer or reader processes these symbols. Unlike other 
literature, modernist texts “undermine the inherent consecutiveness of language, 
frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to perceive the 
elements of the poem juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time” (227). In other 
words, they treat literature like paintings, spatially, which provides one explanation why 
the two media are often discussed together in histories of the period. Based on this 
revised approach, the elements of which modernist texts are composed are only 
meaningful when perceived simultaneously for Frank; “when read consecutively in time, 
[they] have no comprehensible relation to each other” (229). By eschewing this 
conventional organizational form, modernist literature instigates the use of a different 
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reading style or way of processing information, one to which the reader may not be 
accustomed.  
While I follow Frank in all of this, his proposal that modern prose and poetry are 
“reflexive” overlooks the intimate connection that these texts and characters have with 
their environments. Frank means this in the sense that “the primary reference of any word 
group is to something inside the poem itself” (229). According to this characterization, 
modernist artists turn their readers inward, away from the world outside the text, 
assumedly so that it can be perceived “spatially, in a moment of time” (225). This is the 
“proper” way to understand modernist texts, as objects whose meaning can only be 
assessed in relation to themselves (232). Yet, Frank seems to be overstating his case. 
These texts cannot and do not ever escape the sequential, nor do Eliot, 
MacDiarmid, or H.D. appear to want to, because of the way in which Anglophone neuro-
normates read written texts: from left to right, top to bottom, front to back. None of these 
authors alter the form of their texts significantly enough to make this approach 
impossible. They do recognize moments when sequences like normative cognitive 
processing are on the verge of breakdown. Characters like Raymonde Ransome or the 
protagonist of “A Four Year’s Harvest” are confronted by a plethora of possibilities, 
stimuli that can be overwhelming in their number and kind. Neither readers nor 
protagonists are conditioned to form sense from these stimuli. Consequently, they create 
the opportunity for readers themselves to adapt to new environments.  
For their authors, Levin proposes that his “metamorphic impetus” provides a 
means of “contro[lling] the accumulating details,” particularly in the case of Joyce (623). 
Levin sees Joyce responding to a literary movement (Naturalism) in which “the 
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environment came dangerously close to swamping the personages” (624). The question 
is, though, who is saved by the re/deformation in which authors like Joyce engage: the 
characters, authors, or the audience? In the texts analyzed here, no person appears saved; 
they are all moving toward the state of Eliot’s Phlebas, close to drowning. The texts leave 
us wondering about their fate. None go under—at least, in the course of the narrative. 
This existence at the brink of overload without a complete descent into chaos mirrors the 
aesthetic of the texts themselves. Such precarity imbues the texts with a tension that 
influences the reader’s encounter with them. Their form, which does not wholly reject the 
sequential, makes a solution appear both imperative and still possible.   
The allusive density of texts like The Waste Land, Annals of the Five Senses, and 
others calls the reader to move both outward and inward and then forward together. 
Authors like MacDiarmid heighten the centrifugal properties of their texts using 
techniques like allusion or linguistic experimentation, as with his Synthetic Scots. As 
Matthew Hart argues, the “unintelligibility” of the texts that MacDiarmid produced “is 
not a necessary quality of Scots poetry” (56). The poems of Robert Burns use Lallans 
while still remaining accessible to an English-speaking audience. For Hart, 
MacDiarmid’s “radicalization of literary Scots works to undercut the vernacular’s usually 
centripetal force, making strange a language that had calcified into a sickly residue of the 
domestic and the familiar” (57). Synthetic Scots enstranges readers (à la Viktor 
Shklovsky) from their own language using MacDiarmid’s self-professed “delight in 
words; and the obsolete; the distinctively local, the idiomatic, the unused” (qtd. in Bold 
137). Similarly, the seemingly fragmented form of modernist texts enstranges readers 
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from genres like the novel and the long poem with which they have become overly 
comfortable.  
In their rejection of conventional linguistic sequences, modernist artists follow 
their protagonists in indirectly embracing Lessing’s suggestion that “[n]o matter how 
accurate and vivid a verbal description might be…it could not give the unified impression 
of a visible object; no matter how skillfully figures might be chosen and arranged, a 
painting or piece of sculpture could not successfully set forth the various stages of an 
action” (223-4).  Rather than treating their experiments as compensation for linguistic or 
literary defects, it makes more sense to recognize their acceptance of imbalance, of how 
difficult albeit impossible it may be to achieve such a balance. Accepting the inadequacy 
of conventional forms and approaches allowed them and can allow readers to adopt a 
more proactive (as opposed to reactive) position.  
 
Copula(e)tion in T.S. Eliot’s The Waste Land 
The Waste Land (1922) is widely considered one of the most canonical texts of 
literary modernism, though Levin recognizes that texts this one “startled and puzzled his 
early readers” (611). On a basic structural level, it confronts readers with five numbered 
and titled sections of differing lengths and styles. The speakers change with little 
warning, exposing the reader to multiple narrators without clearly distinguishing between 
them. From the experiences with other texts, for example, readers may expect the 
narrators to have names, but any information about the narrators they only learn 
indirectly through overheard conversations or philosophical musings. Neither the 
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narrators nor Eliot go out of their way to provide the context that would make this 
information easier for the reader to process.  
Scores of literary critics have either recognized or more boldly attacked the poem 
and its author for its apparent fragmentation, for exceeding the conventional boundaries 
imposed by genre by deliberately juxtaposing different elements like meters, rhythms, 
registers, and literary forms without reconciling them. For example, poet laureate Donald 
Hall has called the poem “structureless,” and Conrad Aiken has written of Eliot’s layout, 
“If it is a plan, then its principle is oddly akin to planlessness” (150). This language is 
oddly similar to that used by autism researchers like Uta Frith as they assess the cognitive 
processing styles common among autists. Yet, as the previous chapter demonstrates, 
though conceptual coherence may not at first be apparent, it can still exist.  
With such assessments, these critics focus exclusively on the text’s horizontal 
appearance, which John Crowe Ransom calls its “surface.” According to him, “[t]he most 
notable surface fact about ‘The Waste Land’ is its extreme disconnection” (167). Reading 
these interpretations in relation to Ransom’s assessment suggests that they constitute the 
negative version of “surface readings” proposed in chapter one. These critics recognize 
only the elements of the poem that appear to be more weakly connected when compared 
to other literary examples. They neglect to acknowledge, though, that other continuities 
exist, stretching us beyond the text. Ransom continues:  
I do not know just how many parts the poem is supposed to have, but to me there 
are something like fifty parts which offer no bridges the one to the other and 
which are quite distinct in time, place, action, persons, tone, and nearly all the 
unities to which art is accustomed. This discreteness reaches also to the inside of 
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the parts, where it is indicated by a frequent want of grammatical joints and marks 
of punctuation…I presume that poetry has rarely gone further in this direction. 
(167) 
Ransom locates The Waste Land in the literary avant-garde because of the visibility of its 
“parts” and the absence of “unities,” which it can be assumed refer to the three unities 
laid out in Aristotle’s Poetics. The poem appears to disrupt all three (action, time, and 
place), but it is difficult to be sure where exactly these disruptions take place, or by how 
much the unities are disrupted.  
Such ambiguity is one factor that unsettles readers of The Waste Land—in this 
instance, the ambiguous relation between the poem’s elements. Etymologically, 
“ambiguity” captures the feeling of “uncertainty” when a word, object, or concept can be 
“understood in two or more ways” (OED). The text can send the reader in multiple 
directions, which requires the reader to actively make decisions based on the situation at 
hand. Developing such adaptability can be difficult, even cognitively daunting, for many 
readers. Discomfort with ambiguity and the attendant desire to resolve it is not just a 
neuro-normative or autistic but a human trait. As the previous chapter shows, most autists 
need more time than most neuro-normates to resolve ambiguity within their 
environments. The style that Eliot uses in The Waste Land places all of his readers in a 
similar situation; his choices compel readers to remain in what is likely to be an 
uncomfortable and unfamiliar position, where certainty is difficult to find. Texts like this 
one enable neuro-normates to learn to accept and cope with such ambiguity as a part of 
their environments with which they may not be as familiar as many autists.  
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Learning to deal with ambiguity is connected to the poem’s interest in divination, 
both as a search for (and hopeful location of) water and the future. As Jessie Weston 
recognizes, tarot cards—which are referenced in the poem (Eliot, TWL line 46)—initially 
were used “not to foretell the Future in general, but to predict the rise and fall of the 
waters which brought fertility to the land.”3 Therefore, the future is intimately related to 
the presence (or absence) of water in the poem, though drought typically predicts a 
negative future for communities based on agriculture. Like Gawain, the reader of these 
texts is implicitly asked to continue the Quest despite the fact that he lacks necessary 
information: “whither he rides, and why, he does not know, only that the business is 
important and pressing” (Weston). In several versions of the tale (though not the ones 
Weston locates as most dominant), the land remains unfertile and the kingdom goes to 
war because Gawain and Percival have not asked important questions about either the 
Quest or the Fisher King’s health.4 Therefore, the reader’s active participation is a 
necessary component of reading texts like The Waste Land.  
To see the poem as a whole and not a series of broken parts requires distance, 
which may be difficult to gain in an encounter with the text. Another critic, Hugh Kenner, 
suggests that “the first quality of The Waste Land to catch a newcomer’s attention, its 
self-sufficient juxtaposition without copulae of themes and passages in a dense mosaic, 
had at first a novelty which troubled even the author” (148; emphasis added). Though 
concerned about its reception, Eliot still published the text. Two parts of Kenner’s 
assessment stand out here. First, his characterization of the poem as “self-sufficient” is 
contradicted by its commitment to allusion as a literary technique. Allusions are an 
important part of the poem and difficult to overlook because of the many different kinds 
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that Eliot includes. He selects them from multiple languages, including English, French, 
German, Sanskrit, Latin, and Italian, which appear in their original language (except the 
Sanskrit, which Eliot renders in Roman script). Eliot’s allusions are similarly diverse in 
terms of the genres from which he takes them, including prose, poetry, and drama. They 
range from more traditional—such as the Bible, Dante’s Divina Commedia (1320), John 
Milton’s Paradise Lost (1667), and multiple Shakespeare plays—to less, with the latter 
including the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, John Webster’s The White Devil (1612), and 
Paul Verlaine’s “Parsifal” (1888). Eliot not only alludes to literature but also to popular 
songs like “That Shakespearian Rag” and “London Bridge,” along with familiar mythical 
figures like Tereus, Philomela, Tiresias, and Apollo.  
Because of their number, kind, and the brevity with which they are introduced, 
these allusions disrupt a normative sense of narrative continuity, which moves 
horizontally forward through each line from the beginning to the end. Instead, they make 
other lines of flight available to the reader. The poem is, in fact, a dense framework of 
connections that extend beyond the text itself. To raise neuro-normates’ awareness of the 
different directions they can travel, Eliot must disrupt the typical path they would follow 
to process this information, and the way that he employs allusion allows him to do so. He 
connects the reader vertically or obliquely to historical moments and literary traditions 
that may not otherwise have entered the conversation. This approach is similar to that 
taken by James Joyce in Finnegans Wake (1939), but to a lesser degree. Because of this 
approach, readers must be able to quickly transition between different contexts to 
continue reading normatively, with forward progress. 
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Despite their importance to the text, these allusions are typically only a few words 
or a line long, which further impedes the reader’s ability to transition smoothly. Eliot 
closes the first section with an allusion to Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal (1857), which 
produces this effect: 
“Oh keep the Dog far hence, that’s friend to men, 
“Or with his nails he’ll dig it up again! 
You! hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable,—mon frère!” (lines 74-76) 
From here, Eliot moves into a woman’s dressing room, which leaves the reader 
wondering why he must keep the Dog away—and what “the Dog” represents. If he 
recognizes the allusion from these six words, he is likely to pause to remember 
Baudelaire’s text consider its relevance here. If not, then he will still pause to think about 
why Eliot transitions to French and what these words might mean. Eliot provides little in 
the way of explanation.  
Despite the general dearth of context, Eliot could be said to display some concern 
for the reader in the “Notes” with which the poem ends. However, criticism of the poem 
and Eliot’s own reflections underscore their ambiguous relation to the text. The footnotes 
were not included when The Waste Land was first published in The Criterion (October 
16, 1922) and The Dial (according to Lawrence Rainey, in the November 1922 issue that 
was released on Oct. 20). They initially appeared with the version published by Boni & 
Liveright in December of 1922. In assessing their relation to the text, Michael North 
argues that “[s]ome of these notes…are so blandly pointless as to suggest a hoax, and 
others….seem determined to establish mysteries rather than to dispel them.5 In any case, 
the notes themselves need as much annotation as the poem they pretend to explain” 
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(“Preface,” ix). Eliot himself remained ambivalent about their value, writing in “The 
Frontiers of Criticism,” “the poem was inconveniently short, so I set to work to expand 
the notes, in order to provide a few more pages of printed matter,” which later 
“stimulated the wrong kind of interest among the seekers of sources” (113).  
This explanation minimizes the relevance of the notes in interpreting the poem’s 
allusions, making room for the reader’s own contributions. Yet, it also contradicts 
approaches to the poem like that proposed by Kenner. For him, the allusions are “relics” 
(178), like the Grail, and the reader, or “quester,” is “presented with a terminal heap of 
fragments which it is his business to enquire about” (172). Based on the content of his 
notes, Eliot seems to be reacting against such approaches, which focus too much on the 
content of the allusions—moving only away from the text and not back into it or forward 
through it. Eliot’s explanation prompts an important question: what is the right kind of 
interest for a reader to display in this context?  
In the earlier quotation, Kenner uses an aesthetic metaphor—the mosaic—that can 
help to elucidate the kind of interest that Eliot may have preferred. MacDiarmid uses the 
same metaphor in reference to Annals of the Five Senses (3), which makes it particularly 
relevant for discussion in this chapter. When viewed from sufficient distance, the many 
small tiles of which a mosaic is composed lose their distinctness and merge to form a 
unified image or design. Their coherence is a perceptual illusion, and it is similar to that 
which allows neuro-normates to see their environment not as millions of energy particles 
in constant movement, but instead as a coherent and stable image. The same applies to 
the perception of a literary text—made up of letters—as a coherent whole, which we call 
a poem or book. Critics like Kenner who recognize the poem for its fragmentation imply 
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either 1) that no complete poem exists (i.e., it lacks a “plan” or “structure,” as suggested 
earlier) or 2) that readers cannot gain enough distance from the text to see the whole that 
it forms. Though the latter seems more probable, Kenner’s use of this metaphor 
contradicts his reading of The Waste Land as “self-sufficient.” If the text is a mosaic, then 
the connections between the elements of which it is composed are not inherent in the 
piece of art, but instead imposed by a viewer with sufficient distance.  
If we pursue Kenner’s earlier alignment of the reader with the quester, the object 
of the quest because that which merits further analysis. Following Weston’s analysis of 
particular knights who occupied this position—such as Gawain and Perceval—(s)he is 
expected to restore both the health of the land and the king, whose futures are 
intertwined. The object of his quest is not personal gain but “definite benefits to be won 
for others” (Weston). These qualities—in addition to his use of an herb for healing in 
some versions—liken the quester to a doctor or medicine man. Though Weston 
acknowledges that no doctor explicitly exists in the Grail legends, she emphasizes the 
“the curious and persistent attribution of healing skill to so apparently unsuitable a 
personage as Sir Gawain.” These skills and knowledge likely harken back to the myth’s 
origins in ancient fertility rituals, yet they are an important aspect of the relationship 
between the quester and the king that is not often discussed in relation to The Waste Land 
and one that merits consideration within the context of this dissertation. Within the 
environment that the poem depicts, there may be benefits other than restoration, as this 
goal simply may not be possible. Thus, the poem also provides a critique of 
contemporary medicine and the treatment of disabled individuals.  
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Within the legends themselves, the Fisher King’s embodied situation is 
characterized only vaguely as a “loss of virility” (Weston). Though it has visible 
effects—such as the kingdom’s deterioration—the King’s situation could be attributable 
to either an illness/wound or a longer-term disability, perhaps associated with advanced 
age. Though it seems like a temporary situation, descriptions from Weston and others 
fluctuate in their usage of language affiliated with illness and disability. For instance, 
Weston repeatedly describes the king’s situation as a “disability under which he is 
suffering,” despite the repeated suggestion that the quester has the power to cure him. 
Greek myth presents a similar relationship between the king and his lands that vacillates 
between disability and illness: “The king who is without blemish has a flourishing 
kingdom, the king who is maimed has a kingdom diseased like himself, thus the Spartans 
were warned by an oracle to beware of a ‘lame reign’” (Weston). While “lame” and 
“maimed” are both associated with disability, “illness” is not. Unlike illnesses or wounds, 
disabilities cannot be cured; they are embodied positions that are treated as disadvantages 
within particular social, cultural, and geographical contexts. Though this fluctuation may 
merely reflect past conflation of disability and illness, treating the king’s situation as a 
disability allows the reader/quester to leave behind restoration as the ultimate goal.  
 Evidence for approaching the Fisher King as disabled in The Waste Land 
includes a description by a narrator in the third section, who specifically characterizes his 
brother the Fisher King as a “wreck” (Eliot, TWL line 191). This word choice illustrates 
an important connection between embodiment and the form of the poem. In keeping with 
the poem’s nautical and water themes, “wreck” can refer either to “goods cast ashore 
from a shipwreck” or to the remains of the ship itself, “a vessel broken, ruined, or totally 
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disabled by being driven on rocks, cast ashore, or stranded” (OED). The OED definition 
explicitly recognizes this word’s connection to disability because a wreck is “helpless,” 
unable to move in its current environment without assistance from others (OED). Both 
are “remains” that have been “ruined” by conditions of their environments (Online 
Etymology Dictionary); they are leftovers, often treated as useless trash. Unfortunately, 
disabled individuals often find themselves in such situations today, treated as wrecks 
beyond salvage.   
This passage connects to the poem’s end, where the narrator considers his own 
death or a radical transformation akin to it. He aligns himself with other “wrecks,” 
structures in danger of imminent collapse: the London Bridge and la tour abolie. He 
considers how much he should do prepare for it but also what he has already done; 
specifically, he tells us, “These fragments I have shored against my ruins” (Eliot, TWL 
line 430). Typically, one would use a strong body to “shore up” another, as a timber 
would the side of a ship; however, the narrator characterizes his support as ununified 
“fragments.” This word choice calls into question from the beginning the quality of the 
support they provide. Though he could be attempting to prevent himself from becoming a 
wreck like his brother, the plural of “ruin” suggests that he already is one. He figures his 
body here as a broken, decaying entity that is slowly losing its integrity, and recognizes 
that his attempts to preserve its integrity are likely futile.  
If we consider all people as ships floating on water, then they will all become 
wrecks or ruins in an environment without water, such as the one The Waste Land 
depicts. The Fisher King’s title connects back to the theme repeated throughout the poem, 
“that all life comes from the water” (Weston); however, the poem reminds us that water 
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also brings death, either when there is too much (Phlebas) or too little (drought) of it. 
What is necessary is some kind of balance. The narrator of the first section continues to 
hope that the planted corpses “will…bloom this year” (line 72), that the land will 
rejuvenate; however, there seems to be no question that we can fix these bodies, make 
them beautiful again, as “bloom” suggests. The Fisher King is the “guardian of the 
Grail,” according to Weston; thus, he is affiliated with great knowledge, as was the 
Salmon of Wisdom in Irish and Welsh myth. If we approach the king’s situation as a 
disability, then the Grail may represent something other than cure for the King and his 
land. It may be knowledge about how to live in this environment and adapt to its 
conditions.  
Such knowledge may also help us to read the poem, whose form has been related 
to the historical conditions of the time by both Kenner and Edmund Wilson, among many 
others. For instance, Kenner suggests that the poem’s aesthetic is related conceptually to 
the “fragmented present” (Kenner 159). Wilson more explicitly relates the poem’s 
supposed “lack of structural unity” (“The Poetry,” 144) to the conditions of twentieth-
century life: “In our post-War world of shattered institutions, strained nerves and 
bankrupt ideals, life no longer seems serious or coherent—we have no belief in the things 
we do and consequently we have no heart for them” (Wilson, Axel 86). The Waste Land 
supposedly reflects this incoherence, and the disillusionment Wilson outlines is 
manifested in Eliot’s decision not to adhere to a single literary form or literary tradition.  
While they are right to acknowledge the poem’s connection to historical 
conditions, the way in which they make this connection would benefit from a 
reassessment.  In “The Metaphysical Poets” (1921), he suggests that “poets in our 
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civilization, as it exists at present, must be difficult. Our civilization comprehends great 
variety and complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined 
sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and 
more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if 
necessary, language into his meaning” (126; italics in original). In this passage, Eliot 
recognizes the processing power that neuro-normates have developed to succeed in 
modern environments, adapting to deal with ever-greater demands. They are widening 
their lens to incorporate all manner of stimuli, a movement tied to Eliot’s proposal in 
“Ulysses, Order, and Myth” (1923) that the current age has “lost all form” (130). The 
clear delineations between objects and situations have fallen away so that they are more 
difficult to confine within conventional boundaries (i.e., genre). As a result, Eliot argues 
that “something stricter” than the novel is necessary (130), and he explores how he can 
disable language as it existed during the moment in which he was writing.  
The Waste Land accommodates these seemingly contradictory aesthetic strategies. 
As many readers would argue, it is more difficult to process because it moves in multiple 
directions at once. One way to interpret Eliot’s call for strictness is as a move toward a 
narrower perspective, and The Waste Land presents a series of perspectives that appear 
narrow when viewed from one dimension yet expand into others. Their scope is limited 
in that readers do not have much of the information that they might expect when reading 
a poetic narrative. Yet, the poem is more comprehensive in terms of the allusions that it 
makes. Despite the negative neuro-normative connotation ascribed to narrowness, The 
Waste Land reveals the benefits of limiting conventional information, but also the 
difficulty that it poses to neuro-normative processing styles. The Waste Land may not 
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look unified according to conventional standards, but it presents a plurality of unities 
instead. Eliot uses strategies like allusion to interrupt the conventional ways in which 
narratives unfold, sending readers outward though they may still strive to move forward. 
This method calls into question the perceptual coherence that those relying on a neuro-
normative cognitive style likely assume exists as an inherent property of their 
environments.  
Readers may feel more impelled to pursue connections that take them outward 
rather than forward because The Waste Land slows the time that it takes neuro-normates 
to transition between different stimuli (which, in the case of the poem, can be words, 
lines, or sections). As a result, it creates space for a stage of perception of which neuro-
normates are typically not conscious. From this perspective, Ransom is right to suggest 
that Eliot “assails the philosophical or cosmical principles under which we form the usual 
images of reality” (Ransom 168). In this space, sensations that may in other contexts 
appear innocuous easily become overwhelming because the reader is unable to introduce 
the distance necessary to see the image on the mosaic. This stage can be uncomfortable 
for neuro-normates used to moving forward without impediment. By removing the 
textual elements or information that facilitates such movement in other texts, Eliot—like 
the other authors in this chapter—prevents readers from moving too quickly past this 
stage. Thus, they experience perceptual situations more familiar to autists, based on the 
texts discussed in the previous chapter. One of the poem’s profound innovations lies in its 
attempt to counteract readers’ cognitive predispositions, which influence their perceptual 
habits.   
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This situation contributes to fear that The Waste Land can induce, which also 
comes from the interpretive action required of both the narrators and the readers. These 
individuals are accustomed to following a path already laid by their cognitive structures, 
but in this text, they must sort a pile of confusing sensations to find the metaphorical 
needle in the haystack for which Romkema was searching earlier. Turning again to “The 
Metaphysical Poets,” Eliot contrasts typical readers whose “experience is chaotic, 
irregular, fragmentary” with that of a poet, whose “mind is perfectly equipped for its 
work, it is constantly amalgamating disparate experience” (125). Interpreting a text calls 
readers to think like poets, to see the image in the mosaic even when it is difficult to gain 
the necessary distance. This task becomes more difficult when confronting texts like The 
Waste Land, which maximizes the amount of effort required from readers.  
Other authors consider it the task of the poet to organize these parts, minimizing 
the amount of effort required for comprehension. Yet, The Waste Land urges readers to 
move in directions that are likely to counter their cognitive predispositions. They will feel 
pulled to move both forward and outward at the same time. This formal strategy can 
create what biographer Lyndall Gordon has called “a psychological hell in which 
someone is quite alone” because of the effort required for many people to engage in this 
process (72). Such cognitive tension may even create the appearance that a reader is 
disinterested in the surrounding environment because of the intensity required.  
The Waste Land openly recognizes the fear that these conditions can induce in 
stanza two, where the narrator says to “the son of man,”  
Only  
There is shadow under this red rock,  
 125 
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock), 
And I will show you something different from either 
Your shadow at morning striding behind you  
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you; 
I will show you fear in a handful of dust. (lines 24-30) 
Because Eliot uses such a general descriptor for the narrator’s interlocutor, this section 
presents an opportunity for the reader to become aware of the effect time has on her 
body. A shadow is a rough representation of a body hit by light, and its shape changes 
depending on the time of day and the body’s position in relation to the light source (here, 
the sun). The fear that the narrator offers here is connected to the movement of shadows, 
which chart time passing throughout the day. Shadows more generally connote death, and 
the dust no doubt symbolizes the addressee’s mortality. To survive under the harsh sun, 
the reader must learn when and where to take shelter.  
The knowledge that the narrator offers may help to prepare the reader for the 
future. “Fear” has an etymological connection that is relevant in this context. Its relation 
to “ambush” suggests that one may fear more that which one does not see coming or 
which catches one by surprise (OED). This knowledge may provide the same kind of 
protection against future events as the “red rock,” whose protection the narrator invites 
the reader to share. One typically becomes fearful in response to danger, but more 
literally, one could question what there is to be afraid of in “a handful of dust”? Thus, 
fear has the potential to both disable and empower.   
As in MacDiarmid’s “Café Scene”—discussed in the next section—many 
characters presented in The Waste Land are confronted by intense sensations that have 
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the power to injure them. For example, the “son of man” must listen to the overwhelming 
sound of the cricket, which—like the sun—“gives…no relief,” because he lacks “shelter” 
(lines 20, 23). The first narrator in the second section and his wife are also vulnerable to 
sensory flooding because of their “bad” “nerves” and “lidless eyes,” shelter that their 
bodies cannot provide (lines 111, 138). Their brains fill with sensations—“noise” and 
popular songs, respectively (line 117)—which spill out onto the page. Such sensory 
overload leads to cognitive inundation, and characters throughout The Waste Land are 
flooded with stimuli as were the lungs of Phlebas, the “drowned Phoenician Sailor” (lines 
312, 47). Like many autists, these characters find it difficult to breathe among “strange 
synthetic perfumes / [that…] troubled, confused / And drowned the sense in odours” 
(lines 87-89). Because of this information overload, these characters are like the tree 
introduced in the first section of the poem whose roots cannot establish a firm and 
nourishing foundation in this world’s “stony rubbish” (line 20). They must found 
themselves in ground that seems inhospitable to life, as does this reality whose sensations 
constantly overwhelm the body’s defenses and whose elements may feel disconnected. 
To exist, much less “grow” (line 19), the tree must adapt to its circumstances.    
Such non-normative relations are also visible in the interpersonal connections 
depicted in this poem. Eliot repeatedly portrays individuals in close physical proximity 
who encounter impasses in communication, from the Hyacinth girl’s companion, who 
“could not / Speak” to her (line 38), to the Londoners that walk past each other without 
interacting. A similar missed connection appears most obviously in the interactions 
between the husband and wife presented in “A Game of Chess.” Because her “nerves are 
bad,” she asks him, “Stay with me. / Speak to me,” perhaps to help make sense of the 
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sensations that she experiences (lines 111-112). She assumes that physical proximity will 
facilitate communication and thus intimacy, but it doesn’t; his silence frustrates her, even 
as she commands him to “Speak” (line 112). Such interactions read as failures of 
communication that lead some to wonder, as the narrator’s wife does, “Are you alive, or 
not? Is there nothing in your head?” (line 126). These silenced characters have an 
obvious connection to Philomela, a painting of whom sits over the mantle in their home. 
Though their tongues have not literally been cut out, their apparent inability to speak 
(which can also be read, as with autists, as a lack of interest in communication) weakens 
the connection between them.6 
In such cases, these characters may remain silent because they have so many 
sensations to process that it limits their perceptual fields. Since the Enlightenment, vision 
has held primacy over other senses as a means of perceiving and comprehending one’s 
environment. Not surprisingly, it plays an important sensory role in The Waste Land. For 
example, among the Londoners walking the street in “The Burial of the Dead,” only 
“Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled, / And each man fixed his eyes before his feet” 
(lines 64-65). They either do not or cannot engage visually with each other via eye 
contact, an act that signals to neuro-normates that a person is available for 
communication. Therefore, no conversation takes place, even if the narrator encounters 
someone he knows. Similarly, Eliot connects the silence of the Hyacinth girl’s 
companion to the fact that his “eyes failed” (line 39). Though it is not explicit, the 
narrator’s response suggests that he was overwhelmed by what he saw, a state similar to 
that produced by the “lidless eyes” of the husband and wife playing chess (line 138). 
Seeing too much—either stimuli too emotionally charged or too numerous to process—
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impedes the production of knowledge and its subsequent communication. Thus, the wife 
accuses her husband of the same failing that the Hyacinth girl’s companion admits: 
because his eyes failed, he “knew nothing” (line 40).  
The desire for such clear sight provide one explanation as to why Eliot suggests 
that Tiresias, a blind prophet from Greek mythology,7 is integral for understanding the 
poem’s composition. In a note that has drawn much critical attention, Eliot writes, 
Tiresias, although a mere spectator and not indeed a “character,” is yet the most 
important personage in the poem, uniting all the rest. Just as the one-eyed 
merchant, seller of currants, melts into the Phoenician Sailor, and the latter is not 
wholly distinct from Ferdinand Prince of Naples, so all the women are one 
woman, and the two sexes meet in Tiresias. What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the 
substance of the poem. (23n218)  
If we take Eliot at his word,8 the figure that joins the various parts of the poem is one that 
mixes two forms of being, man and woman. Such a doubled center presents another way 
in which this text defies conventional modes of unification,9 and it evokes Susan Stanford 
Friedman’s earlier description of “the center” of modernity: “scattered, interactive, and 
multiple” (507). The one person in the poem who should be able to see clearly “throbs 
between two lives” that are tied to particular bodies, existing in a state of constant 
adaptation as they try to reconcile the diverse perspectives available to them (Eliot, TWL 
23n218). This example provides support for Ransom’s argument that Eliot has written the 
poem “as if it were the function of art to break down the usual singleness of the artistic 
image, and then to attack the integrity of the individual fragments” (167). Eliot 
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destabilizes the poem’s center just as he does the unity of his characters’ perceptions and 
the characters themselves.  
These altered connections also manifest themselves in the acts of copulation that 
the poem depicts. I follow Hugh Kenner’s rhetorical lead, using the word “copulation” to 
include different kinds of connections under the same term. Though copulation’s sexual 
connotation takes precedence today, it more generally reflects the joining of two 
bodies—whether they are words, ideas, or something other. From Weston, we know that 
the Fisher King experiences a “loss of virility,” but The Waste Land is suffused with sex. 
Yet, acts of sexual copulation are as non-normative—or, perhaps, unromantic—as the 
logical and stylistic copulae. For instance, the narrator cannot understand Lil’s recoil 
from the idea of sex with her husband, asking her incredulously, “What you get married 
for if you don’t want children?” (164).10 These two bodies (Lil’s and her husband’s) 
appear to have little connection to each other beyond their shared history and physical 
proximity. Even though Lil’s husband still “wants a good time,” he “can’t bear to look at 
[her]” (lines 146, 148). Such examples indicate that neither interpersonal interest nor 
emotion is a necessary ingredient to pursue and achieve this act. Physical proximity is 
often assumed to bring intimacy—not just with people, but also with the words and ideas 
that constitute a poem—and Eliot displays throughout The Waste Land that this is not 
necessarily the case.  
The interaction between “the young man carbuncular” and the typist provides 
another example of such an interaction (line 231). His attentions are “unreproved, if 
undesired” (line 238); the typist says neither yes nor no, simply allowing events to unfold 
as they will. Rather than being turned off by her “indifference,” the young man “makes a 
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welcome of [it]” (line 242). Afterwards, she is “[h]ardly aware of her departed lover,” not 
showing that the encounter has affected her in any significant way, other than being “glad 
it’s over” (lines 250, 252). Such disinterest appears again from the perspective of the 
husband engaging with his wife in “A Game of Chess,” discussed earlier. The reader may 
not be able to understand why the typist engages with the clerk or why the narrator does 
not or cannot respond as his wife wants.  This goes to show again that the motivation for 
particular connections, what they yield for each party, is more often than not illegible 
without sustained consideration and interaction.    
One force that often serves to connect bodies that are not otherwise is water, a 
constant presence (often by virtue of its absence) in The Waste Land. Water flows over 
and around bodies, not unlike light; different from light, it has the power to move them, 
sometimes against their will, in the same direction. Earlier I drew attention to the lack of 
water in “The Burial of the Dead,” and the fifth section, “What the Thunder Said,” 
presents a rocky environment similarly affected by drought, if not a reference to the 
earlier description. In this world without water, even life-giving symbols like the 
“Ganga” are “sunken, and the limp leaves / Waited for rain” (lines 395-396). We are left 
with “stony rubbish” (line 20), “a heap of broken images” (line 22), “a handful of dust” 
(line 30)—particles related only by their proximity. In such barren situations, water is 
replaced by “crowds of people, walking round in a ring” and the “crowd [that] flowed 
over London Bridge” (lines 56, 62). Yet, from a distance, these people “flow” as water 
would (lines 62, 66), forming what looks like a coherent mass. The same applies to the 
previous examples and to The Waste Land as a whole. These are different kinds of 
wholes, ones without the elements that are often assumed to make them fertile (e.g., 
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water, sexual interest). The question remains, however, are they still valuable? What 
kinds of connections might be possible between them that could facilitate new ways of 
thinking and being? 
 
“Polychromatic Chaos” in Hugh MacDiarmid’s Annals of the Five Senses 
Scottish writer Hugh MacDiarmid is best known for his long poem A Drunk Man 
Looks at the Thistle (1926), which was written in the Synthetic Scots that he developed in 
this and a series of other works. This work and others where MacDiarmid uses his 
Synthetic languages are known from their borderline unintelligibility to readers 
unaccustomed to these languages.11 However, MacDiarmid began exploring many of the 
concepts and literary techniques that emerge in this text in the earlier Annals of the Five 
Senses (1923). MacDiarmid himself wrote that Annals contained “the main ideas of all 
[his] subsequent work” (qtd. in Watson, “Introduction” xv). MacDiarmid drafted the 
majority of this unusual text from 1916-18 when he was serving in Salonika with the 
British Army and then in France recuperating from “cerebral neuritis” (qtd. in xi). It was 
not published until 1923, though, after a failed attempt in 1920.12 This history makes the 
text contemporaneous with—though slightly earlier than—Eliot’s The Waste Land.  
Annals contains six of what MacDiarmid calls “psychological studies, essays, 
mosaics” with six poems interspersed between them (3). This chapter specifically focuses 
on the studies because they present a single individual’s cognitive processing, and of 
these, the first three studies attend most explicitly to the way a protagonist responds to his 
environment. They are also denser and more complex than the poems. The protagonist of 
each study often overlaps with the narrating persona, though it is never clear whether or 
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not they are the same person. Watson sees the six studies connected by a single narrator 
who greatly resembles MacDiarmid (Introduction xviii); however, a definite relation is 
impossible to pin down.13 
These studies also displays the same kind of aesthetic tension discussed in the 
previous section. Though MacDiarmid describes each study as a mosaic, the text as a 
whole appears not unlike a mosaic itself. It is a work of art composed of many pieces, 
and as with The Waste Land, the reader must negotiate her distance from it to optimize 
comprehension. Each study—specifically, the first three—presents a protagonist 
engaging in this process for him or herself, with various levels of success. Yet, one 
question follows the reader through the text: if this is a mosaic, what kind of image 
emerges from the studies and poems that it contains? Only the binding of the book and 
the numbers that begin each section serve as the obvious mortar that connects these 
textual pieces. 
The studies seem to be divided into two groups of three: 1) “Cerebral,” “Café 
Scene,” and “A Four Year’s Harvest” and 2) “Sartoria,” “The Never-Yet-Explored,” and 
“A Limelight from a Solitary Wing.”14 Alan Bold has proposed that these first three 
studies may have been part of the fictional autobiography that MacDiarmid planned to 
write (147). Both “A Limelight from a Solitary Wing” and “A Four Year’s Harvest” 
explicitly treat events that MacDiarmid experienced, yet the former is less reflective of 
“the bewildering hopelessness of trying to sort out his impressions and come to any 
considered conclusion” than the earlier studies (Annals 31). Instead, it is the most overtly 
political, presenting the narrator’s desire for social and political “communion” among 
citizens (89). Its events took place first (1910), yet it is positioned at the end of the text, 
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suggesting that studies in Annals are either organized according to a reverse chronology 
or that they do not follow a linear chronology at all.  
“Sartoria” and “The Never-Yet-Explored” exist in a complex and more 
ambiguous relation to the other studies. In these, MacDiarmid leaves the narrator’s 
gender and identity more fluid, whereas the narrator is labeled as a male in the first three 
and final studies. “Sartoria” is a first-person eulogy of sorts to a man named Pluskow, “an 
eccentric aesthete obsessed with female attire” (Bold 148). “The Never-Yet-Explored” 
has a much more disembodied and omniscient third-person narrator, yet the narrators of 
both studies appear to be female. The narrator of the latter—Mrs. Morgan—is explicitly 
designated as such, while the narrator of “Sartoria” only reveals herself as such by 
recounting her memory of a particular “frock of white silk jersey cloth made with a little 
bodies and tiny short sleeves” that she associates with a particular winter in her memory 
(65). Thus, The Waste Land and Annals each include narrators of both genders, among 
whom they transition.  
The style of “The Never-Yet-Explored” also contrasts with that of “Sartoria,” as 
the style of “Limelight” diverged from the other autobiographical studies. MacDiarmid 
presents the content in the former more as a chronicle of events in the typical subject-
verb-object manner, as in: “She frankly admitted that she could put into words no 
conceivable objection to their union. She knew of no bar or impediment. On the contrary, 
she was perfectly satisfied that Jessie was in all likelihood a more suitable mate than any 
other Frank was likely to choose or have chosen for him” (75). This calmer, more 
conventional style differs from the more reflective, less grammatically correct sentences 
of “Sartoria,” or the areas in which the narrator presents remembered dialogue. Despite 
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the more realistic and abstract style of presentation used in “The Never-Yet-Explored,” 
Bold likens it to “the stream-of-consciousness narrative of Virginia Woolf” (148). He 
may be following Edwin Muir’s lead in comparing MacDiarmid to prominent modernists, 
as Muir argued “in the New Age, that ‘except Mr Joyce nobody at present is writing more 
resourceful English prose’” (Bold 147). However, this comparison may simply reflect the 
study’s attention to a female character as stylistically the study seems quite different from 
Woolf’s work.  
Such comparisons contradict the lack of critical attention given to Annals in 
addition to mixed responses from its readers. When it was first published, “Annals was 
well received: the Scotsman judged it ‘readable and interesting…Gracefully written and 
suggestive’” (Bold 147). Additionally, “the Glasgow Herald bracketed the author with 
those ‘modern Scottish writers who are feeling their way to a permanent place in 
literature’; the Times Literary Supplement praised Grieve's ‘novel and complicated 
harmonies’” in response to the text (Bold 147). Later critics, such as Roderick Watson, 
had more complex reactions, describing Annals as “[i]diosyncratic, exasperating, 
challenging, cliché-ridden, utterly brilliant and flawed by turns” (Introduction xv).  
Such conflicting responses begin with the title that MacDiarmid chose for the 
text, which he borrowed from G. Gregory Smith’s Scottish Literature: Character and 
Influence (1919, 33).15 Few discuss the title’s relation to the form of the text, but annals 
follow a particular textual format that seems important here. They are historical reports 
that proceed year-by-year, and though the OED says they can take the form of a 
narrative, Hayden White suggests in The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and 
Historical Representation that “the annals form lacks completely this narrative 
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component, since it consists only of a list of events ordered in chronological sequence” 
(5). Based on this definition, we could locate each of Annals’s numbered parts as a 
representative of a particular moment in time, though as “A Limelight” suggests, they 
may not necessarily go in chronological order. 
When examining annals as a genre, the feeling of disconnection between the 
text’s parts fits the narrative and aesthetic dictates of this genre. In fact, White recognizes 
the “annalist’s apparent refusal, inability, or unwillingness to transform the set of events 
ordered vertically as a file of annual markers into the events of a linear/historical process” 
as one of its essential characteristics, particularly during the medieval period (6). 
Readers’ horizontal movement through each study is in tension with the text’s essentially 
vertical orientation. Such tension continues in the fact that “annals do not conclude; they 
simply terminate” (8). This form captures the “seemingly incomprehensible” nature of 
events, again particularly during the medieval era (10). An annals presents “a world in 
which things happen to people rather than one in which people do things” (10), and this 
description fits Annals perfectly, as the following analysis will demonstrate.  In annals, 
“it is the forces of disorder, natural and human, the forces of violence and destruction, 
that occupy the forefront of attention” (10), and such is the focus of the first three studies.   
From Smith, MacDiarmid borrowed not only the title but also an aesthetic model 
important to both Annals and the later A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle. Called the 
“Caledonian anti-syzygy,” this concept describes an attitude that values the “mixing of 
contraries” (4), the preservation of the tension between the parts that make up a whole, 
such as two (until recently accepted) binaries like male and female (34). The slash 
separating these binaries becomes as permeable as Michel Foucault suggested it should 
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be in Discipline & Punish.16 Anti-syzygies are theoretically similar to oxymorons in that 
to preserve the integrity of each element, a balance between global and local processing 
must be maintained (5). We must understand the shrimp as “jumbo” within a particular 
context. Examples of such paired contraries include “lust…and love, body and soul, 
passion and intellect, beauty and ugliness, matter and spirit, life and death, the real and 
the ideal, God and man, chaos and cosmos, oblivion and eternity” (Buthlay xxvi). 
Smith and others have treated this as an ability particular among the Scots: “the 
Scottish sensibility was characteristically extreme, containing a combination of opposite 
tendencies,” giving the name to the Caledonian anti-syzygy, according to Roderick 
Watson (Literature 5). This ability affected the composition of Scottish literature, which 
Smith argues “at all periods has shown a readiness not only to accept the contrary moods 
more or less on equal terms, but to make the one blend imperceptibly into the other” 
(37).17 Yet, Edwin Muir later argued in Scott and Scotland (1936) that “the ‘Caledonian 
antisyzygy’ was exactly what was wrong with the national psyche, for it would swing 
frantically from one extreme to the other without ever reading rest or resolution” 
(Watson, Literature 5). Thus, this ability was figured as a disability in a changing cultural 
climate. Since Annals was published earlier, the question remains: how exactly was the 
Caledonian anti-syzygy employed or embodied in this text?   
The anxiety-free protagonist of “Cerebral” presents to the reader an image of how 
it might be successfully employed.  
Night and day, city and country, sunshine and gaslight and electric blaze, myriad-
faceted existences and his own extraordinarily vivid pictorial sense of his own 
cranial geography and anatomical activities were all covisible to him, I say, and 
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perfectly composed, without any conflict or strain. Nor were any of the elements 
permanent or passive. All of them lived, and each in perfect freedom, modifying 
or expanding, easing off or intensifying continually. They moved freely, each in 
its own particular whim, and they moved also with the unity of one impression. 
As one thing receded into unreality, the reality of the other and ever other things 
became newly apparent (albeit oddly familiar and repetitive). (MacDiarmid, 
Annals 6-7)   
The narrator here presents a series of opposites whose simultaneous accessibility defies 
rules assumed to govern systems like time, geography, and optics. Neuro-normatively, 
we may assume that the presence of one (night) requires the absence of the other (day); 
for example, to be in the city, one cannot also be in the country. Yet, the protagonist here 
experiences these conditions comfortably “without any conflict or strain.”  
For him, the Caledonian anti-syzygy is easy to achieve. Among these contraries, 
there is constant movement but also balance; he is able to have both harmony and 
dissonance at the same time. Based on his own processing abilities—demonstrated 
here—he argues that “a sense of the whole is the sign of a sound mind” (6), yet he does 
not seem to value only the whole. The elements of which it is composed are important 
parts of this process. Despite this inclusivity, he takes a clear neuro-normative stand that 
one must be able to balance the stimuli from one’s environment, or else one deserves the 
label of disability. However, he also recognizes “that there be many who have it [a sense 
of the whole] sadly to seek these days” (6). Though these individuals seem to be the 
majority, he pathologizes them for their inability to enact attitudes like the Caledonian 
anti-syzygy.  
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The second study “Café Scene,” presents a protagonist in a perceptual situation 
that is striking for its differences from the first. Its protagonist becomes disoriented by the 
intense sensations accosting him, which differ from those that he is accustomed to 
encountering in the same environment. Alan Bold reads “Cerebral” as “a remarkably 
vivid transcription of a mind almost stunned by its sensitivity to competing sensations” 
(91), but this description applies much more clearly to “Café Scene.” In “Cerebral,” the 
protagonist displays a similar sensitivity: he is “athrill with the miracle of sentience, 
quivering in every filament of his perceptions with an amazing aliveness” (MacDiarmid, 
Annals 7). Yet, for him, these sensory experiences are positive because he has the 
impressive ability to balance “the thousand and one other things of which severally and 
jointly he was just as acutely conscious and just as acutely critical” (6). His perceptions 
are “intricate, yet orderly,” not “import[ing] the least disharmony or friction” (6). He is 
prepared to deal with these sensations, which explains why he is mostly unfazed by the 
possibility that “[i]n a word, anything might happen—and nothing could happen (thus 
this fleeting mood!) that would surprise or perplex him or find him unequal to the strain” 
(9).18 This attitude places him in direct contrast to the protagonist of the next study, who 
appears thoroughly out of control throughout.  
The control espoused by the protagonist of “Cerebral” is unusual for Annals, and 
even he cannot maintain this balance for the entire study. Toward its end, he recognizes 
that there are moments when “he would watch with painful realism the break-up of his 
mental life” (13). Then, he experiences a “sudden instability and nameless fear” that turn 
his brain into “a writhing mass of worms,” which any moment may “burst, deluging his 
mind in warm blood” (13). The language in this passage becomes much more violent 
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than in the surrounding text, reflecting the danger such moments pose and the fear that he 
attributes to them. The “[d]isunity and internecine hostility” attending such situations 
“tore him into shreds” (13). This experience of being “shredded,” or fragmented, appears 
to be produced by his inability to bring unity to his environment, to balance the ideas and 
sensations that he experiences. Though he does not locate a cause for such perceptual 
breakdowns, he does worry in such moments that he has “paralysed his creative faculties 
by overreading” (13). In this case, he would have caused such breakdowns himself, 
making him unable to balance the many difference references or ideas of which he has 
knowledge. This is one problem for readers of texts where allusions predominate.  
Annals rivals The Waste Land in the number of allusions that it includes to 
different literary texts. MacDiarmid specifically describes his method regarding allusion 
thus in the “In Acknowledgment” section: 
The old lady described Shakespeare as being full of quotations. So are my studies: 
I having deemed it desirable for the most part to show the psychological 
movements, with which I am mainly concerned, reflected through the current 
reading and cultural conditions of the characters involved.  
As fish are seen through an aquarium so these perhaps strange fish of mine 
are discernible almost entirely through a strong solution of books and not only of 
books but of magazines and newspaper articles and even of speeches. What I have 
done is similar to what is done when a green light on a railway replaces a red 
light, or vice versa, in a given lamp. (4) 
Based on this passage, MacDiarmid sees allusions as contributing to the reader’s 
understanding of a character’s “psychological movement,” or the way in which (s)he 
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thinks. In texts like Annals that follow the direction of a character’s thoughts, allusions 
are an important part of such cognitive movement because they show give the reader 
indirect knowledge about a character’s education, background, and interests. They 
connect characters to particular communities, and in recognizing an allusion, a reader 
develops a closer relationship with the character through a shared form of life. In this 
case, MacDiarmid positions them as the water that allows his “fish”—whether this 
ambiguous noun refers to the studies themselves or the characters, or perhaps both—to 
move and breathe; allusions help these characters to exist in their own worlds and in the 
reader’s imagination. In the final line, MacDiarmid suggests that by including so many 
allusions, he also facilitates the reader’s movement forward through the text at a normal 
speed, as a green light would indicate to a railway conductor. Based on analysis in the 
previous section, however, this explanation may be contestable.    
Though the Acknowledgement section recognizes some 23 authors and/or sources 
that appear in Annals, MacDiarmid admits that he “cannot now trace” all of them (4). It is 
unclear for what reason these sources cannot be traced, whether because he does not 
remember what they were or for a more deliberate purpose. The latter seems more likely 
as the first study, “Cerebral,” which directly follows the “In Acknowledgement” section, 
opens with an unattributed epigraph from George Cabot Lodge’s “The Great Adventure” 
(1905). All of the other studies open in the same way: with an epigraph, though in some 
cases its provenance is acknowledged (71) and in others, it may be a “false” epigraph 
(positioned as one, but actually written by the author, 62). MacDiarmid does not 
recognize Lodge in his list of explicit acknowledgements, nor does he recognize William 
Wordsworth, a reference to whose poem “I Wandered Lonely as a Cloud” (1804, 20), 
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opens the second study, “Café Scene.” It is difficult to compare the extent of 
MacDiarmid’s allusions in this text to Eliot’s because no annotated version of Annals has 
yet been produced. In fact, it only came back into print with Carcanet in 1999.  
These are only a couple of instances that represent a general trend within Annals 
not to acknowledge authors of the allusions that he includes. In the past, this literary 
technique caused MacDiarmid some trouble as he repeatedly faced charges of plagiarism 
with his essays and poetry—specifically, regarding the poem “Perfect” in 1965. His 
approach in Annals differs from Eliot’s approach in The Waste Land first because he only 
includes a few notes, whereas Eliot includes pages of them (disregarding at this moment 
their complex relationship with the text itself). Unlike Eliot, MacDiarmid does allude 
specifically to some authors and works, such as Joseph Conrad’s Youth (1902, 64), 
Rupert Brooke’s Great Lover (1913, 63), and Francis Thompson’s “Her Portrait” (67). 
These instances coincide with places where MacDiarmid sets allusions off as block 
quotations—using textual formatting to indicate that they are, in fact, allusions to other 
works. Eliot, on the contrary, integrates allusions much more smoothly into the text itself. 
Such moments in Annals, where allusions are called out as allusions, may trick readers 
into thinking that no allusions are present where they are not called out—a mistake as 
“Café Scene,” among others, shows (25). Yet, MacDiarmid’s practice of often not 
providing authorial attribution allows the space that exists before and after each block 
quotation to function as spaces for reflection, whereas if the author and text were evident, 
readers would be likely to move more quickly through them. MacDiarmid’s placement of 
these allusions breaks the linearity of the text, suggesting that readers move not just 
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forward through it but outward as well, thereby contradicting his allusion to railways and 
forward movement in the Acknowledgements.   
Returning to the studies themselves, “Café Scene” contrasts with “Cerebral” in 
presenting a more extended moment of such imbalance. In it, the protagonist arrives in “a 
well-known tea shop, one which,” he tells the reader, “I have frequented for years and 
years” (26). However, the tea shop is no longer a place where he is comfortable; instead, 
the sensations that he perceives defy the laws that govern the world he knows: “the tea-
cups appeared to be twinkling with an unusual rapidity and the little circular tables to be 
going round at such an intense speed that they deceived the eye, any eye but his, with a 
seeming immobility!” (22). Such formerly familiar locations and everyday objects, such 
as these teacups and tables, no longer provide the comfort that he expects. Instead, the 
format of his daily newspaper becomes a series of “bizarre geometrical experiments,” and 
he recoils from “the flaming effrontery of a bunch of cheap roses, brutally red! The hot 
offensive dampness of an afternoon edition!” (21-22). The sensations that he experiences 
in contact with these objects defy years of interactions with their like as their color and 
texture gain new intensity. Further contributing to this disorientation, the protagonist 
cannot sit at his normal table because it has been taken by the “Thundercloud,” “a titanic 
figure” of a man “discharging a dark incalculable belligerency” (22). 
Throughout the study, the narrator and protagonist focus on the “vivid” nature of 
the latter’s surroundings as their new life shocks him out of his processing habits (20). 
Everything around him is moving more than it ever has before: the tea-cups “twinkle,” 
faces “leap,” eyes “swin[g] like lanterns,” “corners of houses…split into his thoughts like 
an elbow in the ribs,” and “the glittering unsteady counter” is “scintillating and swaying” 
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(21, 20, 23, 21). These perceptions produce in him a correspondingly “seismic” “state of 
mind” (21): objects around him are moving so much that they incite in him a figurative 
earthquake, which unsettles his beliefs about the world in which he lives. Yet, as he 
recognizes in the previous paragraph, these objects may have always been moving thus, 
and he just may not have seen it. Now, he experiences “countless excruciating and 
simultaneous impressions” because “the processes of his brain [were] obscurely altered, 
the selective methods of his senses subtly different” (27, 21). Despite the force of this 
change, its cause remains unclear—as it does for such moments in “Cerebral”—an 
unanswered question that looms over the text.  
The force and strangeness of these sensations drive the protagonist into the 
position of perpetual observer and reactor. He is left to take them in “helplessly,” “[w]ith 
his eyes starting out of his head” (26). As he remains in this situation, these experiences 
have such adverse effects on his body that the reader may wonder why does he not leave. 
They make him feel “an extraordinary sense of intolerable belittlement…It was as if a 
dwarfing process had set i[t]. He would soon have no more stature than a fly” (22). This 
moment evokes the scene from Alice in Wonderland where she drinks a potion and 
shrinks enough to walk through a particularly small doorway. However, the narrator 
treats this experience not as enabling but as disabling. The protagonist of “Café Scene” 
loses control whereas Alice gains control, a state similar to that experienced by the 
protagonist of “Cerebral.” Such intense and unfamiliar sensations leave the former 
feeling powerless and afraid, in a state of mind where “the slightest incident or 
impression, negligently admitted, might set up unthinkable conditions of terror. Every 
cell of his body and his brain seemed, separately and conjointly, poised on the very edge 
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of an unknown that was both ludicrous and fatal” (23). Again, this state of overload has 
carries extreme fear and potential violence, positioning the protagonist on a precipice—
the point of a breakdown or explosion—from the beginning to the end of this study.  
At the study’s close, MacDiarmid conveys the physical weight and value of the 
protagonist’s sensations using syllepsis. At the protagonist tries to leave the tea shop, 
MacDiarmid writes that “[h]e received his change and countless excruciating and 
simultaneous impressions ranging from a feminine eyebrow twisted into the shape of a 
question mark to a sense of his boots rooting to the tiles of the floor” (27). Again, the 
protagonist is a passive recipient, in this case of both the literal money and also his 
figurative impressions. This statement gives weight to his sensations by comparing them 
with the heavy yet valuable metals of which coins are made, like silver. The comparison 
also suggests that these sensations could be used elsewhere as tender, material offered to 
another in an act of exchange and communication. Thus, it conflicts with the 
characterization elsewhere of the protagonist’s situation as a disability.  
The narrator takes such a position by presenting the protagonist’s situation as a 
“peculiar and unsupportable condition,” language that negatively compares the 
protagonist’s perceptions to those that another person would experience in the same 
situation: the world appears “disproportioned” to him, like an “optical illusion” or an 
“insane aberration” (21, 25, 21). As the last phrase suggests, the narrator locates the 
protagonist as having wandered from the path that neuro-normates follow when 
processing sensory stimuli, which opens him to the label of mental illness. Describing his 
image of his environment as a “caricature” furthers this negative reading by again  (21). 
A caricature is a “representation of persons or things by exaggeration of their most 
 145 
characteristic and striking features” (OED). The protagonist produces a caricature by 
focusing too much on the “little everyday things” in his environment like teacups, 
counters, and the corners of houses, and the narrator’s description suggests that the 
protagonist may be amplifying the extremity of the situation (21). Typically, artists 
drawing caricatures do so to achieve a comic effect, but while this situation may seem 
comic at times to the reader—as the protagonist strives not to smash his teacup into its 
saucer, for instance—it is certainly not so to the protagonist.  
To emphasize the intensity of these experiences, MacDiarmid alters the style that 
he uses in this study: he introduces a profusion of exclamation points, uses 
unconventional grammar, and introduces figurative language so strong it may seem 
hyperbolic. For instance, the protagonist’s experience walking down the street is 
presented thus: “A line between two flagstones on the pavement, suddenly a yawning 
chasm! A cough behind him which gave him the feeling of having been buried under an 
avalanche! Feet splaying at angles suggestive of the most irreconcilable and meaningless 
divergences! A tall man instantly precipitous! A woman’s waist expanding equatorially!” 
(22). The words in these phrases are arranged so as to draw attention to the subject that 
preoccupies the protagonist’s attention, and many sentences in this study are much 
shorter than those in the previous study. Every sentence in the passage above—though 
none are grammatically complete—ends with an exclamation point, as do many more in 
this study than “Cerebral.” The intensity of each sensory moment makes the transition 
between sensations look even more abrupt. This approach leaves the reader in danger of 
becoming immune to such heightened intensity, a danger Nietzsche recognizes in “The 
Case of Wagner.” Despite the protagonist’s seemingly dire circumstances, the unusual 
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metaphors that MacDiarmid introduces diverge so radically from neuro-normative 
experience that they may push such passages toward the comic for many readers.     
MacDiarmid acknowledges such attention to experiences like these, which may 
seem unimportant, as one of Annals’s principle characteristics and one that is likely to 
mystify readers. In the Dedication, he writes, “The greater part of readers, instead of 
blaming us for passing trifles, will wonder that on mere trifles so much labour is 
expended. To them I answer with confidence that they are judging of an art which they 
do not understand” (3). The issue that he locates here is that people may not see the value 
of presenting—or processing—the subjects, perceptions, or experiences that Annals 
treats. In response, “Café Scene” follows up on “Cerebral” by giving these “trifles” 
perceptual weight and showing the severe effects that they have on the protagonist. It 
creates the opportunity for the reader to re-evaluate the relevance and amount of attention 
everyday objects or experiences deserve, and what we might see or feel if we did 
distribute our attention differently.   
Some readers may conclude that this study represents a schizophrenic break, 
which makes it easier to compartmentalize and thereby avoid the protagonist’s 
experiences. However, the protagonist does not seem to feel persecuted by people, but 
instead by his sensory apparatuses. While the protagonist nicknames the other man in the 
café “Thundercloud,” he recognizes that the Thundercloud’s furor is “directed against the 
world at large, it seemed and only incidentally and fortuitously against himself” (22). He 
cannot understand why he never felt these sensations before, though, and now that he is 
feeling them, why his eyes and ears would convey sensations that affect him so 
negatively. Though many of these sensations could be described as hallucinations—are 
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the teacups truly spinning?—these objects are certainly present and the narrator describes 
them as having violent physical effects suggesting that the exploding brain the 
protagonist of “Cerebral” feared may come to pass. For instance, “[c]orners of houses 
had split into his thoughts like an elbow in the ribs,” and “The glittering motion of a 
bicycle wheel had communicated a wild dizziness” (21).  
The state of “internal agitation” presented in “Café Scene” produces a state of 
metal exhaustion, which MacDiarmid describes in the next study, “A Four Years’ 
Harvest” as being “puggled” (23, 36). Those affected are so filled with information 
and/or sensations that more must be packed in with a stick—or else the stick used to 
make additional space (“Puggle,” OED). “Puggled” can also mean “drunk,” which 
introduces an interesting connection between the cognitive styles of the central characters 
in Annals and A Drunk Man Looks at the Thistle. This third study deals with some of the 
same cognitive and perceptual issues as the previous two; however, I focus less on it here 
because it has received more critical attention, primarily because in it MacDiarmid 
describes the experience of a British soldier in Salonika during World War I—of which 
he was one.  
The narrator of this study characterizes his experience in the war as one filled 
with the contraries that those who can enact the Caledonian anti-syzygy enjoy: “[o]n all 
sides the mind was baffled by paradox…the co-existent sensation of living on a volcano 
edge and of being bored to death on a front comparatively uneventful to others” (35-36). 
Living between these contraries demands balance, which as we have seen, can be 
difficult to achieve; the narrator suggests it is more difficult to achieve in this case 
because of their extremity. Instead, the demands of living in such precarity produce a 
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mental state in which the soldiers “became unable to size things up” (36), or determine 
the relation between one event, object, or sensation and another. As a result, the narrator 
is left to cope with “the bewildering hopelessness of trying to sort out his impressions and 
come to any considered conclusion” (31). As the etymology of “bewilder” suggests, 
soldiers like the protagonist are led astray from the path that they typically follow when 
processing sensations, unprepared to deal with these conditions  (OED). They are left in a 
sort of limbo between extremes, confronted by what the narrator describes as 
“polychromatic chaos” (36). 
Based on the protagonist’s situation, this study naturally follows the previous two. 
In the first, the protagonist copes easily with balancing sensations, while in the second, he 
is in a state of complete sensory overload. The third presents the protagonist in a moment 
of calm that follows moments like that presented in the second study, searching for the 
stability present in the first. The reader knows about the prior circumstances thanks to the 
narrator, who confirms that “For the soldier the rush of impressions had been 
tremendous, beyond the possibility of assimilation. The course of events had been so 
rapid and tortuous withal that it had been well nigh impossible to follow it, although 
paradoxically it had often been their complaint that ‘nothing ever happens out here’” 
(35). The protagonist is now left in this moment of calm to try to “assimilate” the 
sensations he experienced, to absorb them into his existing frame of reference as one 
absorbs nutrients into the body now that “[t]he crisis was over once again, once again” 
(28). The repetition of the final phrase emphasizes the cyclical nature of these 
experiences; where there is a valley, there will be yet another peak.  
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While in this space, it is up to the protagonist to find a way to express himself 
again, to escape the “conspiracy of misunderstanding” that the War has produced (32). 
For him, it means pursuing a “reviving trust in a centre of unity” (33). Despite his 
exhaustion and awareness that another peak may soon arrive, the protagonist still believes 
that somehow these extremes can be unified and described while still preserving their 
integrity. He believes he can become adept at managing the Caledonian anti-syzygy. 
Though his experiences have upset the strategies that he used before to produce such 
unity, he maintains hope that new strategies might exist and that he can adapt enough to 
employ them.   
 However, tension still remains between the figure of the mosaic and the 
Caledonian anti-syzygy, and resolving this tension may provide insight into the way 
forward for this protagonist. To fully appreciate a mosaic, one see past the parts toward a 
whole; yet, that strategy does not seem to work in the contexts that Annals presents in the 
second and third studies. Instead of the mosaic, Smith suggests another compositional 
model as common among Scottish writers: the conglomerate. These writers strove for 
realism by creating what he describes as “a conglomeration of details” (9, 15). Like a 
mosaic, a conglomerate is composed of many small pieces that when cemented together 
form a spatially larger body; however, their particularity is preserved to a greater extent 
than in a mosaic. No image exists to blend and thereby usurp the elements of which it is 
composed. Yet, MacDiarmid chooses to describe his studies as mosaics not 
conglomerates, which was no doubt a deliberate decision as he borrows other elements 
from Smith’s text, but not this one. By calling them mosaics but still using other language 
from Smith, MacDiarmid could be attempting to achieve more of a balance between the 
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two approaches, positioning them via the Caledonian anti-syzygy as contraries that must 
be managed and maintained together.  
In his essay “Art and the Unknown” (1926), MacDiarmid writes that 
“Comprehensibility is error: Art is beyond understanding” (44), but this position 
contradicts the approach that each protagonist is taking in the first three studies. They all 
want comprehension; whether it is available to them or not is another story. This 
inconsistency raises several questions: Should our desires when encountering art differ 
from those we have when processing our environments at large? If not, then does 
MacDiarmid support the search for understanding, in which his protagonists engage, or 
reject it, based on his aesthetic philosophy? If so, how do we reconcile the demands of 
these two different situations?  
 
Modernism and the Blurry Boundaries of H.D.’s Palimpsest  
In the first decade of the twentieth century, H.D. was primarily known as an 
Imagist, an author of poetry that used a direct, concrete style to present a single image. 
According to Amy Lowell, this style of writing relies on details to “produce poetry that is 
hard and clear, never blurred nor indefinite” (240). As she clarified elsewhere, in the 
American anthology Some Imagist Poets, “we believe that poetry should render 
particulars exactly and not deal in vague generalities, however magnificent and sonorous” 
(qtd. in Lowell 240). This philosophy influenced H.D.’s first collection of poetry, Sea 
Garden (1916), though after World War I, she moved toward a different manner of 
presentation. Palimpsest (1926) marks a definite break with the aesthetic philosophy of 
Imagism.  
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This text was published by Contact Editions, which was run by Robert McAlmon, 
the husband of H.D.’s partner Bryher.19 H.D. has divided the novel into three sections, 
each of which has a different female writer for its protagonist. The first section 
concentrates on Hipparchia, a Greek poet living in the Roman Empire around 75 B.C., 
and this section bears her name as its title. The second section, “Murex,” introduces 
Raymonde Ransome, an American poet living in interwar London. Helen Fairwood, an 
American journalist living in London, is the protagonist of the third section, “Secret 
Name,” which takes place during the 1925 excavation of King Tutankhamen’s tomb. The 
table of contents provides a timeline to help readers to locate the different layers 
temporally, yet no direction is given as to the relationship between them—either in the 
table of contents or the text itself.  
As the title implies, H.D. uses the palimpsest as the artistic model for this text. 
According to the text’s cover, a palimpsest is “a parchment from which one writing has 
been erased to make room for another.” It is a surface that retains traces of multiple texts 
created at different points in time, though it is the erasure of the earlier text that makes it 
possible for the later one to exist.20 To accommodate them all in the same space, their 
legibility—their accessibility to the eye and, consequently, the brain—suffers. Thus, a 
palimpsest is a text that has multiple layers of writing whose relationship is difficult to 
decipher; they are separate yet connected. Without referring to H.D.’s text, Hugh Kenner 
locates the palimpsest as an important figure for modernism in his essay “Poets at the 
Blackboard” (1982).  
Palimpsest presents three narratives in the same textual space; though they have 
different narrators and different geographical and temporal settings, they seem to repeat 
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the same story. By positioning them next to each other within the covers of the same text, 
she emphasizes both the similarities and differences among them. Despite their 
proximity, however, H.D. makes little attempt to resolve their relationship, leaving the 
reader to puzzle it out. She slows readers’ attempts to consume the text as a whole—and 
thereby integrate it with their prior knowledge—by using its form to raise questions that 
she leaves unanswered. The book’s binding frames the text, giving the impression that it 
constitutes a unified object. Based on this convention, the three parts of Palimpsest could 
be read as sections of a single novel. Its covers would mark the beginning and end of the 
cognitive processing required to consume what they contain, but this relationship feels 
too confined for Palimpsest. Cassandra Laity also proposes that they could be separate 
novels of a trilogy. The trilogy is a common textual form for H.D., and Palimpsest itself 
is part of one (with Asphodel and Hedylus). However, “trilogy” is too broad a term to 
adequately describe the relationship between these sections, and describing it as such 
removes the ambiguity concerning their connection, which the title preserves.  
Deborah Kelly Kloepfer takes another approach, which may be the most fruitful 
for considering the relationship between Palimpsest’s three sections. She considers it as a 
triptych because this text, like others written by H.D., “do[es] not move forward from the 
initial telling but rather back inside it, altering the landmarks but never leaving the 
original ‘scene’” (556). Analyzing Palimpsest as a triptych draws attention to the layered 
and recursive nature of these three sections. This figure elicits cognitive movement 
contradicting the conventional ways readers are expected to move through novels. A 
“triptych” (from the Greek, tri- “three” and ptyx “fold, layer”) can refer to either the 
three-leaved writing tablets used in the ancient world or an altarpiece, a distinction that 
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matters for our understanding of Palimpsest. If we compare the text to a series of ancient 
tablets, then each leaf has the same status; however, considering it in relation to the 
altarpiece suggests that the central story may dominate the lateral ones.  
Though H.D. makes sure that we cannot resolve this relationship, Palimpsest’s 
central narrative does seem to dominate. It takes place in London during the period in 
which H.D. was writing the text, and of the three sections, it deals most with details of 
her own life.21 This information seems particularly relevant since H.D. is known for the 
semi-autobiographical nature of her texts. Also, the section’s title indicates that it is an 
object of great value. Murexes are mollusks found in the Mediterranean that produce a 
secretion used to produce the unusual Tyrian purple dye for fabric. Valued by ancient 
civilizations, such as the ones depicted in Palimpsest, the murex is difficult to obtain. 
This dye became more intense, as opposed to fading, with age (likely because the color 
change in the mucus itself was activated by contact with the air). Hipparchia wears 
garments of this color, given to her by her second lover, Quintus Verrus, though she does 
later reject them in favor of her former yellow garments. 
The title for this section also alludes to Robert Browning’s poem “Popularity” 
(1855), and H.D. includes a line from this poem on the page preceding it, which she 
repeats later in the text (133, 226). As with many of the allusions made by Eliot and 
MacDiarmid, H.D. does not attribute this line to anyone, but she does put it first in 
quotation marks and later in italics, suggesting its status as allusion to the reader. In his 
poem, Browning depicts the poet as a fisherman searching for murexes. In both the poem 
and Palimpsest, murexes serve as a metaphor for the verses of a poem, which Ransome 
spends much of the section struggling to compose. She explicitly makes this connection, 
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arguing that “They [verses] dyed all existence with their color” (226). Thus, Browning’s 
poem and the connection between the ambiguous poet depicted there, who Jerome Thale 
argues represents John Keats, adds yet another layer to the text.22  
Palimpsest is a text of many layers, in the sense that it is composed of multiple 
texts, as discussed previously, and many different women contribute to its production. In 
this case, the word “layers” refers to the multiple texts inscribed at different times on the 
parchment’s surface and also the narrators who have placed the texts, much as bricklayers 
place bricks. This definition evokes reproductive activities like textual creation (e.g., a 
bricklayer creates a wall much as an artist composes a mosaic) and physical reproduction 
(e.g., a hen lays eggs like Ransome writes verses). Within the text, the literal and 
figurative profiles of these women cross time and space to create an overlapping portrait. 
For instance, the female protagonists overlap both within sections, as with Hipparchia 
and her mother, and between sections, as with Hipparchia and Ransome. The protagonists 
and texts also overlap temporally as the third section takes place during the same period 
as the second. Finally, the narrator and H.D. herself overlap with the protagonists because 
the text mixes interior monologue and third-person narration. As in Annals, it is difficult 
not to read the narrator’s limited omniscience as the protagonist speaking about herself or 
H.D.  
H.D. develops composite images of not only the sections and the female 
characters, but also the male characters. Though they occupy a subordinate position, the 
men in Palimpsest are also layered between and within sections. Each section presents a 
female protagonist attracted to a soldier who has recently fought in a war. In this respect 
and others, Marius, Freddie, and Captain Rafton all seem to be representations of each 
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other. They may be versions of Richard Aldington, H.D.’s husband, whose participation 
in the First World War was no doubt fresh in H.D.’s mind when she wrote this text. The 
men within the first (Quintus Verrus and Marius) and second (Martin and Freddie) 
sections are also layered.  
The protagonist of the second section, Raymonde Ransome, recognizes the 
complex relationship that these men, and also the women who interact with them, share: 
she sees a “webbed and beautifully veiled composite picture of three overlapping faces 
and three overlapping interweaving realms of consciousness” (195). Here, the three faces 
appear to be Ransom; her husband, Freddie; and her friend, Mavis, with whom Freddie 
had an affair. Describing this image as “webbed” adds a third dimension to the flat 
image, relating it to a piece of fabric based on the word’s etymology and her later use of 
the verb “interweaving” (OED). She also recognizes the complexity of their relationship 
by describing it as a “composite,” one example of which is a conglomerate. Yet, its 
particularities are “veiled” or unable to be seen clearly. Based on Ransome’s 
presentation, this image sounds like yet another palimpsest. As the protagonists and 
readers strive to see this image clearly, things are never quite what they appear: “[b]ehind 
the Botticelli, there was another Botticelli, behind London there was another London, 
behind Raymonde Ransome there was (odd and slightly crude but somehow ‘taking’ 
nom-de-guerre) Ray Bart” (147). This quotation becomes a mantra for the narrator, which 
reminds her that all bodies—whether art, human, or composite—are combinations of 
surface and depth, multidimensional figures never fully apprehended.  
Based on their cognitive style, neuro-normates will be driven to locate one 
dominant image within the three, as with the triptych version of the palimpsest. Yet, the 
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proliferation of elements within each palimpsest and palimpsests within the overall text 
works to thwart this drive. H.D. places neuro-normative readers in a position similar to 
that of the protagonists: they are left seeking coherence in an environment that actively 
works against them. Any attempts to privilege one part of the palimpsest over the others 
can be only provisional. As with the Caledonian anti-syzygy in the last chapter, elements 
of Palimpsest conflict without presenting a clear resolution; however, the protagonists 
must reach some form of equilibrium to remain functional within their larger 
environment. 
To emphasize this struggle, the narrator of Palimpsest compares the third 
protagonist, Mrs. Fairwood, to a circus performer trying to keep her balance:  
Like a juggler, she considered two regions, two shining and slippery worlds, to be 
balanced carefully, lest one, lest the other topple her over; she must keep 
suspended, she must hold balanced, two exactly shaped, exactly weighted, yet 
mysteriously exactly antagonistic worlds. She must keep, miraculously, by very 
cautious manipulation, her own balance meanwhile. She must keep her own 
balance, like a tightrope walker, by the very use of this couple of heavy balls, 
these worlds, one at either end of some sort of slender balancing pole (her every-
day self?) themselves serving to keep her firm, while step by step she must 
continue her difficult experiment, her prowl. (251, 322)23 
In this passage, the narrator presents Mrs. Fairwood in a dangerous situation where she 
could easily lose control of her body and fall; to capture her precarious situation, the 
narrator combines the act of juggling with walking a tightrope. Both activities are 
typically performed to entertain others, which invokes an audience of silent observers to 
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this scene. Juggling requires serious concentration and motor control, and when 
combined with a tightrope, it requires even more concentration and balance. However, 
the situation that the narrator describes sounds much more like tightrope walking than 
juggling as the latter typically requires three objects or more; only two are represented 
here. The “two worlds” being juggled become the two weights on either end of the stick 
she uses to balance while walking the tightrope. 
The narrator recognizes that the sensory properties of the objects that Mrs. 
Fairwood threaten her control within this already precarious situation. The objects emit or 
reflect light, which could easily distract, even blind, her; their surfaces are difficult to 
grasp, too smooth to facilitate an easy catch if being juggled; and they weigh more than 
objects in either role should, requiring not just mental but physical strength. These 
properties mean that the worlds can easily impede her movement rather than assisting it, 
as they should in their balancing role. When considered in relation to the Caledonian anti-
syzygy, these worlds represent the two contraries that are in tension. This scene captures 
the difficulty of maintaining the balance required to preserve the anti-syzygy.  
Forming coherence from diverse stimuli requires a similar balancing act, one that 
is easily disturbed, and texts like Palimpsest drive their readers to recognize how difficult 
it is for an individual to maintain perceptual balance. Amy Lowell describes H.D.’s 
prewar work as “an art of balance, of repose” (261), but the method presented here 
contrasts with the author’s earlier style. The text itself models an aesthetic philosophy 
that H.D.’s protagonists see springing from the interwar period itself. As Ransome 
recognizes in the second section, “Art wasn’t seen anymore in one plane, in one 
perspective, in one dimension. One didn’t any more see things like that. Impressions were 
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reflected now, the salt24 had lost—they were overlaid like old photographic negatives one 
on top of another” (218). H.D. here refers to the salted paper prints that photographers 
made between 1840 and 1860 using a process called “photogenic drawing” developed by 
William Henry Fox Talbot. The photographer could produce an image by soaking a piece 
of paper in salted water and then coating one side with silver nitrate. The salt, combined 
with the silver nitrate, made the paper sensitive to light. After the paper dried, a negative 
was placed overtop, and then light would activate the chemicals to transfer the image. 
Coating the paper with salt again could prevent the image from changing, another 
important innovation because, according to J. P. Ward, “One of the greatest problems of 
19th-century photography was the fading of prints.” However, the additional salt coating 
proved unstable and was later replaced by potassium bromide or sodium thiosulphate. 
(Ward). H.D. recognizes the instability of this attempt to preserve the distinctness of an 
impression in a photograph by invoking the salting technique. Though for a time 
impressions may have seemed to be singular, clear, and distinct, now they are faded and 
one can see behind them the outlines of other impressions, residue of the past.  
As a textual form, the palimpsest reminds us that a single object—or even, a 
concept like reality—can have multiple, interpenetrating layers with indistinct 
boundaries. The reader can either take each layer on its own terms, as a whole in itself, or 
attempt to bring these layers together, an action that calls for them to be balanced with 
great effort, as Mrs. Fairfield balanced her two worlds. A reader who does the former will 
never see the whole, and though the whole may never be accessible, at least one who tries 
to balance the different layers has made the effort.   
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 Ransome tries to achieve this goal in a situation where she feels out of control, 
and to do so, she adopts a stereotypy that will blur her perceptions. This term’s 
etymological root, “blear,” refers to the fact that watery eyes—as in tears—dim one’s 
vision. For example, water can also blur one’s vision if the protagonist tries to see 
through an “over-blur of autumn mist” (136) or if someone only incompletely washes 
away the ink of a text (as in a palimpsest). This blurred state figures importantly in other 
texts by H.D., including Notes on Thought and Vision (1919). In this text, H.D. describes 
what she calls her “over-mind” as a “lens” that must be “properly adjusted, focused” to 
“bring the world of vision into consciousness” (23). The over-mind can also be thought 
of as “a cap of consciousness over my head, my forehead, affecting my eyes. Sometimes 
when I am in that state of consciousness, things about me appear slightly blurred as if 
seen under water” (18). In this case, water serves the same connecting function as it 
would if present in The Waste Land.  
 London fosters such conditions with the figurative fog that it induces: “London 
did this to her, blurred her acute perceptions so that inevitably at the end of her half-year 
visit…she would let go perception, let go arrow-vibrant thought. London did this to her. 
It blurred over too alert perception, it so to speak, snuffed out vibration of too keen 
thinking” (135).  The blurred-over state induced by the city erases distinctions to produce 
the illusion of harmony where there may in fact be dissonance. It allows Ransome to 
ignore the acute perceptions that disturb her mental comfort so much that H.D. compares 
them to sudden acts of violence like arrows and “lightning” (243). In comparison, 
London’s fog “soothed her nerves, that blurred down, softening odd jagged corners, 
letting nothing so poignant as mere tragedy be admitted to its suave and enveloping 
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depth” (139). Fairwood carries this description of “the blur of London” even into the next 
section (291). As it does for Ransome, this blur makes her perceptions less acute and 
vibrant; thus, they become more manageable. For both characters, it makes the contrast 
between elements of their environment less striking and produces a physical state that the 
narrator of the middle section compares to a “cocoon-blur of not thinking” (136). By 
introducing the image of a cocoon, the narrator recognizes that this state only temporarily 
protects Ransome from her acute perceptions by allowing her to revert to an impermanent 
infant-like state.25 For Ransome, blurriness functions in the same way that it does for 
many autists—it creates a shell that dulls her experience of the environment—and 
listening to a repetitive sound helps to produce this effect. It enables her to leave her 
experienced looking fragmented and not search out the connections between them.  
Ransome produces this cognitive fog by listening for the sound of “feet, feet, feet, 
feet, feet.” The reader of Palimpsest listens to this sound with Ransome as H.D. repeats it 
continually throughout the middle section. This repeated phrase represents the movement 
of people on the streets, a sound that permeates Ransome’s apartment and her mind. Like 
other stereotypies, focusing on the sound of feet allows her to escape from a confusing 
and painful environment. This stereotypy is only possible in London, though, because the 
city and the sounds it produces are interchangeable for Ransome. There, “one never knew 
the barrier of day and night, one never outlined accurately the barrier of summer, spring 
and autumn” (135). This sound blurs boundaries of multiple kinds, not just temporal 
ones: “That pain and that sound and that rhythm of pain and that rhythm of departure 
were indissolubly wedded” (206). Consequently, Ransome exists in a liminal state that 
the narrator likens to “a foggy Limbo and one’s only hope was to be drowned out in it. 
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One’s only hope was drift and obliteration” (172). Listening to this repeated sound fosters 
a state of mind that prevents her from having to reflect on and locate the relationship 
between parts of the past that she finds painful. Based on the etymology of “obliterate,” 
Ransome’s stereotypy literally effaces the past and future from the text—much as a 
writer of a palimpsest would erase an earlier text.26  
For Ransome, then, the sound of feet dulls the past and certain events that she 
does not want to face. The reader learns that “She came to London to forget—feet, feet, 
feet” (140), but in going there to forget, she is also forced to remember. This sound 
distracts her from certain events but it also forces her to remember others: the sound of 
men marching to the troop trains or outside her house in Corfe Castle during World War 
I. It was during this time that she lost her baby and husband.  Somehow, remembering the 
War distracts her from this more upsetting information. Ransome does not want to hear 
or feel herself, but instead, the city and the War. The fog that her stereotypy creates 
makes it so she has to sift through “Layer and layer of pain, of odd obliteration” to reach 
her past (154); to reach the first layer of the palimpsest, she has to work backward 
through all of the subsequent ones. We can read Ransome and many others in her 
generation as trapped on the border between two worlds—the past and the present—but 
“limbo” can also refer to “a condition of neglect or oblivion to which persons or things 
are consigned when regarded as outworn, useless, or absurd” (“Limbo,” OED). Such is 
the category for young people who lived through the War, the so-called Lost Generation.  
It is somehow easier for Ransome to claim affiliation with this group than to recognize 
other elements of her past.27 Ransome remains in limbo partly because she is no longer 
sure what should matter in this interwar world. Her world appears incoherent if viewed 
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from a pre-war perspective, and a major force that contributes to her overall uncertainty 
is the status of poetry during this period. Has it come through the War or become 
irrelevant?  
The extent of this uncertainty turns Ransome’s stereotypy into a drug of sorts. She 
sees this parallel because of the power that the stereotypy has to alter her perception and 
memory. As such, Ransome compares London to the home of the lotus-eaters in Homer’s 
The Odyssey. This “island of forgetfulness” produces “a lotos-drug,” “Sleep fumes to dull 
the perception” that make existence more comfortable for Ransome (228, 138, 243). It 
distances her from what is happening in her present and what has happened in her past, a 
state that is represented by the repetitions of “far and far and far” that appear in the text 
(183). This distance produces a blurred picture because she is too far away from these 
events to see their distinctions.  
The mediated state that London induces in her can also be likened to a dream, 
though she finally recognizes that “London was a bad dream. London was a state of 
paradisial drifting that would become a bad dream if she so further drifted” (italics mine; 
243). Ransome paradoxically compares London to nightmare and paradise, a description 
that makes sense with the myth of the lotus-eaters. She know that if she leaves London, 
she will awaken and be forced to confront the fragmented appearance of her environment. 
When the sound of feet no longer exists, “the clear Alpine air inevitably focussed, 
brought her mind to almost clairvoyant intensity of vision” (140; misspelling in original). 
The mountain air here has a distinctly different effect on the speaker than it does in The 
Waste Land. Marie finds that “In the mountains, there you feel free” (line 17), but 
Ransome has a distinctly different experience in the mountains. Like Ermy’s presence, 
 163 
the air “force[s] her out of her delicious blurred state, to think, think, think, think, think” 
(Palimpsest 140). For Ransome, thinking is restricting not liberating. Thus, she wants to 
stay in London, whose sounds deter her from thinking, feeling, and writing—exactly 
those activities that require her to reflect upon her current situation and the more specific 
relation between the elements of her environment.  
Before her epiphany, Ransome finds it overwhelming to experience the unblurred 
present because to do so she must continue writing—continue her search for the murex.28 
Like Ransome, H.D. was greatly concerned with the possibilities for poetry after the 
Great War, anxieties that emerge in Palimpsest. According to the narrator, “There would 
be poets, there would be poets, there would be poets. Raymonde had even till the last 
held to it—but where were they?” (191). During this period, H.D. found her path to 
comprehension barred, confronted by a similar lack of coherence. In a letter to John 
Cournos written several years before the publication of Palimpsest, she writes, “I am 
working through a wood, a tangle of bushes and bracken out to a clearing, where I may 
see again” (qtd. in Hollenberg 148). Writing becomes a means for H.D. to strengthen her 
perceptions: “in order to clear the ground, I have tried to write things down—in order to 
think straight, I have endeavored to write straight” (qtd. in 148). Yet, her assessment here 
suggests that she is trying to adhere to conventional spatial models, which value both 
straight writing and thinking. She may have been able to achieve success in Palimpsest 
because she eschewed such models and instead created layers of writing that call for the 
development of multidimensional connections, straight or not.   
As Ransome’s section demonstrates, strong coherence comes at a cost; while her 
stereotypy facilitates her everyday functioning, it also obscures the details of her 
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environment and allows her to avoid the subjects that make her uncomfortable.  Ezra 
Pound criticizes H.D. for just utilizing what appears to be a similar aesthetics.  In a 1917 
letter, he comments that H.D.’s current work “let loose dilutations and repetitions, so that 
she has spoiled the ‘few but perfect’ position which she might have held onto” (qtd. in 
Engel 508).29 The word that Pound creates here, dilutation, captures an important aspect 
of the aesthetics at work in Palimpsest. Pound merges dilution (dissolve, weaken) and 
dilatation (make wider, expand, enlarge) to argue that the power of H.D.’s texts 
weakened as she widened their focus. He sees a limited perspective, such as that 
employed in Imagism, as a strength; however, he does not seem to recognize that H.D. 
continues to employ a series of such limited perspectives in texts like Palimpsest. Even 
though she widens her focus beyond the limits of a short poem, she still presents her 
novel as three seemingly separate stories and requires the reader to widen the perspective 
on his or her own. H.D. strategically uses the same cognitive style as individuals with 
autism—weak central coherence, which I discussed in the last chapter—and uses 
Ransome to demonstrate the consequences of strong coherence.  Neither style will 
produce a complete image of the environment, which Ransome seems to recognize by the 
end of her section.      
Palimpsest presents an environment in which both the protagonists and readers 
must labor to locate connections between different elements. Ransome uses a stereotypy 
to increase her comfort and eventually enable her to expend the cognitive effort necessary 
to locate such connections. Based particularly on the middle section, Palimpsest 
contradicts Lowell’s reading of H.D. as “quite unaffected by the world around her” (275). 
H.D.’s protagonists are so affected by the world around them that they have to protect 
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themselves from it. When compared to her earlier Imagism, H.D.’s interwar work appears 
to be a striking aesthetic divergence. Critics have lauded H.D. for her progressive 
feminism, but she has received much less attention for the aesthetic complexity of her 
texts. Uncertainty and the attendant anxiety can be powerful forces that work against our 
productive capacities; sometimes, to be functional in a confusing environment, we may 
need our stereotypies.  
These three sections have provided a series of examples that suggest using the 
word “fragment” to describe their aesthetic limits the kinds of connections that we can 
see between the elements within these texts, which extend out into the world. It positions 
us as literary critics as seeking a kind of closure that is explicitly not valued by the texts 
themselves and their authors. Continuing to use it positions critics as reading against the 
grain, and not in the productive way often associated with the term. Instead, this approach 
imposes a neuro-normative critical framework on these texts, just as Frith and those who 
support the theory of weak central coherence do to autists. Though two elements may 
appear disconnected, a different approach may reveal a connection that was otherwise 
ignored or not otherwise perceived. Reading modernist texts like The Waste Land, Annals 
of the Five Senses, and Palimpsest challenges readers to develop their cognitive 
flexibility in ways that are similar to reading texts by autists like Romkema, 
Mukhopadhyay, Lawson, and others. Though these texts and the protagonists they depict 
may appear at times to be inwardly focused, they demonstrate that such insulation is not 
possible and push us to reexamine established ways of thinking about both modernism 
and autism as diagnoses.  
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1 This chapter includes material that was previous published in Barber-Stetson, “Slow 
Processing.” 
2 Today, modernism has expanded to include representations in non-Western literary 
cultures; however, the analysis performed here focuses on its manifestation and 
theorization in the U.S. and UK.  
3 The “four suits of the Tarot” are also the four objects in the Grail legends: Sword, 
Cup, Dish, and Lance.  
4 Weston quotes these lines: “You asked not of his grief and dread, / So though you live, 
your bliss is dead.” The knight could have given relief but did not.  
5 One example that supports North’s argument is the note that characterizes the 
onomatopoeic “Drip drop drip drop drop drop drop” (Eliot, TWL 357) as the song of the 
hermit thrush (25n357). Critics like Jim McCue have recognized that Frank M. 
Chapman’s Birds of Eastern North America (the text Eliot cites) includes no such 
description of this bird’s song. Therefore, other interpretations are warranted.  
6 The song of the nightingale, the bird into which Philomela is transformed, repeatedly 
appears in the text, language that the listeners are unable to decode (103, 204). This 
sound provides a link between the second and third sections of the poem. More coded 
language is presented by Madame Sosostris, a tarot card reader who communicates with 
one narrator in “The Burial of the Dead.”  
7 For Tiresias’s role in Greek myth, refer to volume three of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a 
section of which is provided in the Norton Critical Edition of The Waste Land (46).  
8 As suggested earlier, the annotations may not provide the interpretative assistance that 
readers expect from authorial notes.  
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9 Based on current gender theory, the center (Tiresias) may be further multiplied with the 
growing prevalence of trans and intersex as gender identities. This approach risks reading 
new theories onto old texts because the Greek myth positions two genders as contraries, 
male and female; however, the continued diversification is important to consider in this 
context.  
10 This line is an important one, inserted by Vivienne Eliot after reading Eliot’s draft of 
the poem (V. Eliot 14-15).  
11 Alan Bold agrees with my relation of Annals and these synthetic languages: “With its 
obsessively subjective concerns, its long catalogues, its allusive technique, the prose in 
Grieve’s Annals anticipates the ostentatiously intellectual verse MacDiarmid wrote in the 
1930s, in the idiom he called Synthetic English” (Bold 148-9). 
12 MacDiarmid published Annals of the Five Senses (1923) in the same year that he 
proclaimed the beginning of a Scottish Literary Renaissance and the year after he made 
the critical transition from Christopher Murray Grieve to Hugh MacDiarmid (1922).  
13 In this section, I choose to refer to the protagonist and narrator (when possible) as 
separate entities, despite the (very likely) possibility that the narrator is (part of) the 
protagonist. 
14 “Limelight” could also be argued to be part of the first group given that its narrator also 
shares similarities with MacDiarmid.  
15 Roderick Watson is the only critic to prominently note this discovery (Introduction 
xix). The origin of this title suggests that any critical analysis of Annals should account 
for its relation to the Caledonian anti-syzygy and MacDiarmid’s use of this concept in 
later works. In Scottish Literature, “Smith tried to define what might be called a national 
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psychology, or at least national habits of expression, as manifested in Scottish literature 
over the centuries” (Watson, The Literature of Scotland 5). 
16 See his chapter on the Panopticon.  
17 He suggests Robert Burns’s wonderful word “intermingledons” as a synonym (34). 
18 “[T]he Russian Duma might meet in the case of his skull and he would take in the 
whole ensemble, hear every word spoken, weight up every speaker, discount the 
particular prejudices of each of his own personalities, educe an aggregate of conviction 
quite unanimous in its essence and airily at variance in its details—and communicate his 
impressions to the Times!” (9).  
19 McAlmon also wrote a foreword for the text (“Forewarned as regards H D’s Prose”) 
that was only published with the 1968 re-issuance of the novel. 
20 Interestingly, in the original Greek— παλίμψηστος —the focus is on the act of 
scraping. Writing would have been removed from vellum by scraping or rubbing, but 
papyrus required washing with water. See Peck.  
21 Like other critics, Kloepfer has argued that Palimpsest is a semi-autobiographical text 
in which each protagonist represents H.D. (572). In her review of the edited edition of 
Palimpsest (1969), Joyce M. Holland describes “Murex” as “the most clearly 
autobiographical of the three stories in Palimpsest” (83).  
22 See Thayer, “Browning's ‘Popularity’ and the Spasmodic Poets,” The Journal of 
English and Germanic Philology 54.3 (Jul. 1955): 348-354 
23 Capt. Rafton is the force that threatens to upset Mrs. Fairwood’s precarious balance 
(252), which she maintains through “sheer nervous force” (261). 
24 See also Daniel.  
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25 Cocoon has its etymological roots in the French coque (shell), which may indicate that 
Ransome herself can be read as the murex of the section’s title. 
26 Mrs. Fairwood is also separated from her environment by a perceived veil: “She 
couldn’t rest there, cold, numbed with that curious texture as of golden cobwebs, slightly 
cloying, yet totally narcotic, soothing, beatifying about her brain, across her eyes, 
almost…blurring the substance of the flimsy coat he had in that amateur-of-textures 
manner, criticized” (315-6). The cobwebs affect her perception much as London does 
Ransome’s. They produce a sense of detachment in these protagonists by mediating their 
relationship with the external environments. Fairwood compares this mediating cobweb 
to the lotus introduced earlier by Ransome. 
27 As a member of a later generation, Ermy cannot understand Ransome’s “predicament” 
because the War did not affect her in the same way: “Ermy was too smug, too secure, too 
wrapped in her own importance. What could such things matter? Feet—feet—feet—
feet—feet. Their generation should have long ago accepted it” (172). 
28 Mrs. Fairwood is also searching for something like a murex: “She wanted to dive deep, 
deep, courageously down into some unexploited region of the consciousness, into some 
common deep sea of unrecorded knowledge and bring, triumphant, to the surface some 
treasure buried, lost, forgotten” (255). Kloepfer asks a question that I also had: “What is 
it, then, the women in Palimpsest are looking for?” (571). 
29 In a related quotation, Pound called H.D. “that refined, charming and utterly narrow-
minded she-bard” in a 1920 letter (qtd. in Reeve 165). Obviously, he serves as an 
example that narrow-mindedness has its dangers. Pound’s narrow-mindedness fostered an 
anti-Semitism led to his institutionalization at St. Elizabeth’s. 
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Chapter 4 
Figures 
 
Figure 1: Spatial representation of a tangent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A sample EFT in which “[t]he participant’s task is to find the simple shape 
within the complex and camouflaging gestalt” (Happé, “Embedded Figures” 1077) 
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Figure 3: The Navon Task, as employed by Plaisted, Swettenham, and Rees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Chwast’s Artist Statement for Debra’s Brain (Nov. 30, 2013) 
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